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Sales promotions within consumer packaged goods markets have been increasingly used 
as one of the main tools for both manufacturers and retailers to increase sales. A decrease in 
consumer willingness to pray premiums for national brands (Steenkamp et al. 2010) and an 
increase in willingness to visit multiple stores (Baltas et al. 2010) are amongst the main drivers 
of the increased use of sales promotions. Despite its popularity among retailers and 
manufacturers, the net effects of promotions are not always positive (e.g. Srinivasan et al. 
2004). Not only are promotions a prevalent phenomenon in the industry, the academic literature 
has dedicated a large amount of attention to this topic. In specific, the literature has documented 
how promotions lead to promiscuous (switching) behaviour (e.g. Gupta 1988; van Heerde et al. 
2004). Despite the fair share of attention that has been given to promotions in the literature, 
several key questions have remained as of yet unanswered. Jointly, the three chapters in this 
dissertation aim enrich the literature on sales promotions, by combining practical issues with the 
already rich existing literature. 
The second chapter of this dissertation addresses the promotion calendar. Although there 
has been some attention to the scheduling of promotions, studies on the optimal timing of brand 
promotions have mostly been conducted at the market level, or within a retail chain (Mehta and 
Ma 2012; Silva-Risso et al. 1999; Tellis and Zufryden 1995; Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004). 
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In Chapter 2, the co-occurrence of brand promotions across retailers is assessed. Specifically, 
this chapter focuses on store flyers featuring price cuts - around which planning of the 
promotional calendar typically revolves - to address the following set of questions. Does the 
calendar of featured price cuts for a national brand across retailers, affect the promotion 
outcomes for the manufacturer and the retailer? If so, what mechanisms bring about these 
differences, and what are the implications? Should a brand’s featured price cuts be scheduled in-
phase (simultaneously), or out-of-phase (asynchronously), across retail chains? Does the 
preferred calendar differ when it comes to gross sales lift, versus net sales gains or revenues? 
Are the interests of manufacturers and retailers necessarily unaligned? This chapter examines 
the mechanisms underlying out-of-phase vs. in-phase schedules, and empirically demonstrates 
their sales and revenue implications in four product categories, covering purchases of a national 
panel of households across eight years. The results reveal that calendar effects primarily 
materialize in categories where the chosen retailer is driven by brand promotions. In those 
categories, alternating the timing of featured price cuts across chains substantially increases the 
manufacturer and retailers’ immediate sales lift. However, when it comes to net gains, striving 
for out-of-phase promotions – the dominant approach among chains – is not necessarily ‘best 
practice’: retailers see the revenue advantage diminish, and manufacturers may even earn less. 
 The third chapter of this dissertation focuses on the decomposition of the effects of sales 
promotions. Where previous literature has mainly analyzed the effect of promotions on an 
aggregate level (e.g. Srinivasan et al. 2004; van Heerde et al. 2004), or on store (e.g. Gauri et al. 
2008) or brand choice (e.g. Mehta and Ma 2012), this study takes a disaggregate approach that 
looks at both brand and store choice. How individual households trade off their category 
purchases between brands and retailers, and how these (possibly heterogeneous) decision 
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patterns align with the effects of feature and price discount promotions is as of yet not well 
documented. The interplay between manufacturers and retailers has become increasingly 
strained, making it critical to understand to understand the role of promotions in how shoppers 
choose among brands and stores, for the effective allocation and targeting of promotions sales 
budgets for both retailers and manufacturers. The primary objective of this chapter is to shed 
light on the patterns of brand-retailer choice in consumer packaged goods categories, and to 
explore how they affect the impact of promotions on the manufacturer and retailer. Using a 
flexible generalized extreme-value model, this chapter analyses the effect of feature and 
discount promotions in a multi-retailer and multi-brand setting, in which households can use 
different decision routes to choose a brand and store. Across nine different CPG categories, 
results reveal that in each category a mixture of decision routes prevails: about 55% of 
households exhibiting a brand focus (i.e. primarily select a brand, and then choose between 
stores offering that brand); the remaining 45% showing evidence of a retailer focus (i.e. rather 
substitute brand offers within a visited store). Not only do these decision routes entail different 
patterns of competition between brands and stores, they also come with differences in 
promotion response: feature ads triggering stronger (weaker) reactions among households with 
a brand (retailer) focus in almost all categories, and discount depth hardly affecting households 
with a retailer focus. As such, especially for less-frequently purchased categories, the brand-
focus decision route leads to larger net promotion benefits for the retailer and, despite the 
stronger brand-cannibalization, even for the manufacturer. Managerial implications are 
discussed. 
The fourth chapter of this dissertation deals with large-scale promotional events. A 
recent and as of yet largely unstudied phenomenon in grocery retailing is the use of “Savings 
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Weeks”, i.e. large scale promotional events in which supermarket chains advertise promotions 
across multiple categories simultaneously, under a common theme, and across several weeks. A 
rigorous analysis of the countervailing forces is currently lacking, and this sets the stage for our 
current research. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions. First, how do large-
scale “Savings Week” events at grocery chains affect store traffic and spending during 
promotion weeks? Do they attract extra visitors to the store? Do they increase current 
customers’ spending at the store? And: to what extent do similar competitive events offset the 
impact of the retailer’s own initiatives? Second, what are the dynamics involved? Do the 
Savings Weeks, given their ‘recurrent’ and ‘recognizable’ character, lead to negative lead 
effects? Do they come along with post-event dips in store traffic and spending? In an empirical 
analysis of 25 large-scale events by the four largest Hi-Lo Dutch retailers across a three-year 
period, we find that the fraction of consumers visiting the retailer during such a promotional 
event increases substantially (by up to 13%) and that, for the majority of events, average weekly 
spending at the focal retailer also goes up (by up to 10%) at the cost of visits and expenditure 
elsewhere. We find the store visit effects to be strongest for non-primary customers, while the 
absolute spending increase is largest for regular store visitors. Due to their recurrent character, 
the events give rise to modest lead effects (i.e. to a small degree consumers postpone their visits 
or spending prior to the event). In addition, consumers have a lower propensity to re-visit the 
store after the promotional event, yet spend slightly more than average in post-event weeks. 






“Take Turns or March in Sync?” Impact of the National 




Sales promotions have become a dominant marketing instrument of consumer packaged 
goods (CPG) manufacturers and retailers. The share of products sold on promotion at HiLo 
chains has steadily increased over the past years – exceeding 20% for several retailers (GfK 
2012). Especially price cuts supported by feature advertising have been found to entice 
consumers (Ailawadi, Beauchamp, Donthu, Gauri and Shankar 2009; Bijmolt, van Heerde and 
Pieters 2005). At the same time, there is growing concern about the net benefits that accumulate 
from these promotions. Even if featured price cuts lead to a large sales bump during the 
promotion week, they do not necessarily imply a net gain in sales volume or revenue (Ailawadi 
et al. 2009, Srinivasan, Pauwels, Hanssens and Dekimpe 2004). 
A major threat for the manufacturer is that – instead of increasing category consumption 
or stealing sales from competing brands – the promotion bump comes at the expense of own 
brand purchases, in past or future periods (Neslin and van Heerde 2009) and/or in retail stores 
where it is not on promotion (van Heerde, Leeflang and Wittink 2004). Although evidence of 
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direct store switching (i.e. consumers changing store allegiance because of promotions) is 
generally weak (see e.g: Srinivasan et al, 2004), promotions may trigger indirect store switching 
– consumers shifting category purchases among stores they already visit regardless of 
promotions (Bucklin and Lattin 1992). Indirect store switching may become more prevalent as a 
consequence of the increase in multiple store shopping (Gijsbrechts, Campo and Nisol 2008, 
Zhang, Gangwar and Seetharaman 2010). Promotions at one retailer are likely to attract regular 
brand customers from other retailers, who would have adopted the brand anyway at the regular 
price, and now simply shift stores (Srinivasan et al. 2004, Gauri, Sudhir and Talukdar 2008). 
Clearly, such shifts in purchase location are not beneficial for the manufacturer: they do not 
increase total brand sales, but only subsidize consumers (van Heerde et al. 2004). In contrast, 
store-switching is essential for the retailer, whose main promotion objective is to generate extra 
(category) sales by attracting consumers from rival chains (Ailawadi et al. 2009). As such, 
promotion-induced store shifts create a tension between the manufacturer and the retailer and 
place the timing of a brand’s promotions across retailers high on the promotion-planning 
agenda.  
According to anecdotal evidence and extant literature (Wierenga and Soethoudt 2009, 
Freimer and Horsky 2012) both the manufacturer and the retailer exert some influence on the 
promotion calendar. Typically, one party (either the manufacturer or the retailer, the dominant 
practice depending on the geographical setting and specific parties involved, Wierenga and 
Soethoudt 2009) proposes a calendar specifying the promotion weeks for the brand and retailer 
over the upcoming half-year. This proposed calendar is refined throughout the negotiation. The 
manufacturer can take into account the promotion times across all his retail accounts; the 
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retailer, though not directly in control of promotions at competing chains1, can steer the timing 
of these promotions by imposing restrictions on the manufacturer, i.e., urging him not to 
promote at rival chains in specific weeks. 
The prevailing view is that retailers want ‘exclusivity’; they desire calendars in which the 
manufacturer brand is not promoted at competing chains in the same week (Wierenga and 
Soethoudt 2009, GfK Internal Report 2012). Manufacturers want simultaneity, because it takes 
away the incentive for consumers to ‘cherry-pick’ the brand between stores. Empirical 
evidence, however, does not point to exclusive use of one or the other practice. More 
importantly, the question remains: does it really matter and, if so, what type of schedule should 
each party strive for? 
Practitioners have been increasingly preoccupied with this issue2, but academic research 
has not followed suit. Studies on the optimal timing of brand promotions have mostly been 
conducted at the market level, or within a retail chain (Silva-Risso, Bucklin and Morrison 1999, 
Zhang and Krishnamurthi 2004, Tellis and Zufryden 1995, Mehta and Ma 2012). A likely 
reason is the complexity of the topic, which involves interrelated decisions by multiple parties 
(manufacturers and retailers), with various objectives that are often not aligned (brand and/or 
category sales, sales volume and/or revenue) and the outcome of which materializes through 
different consumer-response mechanisms over time. This makes an analytical approach 
virtually impossible (Freimer and Horsky 2008), and renders the decision highly challenging for 
                                                 
1 Unless the calendar negotiations are performed by a buying group encompassing multiple retail chains – in which 
case the calendar proposal can include coordination of promotions across members of the buying group. 
2 Based on exchanges with, e.g., Inge Vening, (Consultant (ABS) at GfK),  Suzan Jansen (Business analyst at 
GfK), Eijte Foekens, (Manager Commercial Analytics and Consumer Research at Jumbo Supermarkets & C1000, 
former Senior Manager Market Research at Albert Heijn), and retail account managers/members of the promotional 
planning  group at Heineken. 
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the parties involved. Hence, there is no consensus on which calendar leads to better outcomes 
and why. 
Our paper sheds light on this issue. Specifically, we focus on price cuts featured in the 
retailers’ store flyer - around which the planning of this promotional calendar typically revolves 
- to address the following set of questions. Does the calendar of featured price cuts for a 
national brand across retailers, affect the promotion outcomes for the manufacturer and the 
retailer? If so, what mechanisms bring about these differences, and what are the implications? 
Should a brand’s featured price cuts be scheduled in-phase (simultaneously), or out-of-phase 
(asynchronously), across retail chains? Does the preferred calendar differ when it comes to 
gross sales lift, versus net sales gains or revenues? Are the interests of manufacturers and 
retailers necessarily unaligned? 
To address these questions we build on the research tradition initiated by Gupta (1988) 
and first identify the components that make up the consumers’ promotion response. However, 
instead of focusing on one isolated promotion, we outline how the scheduling of featured price 
cuts across chains – in-phase versus out-of-phase – may affect the outcome for the manufacturer 
and the retailer. We then empirically test the effects in four product categories – beer, liquid 
laundry detergents, coffee and chips – covering households’ store choice, category purchase 
incidence, brand choice and quantity decisions; in the presence of promotions by multiple 
brands, across grocery chains in the Netherlands. Our generalized extreme value model flexibly 
captures households’ promotional response, and provides a tool to simulate and compare the 
impact of alternative promotion calendars.  
Three points must be noted upfront. First, we consider the promotion schedules of a 
given (leading) brand manufacturer. Clearly, adjusting that manufacturer’s calendar will 
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automatically affect the timing of its promotions relative to those of competing brands. Though 
our analysis accommodates rival brand promotions, we largely treat them as exogenous. 
Consequently, our paper is limited in the sense that it does not accommodate strategic 
competitive reactions to changes in promotion calendars. We revisit this point in the discussion 
section. Second, similar to Srinivasan et al. (2004), we focus on sales and revenue within the 
category. Retailers, and multi-product manufacturers, may care about sales shifts induced by the 
promotion in other categories as well. Also, they may ultimately focus on profit (i.e. gross 
margin). Though our analysis is an important step towards assessing such profit implications, 
we will, for lack of data on pass through, only roughly explore those below. Third, real-life 
calendars are often a mixture of in-phase and out-of-phase promotions. By laying out the pros 
and cons of each and empirically assessing them in our simulations, we help managers trade off 
schedules with more ‘in-phase’ or more ‘out-of-phase’ promotions. 
2.2. Impact of the Promotion Calendar 
2.2.1. Background Literature 
Starting from the seminal work by Gupta (1988), various papers have uncovered the response 
mechanisms that lead to promotional gains for the manufacturer (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004) 
and the retailer (e.g. Ailawadi, Harlam, Cesar and Trounce 2006, Ailawadi et al. 2009). These 
efforts yield several insights relevant for our analysis: (i) although promotions lead to sizable 
immediate sales bumps, only part of this gross sales lift represents a net sales gain (e.g. Gupta 
1988, van Heerde et al. 2004, van Heerde and Neslin 2008), (ii) the sources of this gain are 
different for manufacturers and retailers (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004, Srinivasan, et al. 2004), 
(iii) promotion effects are asymmetric: some brands triggering stronger sales shifts away from 
their rivals than others (e.g. Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Sethuraman, Srinivasan and Kim 
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1999, Neslin 2002), and (iv) even if promotions result in a net gain in unit sales, their net 
revenue implications may be less appealing (Srinivasan et al. 2004, Ailawadi et al. 2009, Haans 
and Gijsbrechts 2011). Several consumer and market characteristics can enhance or reduce the 
magnitude of these effects, such as the size of the switching (deal-prone) versus loyal (non-
responsive) segment (Narasimhan 1988, Freimer and Horsky 2012) and the possibility of 
market expansion (Freimer and Horsky 2012). 
 Our research builds on these insights. We analyze the sales and revenue effects of price 
cuts featured in the retailers’ store flyer (hereafter ‘promotions’). Instead of looking at the effect 
of each price cut in isolation, we study how the scheduling of a brand’s featured price cuts 
throughout the promotion planning period, across retailers (i.e. its ‘promotion calendar’), 
affects the outcome for manufacturers and retailers. 
2.2.2. Sales Shifts under Alternative Promotion Schedules  
Consider a manufacturer that, over the planning horizon, needs to schedule store-flyer 
appearances for its brand at a given set of retailers (hereafter, we refer to this brand as the focal 
brand; to the retailers involved in the promotion calendar – i.e. where the brand is promoted in 
at least some weeks – as the ‘focal retailers’; and to retailers that never offer a featured price cut 
for the brand as ‘non-focal’ retailers). The timing of featured price cuts can follow (i) a more 
‘out-of-phase’ schedule (with few overlapping promotion-weeks among focal retailers) or (ii) a 
more ‘in-phase’ schedule (in which the brand is, more often, featured simultaneously at 
different focal retailers). The key question is how does the promotion bump and its components, 
change as the brand moves from a more out-of-phase to a more in-phase calendar? 
Even if the number of promotion events (weeks with a store flyer ad and price cut) for 
each retailer is decided/agreed upon, their scheduling across retailers may still affect the gains 
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from the promotion calendar, for the manufacturer as well as the retailers. To show this, we first 
list the components that make up the consumers’ promotion response. Next, we explain how 
different promotional calendars affect each component.3 
Within the promotion period, sales of the focal brand at the promoting chain consist of 
baseline sales, plus the promotional sales bump or ‘gross sales lift’. This lift partly results from 
shifts within the promotion week, made up of: brand switching (consumers shifting purchases 
within the promoting store, from a rival brand to the focal brand), store switching (consumers 
buying the focal brand at the promoting chain, rather than a rival chain), brand-store switching 
(consumers buying the focal brand at the promoting store, instead of a rival brand at another 
store) and category expansion (consumers buying and using more of the focal brand at the 
promoting chain). The promotion may also induce sales changes in preceding weeks (in case 
consumers anticipate it, and postpone their purchases) or subsequent weeks (due to consumers 
stocking up or repeat buying); this can be classified as pre-emptive brand switching (accelerated 
or delayed purchase shifts away from rival brands), pre-emptive store switching (forward 
buying or postponed purchases away from rival stores), pre-emptive brand-store switching 
(accelerated or delayed purchases away from non-focal brands and stores) and stockpiling 
(accelerated (postponed) baseline purchases from future (previous) periods, or, alternatively, 
post-promotion category expansion). 
Comparing these promotion components between calendars, two main differences 
become apparent. First, more ‘in-phase’ calendars should result in smaller cross-store shifts. If 
promotions run concurrently, even though customers of non-focal chains (i.e. where the brand is 
                                                 
3 As noted by Leeflang, Selva, van Dijk and Wittink (2008), brand promotions can trigger (minor) sales effects in 
other categories. Similarly, Ailawadi et al. (2006) point to possible ‘halo effects’: shoppers attracted to the store by 
a promotion also purchasing other categories. While we focus on within-category effects - the bulk of the 




never promoted, see above) may shift towards the promoting stores, focal-chain customers have 
little to gain from store switching, as they can buy the brand on promotion in their ‘customary’ 
store. In contrast, if the promotions alternate in time, customers do have an incentive to shift 
purchases between focal stores (i.e. from the non-promoting towards the promoting store in that 
period) to benefit from the deal on offer. Hence, we expect out-of-phase calendars to entail 
more (immediate) store- (and, possibly, brand-store) switching. 
Second, the ‘spread’ of promotions in more out-of-phase calendars means a larger 
number of ‘promotion’ weeks (in which at least one chain has the brand on promotion). On the 
one hand, this may result in ‘deal-to-deal’ buying (as consumers postpone their purchase in 
anticipation of the next price cut); consumers may also not stock up in large quantities, thereby 
reducing the positive ‘inventory pressure effect’ on consumption. On the other hand, the higher 
promotion frequency may stimulate category consumption if the featured price cut entices 
consumers to buy a product they would not have bought otherwise. This may become stronger if 
consumers feel more certain that future promotions are likely (Sun 2005). Similarly, while the 
temporal spread of out-of-phase promotions may lower the need to buy large amounts, it may 
also inspire consumers to ‘stock up till the next deal’. Whether out-of-phase calendars increase 
or decrease category expansion and stockpiling is an issue we empirically examine.4  
2.2.3. Sales Volume Implications for the Manufacturer and the Retailer 
How do these calendar differences play out for the different parties? For the 
manufacturer, net sales gains stem from brand (-store) switching and/or category expansion. 
The calendars affect these components in different ways. On the positive side, more out-of-
phase schedules mean ‘extra’ brand-store switching, i.e. shifts away from rival brands at the 
                                                 
4 To the extent that an out-of-phase calendar for the focal brand increases the likelihood that its promotion 
coincides with that of a rival brand in the focal chain, that calendar may lead to lower brand switching. Any such 
effect depends on the distribution of other brands’ promotions – which we take up in the empirical part. 
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rival focal stores, in weeks where those stores do not promote. Moreover, in out-of-phase 
calendars, the focal brand is more often ‘on promotion’, which may stimulate consumption. On 
the negative side, frequent brand-promotions may stimulate buying in smaller quantities: this 
could reduce inventory pressure and consumption and, hence, brand sales. Taken together, the 
impact of calendar shifts on manufacturers’ net sales gains depends on the relative size of the 
brand-store switching and consumption effects.5  
For retailers, promotional gains should come from increased consumption or store 
switching. As argued above, more out-of-phase schedules can lead to higher or lower category 
expansion. As for the store-switching implications: each focal retailer will, during his promotion 
weeks, attract more customers of non-focal stores (i.e. stores that do not run promotions) under 
the out-of-phase schedule, because he does not have to ‘split’ this segment of customers with 
rival promoting chains. A caveat is that, while he will also attract more customers from 
competing focal chains in his own promotion weeks, he will lose customers when the brand is 
not promoted in his own store, but is promoted at a rival chain. The question for retailers is: 
how will this net out? Extant literature shows that the absolute sales shifts from promotions are 
asymmetric across brands and depend on their size and quality positioning (see, e.g., Neslin 
2002). Similar forces may be at work for the competition between stores. On the one hand, 
retailers with many customers who buy in the category have more to lose from out-of-phase 
schedules, because they have more buyers that can switch away in weeks where rival stores 
promote. On the other hand, retailers with a large customer base (of not necessarily store-
category loyal shoppers) may enjoy higher indirect store switching – consumers who visit the 
                                                 
5The higher promotion frequency may also leave less room for rival brands to eat into the promoted brand’s sales 
(the ‘deterrence’ effect, see Lal 1990). Conversely, due to the spread in time, the brand’s promotions in one focal 
chain, may coincide more with rival brands’ promotions in the other (focal) chain, which may dampen their effect. 
The presence and strength of these effects depends on the frequency and timing of other brands’ actions (that the 
manufacturer has no control of). Our analysis takes into account such other-brand promotion effects.  
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store for other purposes than buying the brand on promotion (Bucklin and Lattin 1992). 
Moreover, just like high-quality brands (Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989), high-end retailers 
may attract more customers through promotions than their lower-end rivals. Depending on 
which force prevails, larger or higher-end retailers may steal more (fewer) customers away from 
other focal chains in their own promotion weeks than they lose when those rivals promote – 
adding to (detracting from) the benefits of out-of-phase calendars. 
2.2.4. Revenue Implications for the Manufacturer and the Retailer 
So far, we focused on net volume gains. When it comes to net revenue (i.e. the dollar 
value instead of the volume of extra units sold), the trade-off between out-of-phase and in-phase 
schedules may be quite different. To the extent that out-of-phase calendars come with larger 
volumes sold on deal (i.e. at prices below the regular price), they become less appealing in 
terms of net revenue gains. For the manufacturer, (immediate and pre-emptive) store switching 
becomes a source of ‘subsidization’ (van Heerde et al. 2004, Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2010): 
consumers who would have bought the brand at full price, simply shift stores to benefit from the 
promotion. Moreover, the fact that brand promotions in more out-of-phase schedules are ‘spread 
in time’, may stimulate deal-to-deal buying, adding to the subsidization problem. For retailers, 
the lower prices also make out-of-phase schedules less attractive from a revenue perspective: 
extra unit sales (at deal prices) realized in feature weeks, being countered by (possibly 
asymmetric) sales losses at regular prices in weeks where competing retailers promote.  
In the next section, we examine the magnitude of the performance difference between 




2.3.1. Motivation  
To empirically assess the impact of the promotion calendar, we need a methodology that 
properly captures consumers’ promotional response. Three challenges emerge from the previous 
section. First, promotional sales gains/losses may accrue from shifts in consumers’ category 
purchase incidence, brand- and store selection, and purchase quantity – hence, we need to model 
all four decisions. Second, the most rewarding calendar depends on the relative size of these 
shifts for specific brands and stores, which, in turn, depends on consumers’ loyalty to these 
brands and stores. This calls for a flexible specification that accommodates heterogeneity in 
consumers’ decision sequences, and in their brand and store preferences. Third, these shifts 
extend across multiple periods so we need to accommodate purchase dynamics. Treating such a 
setting analytically is prohibitive: as indicated by Freimer and Horsky: “The problem of several 
manufacturers and several retailers is currently an unsolvable problem even for the most 
stylized formulations” (Freimer and Horsky, 2008, p. 806). A complicating factor is that the 
decision authority of the different players is unknown: both manufacturers and retailers 
influence the calendar, but it is not clear in what way (Wierenga and Soethoudt 2009). Hence, 
following Chintagunta, Erdem, Rossi and Wedel (2006), instead of relying on analytical 
modeling, we adopt a more empirical approach. In the spirit of Silva-Risso et al. (1999) and 
Tellis and Zufryden (1995), we first estimate a ‘full-fledged’ model of consumers’ response to 
observed promotion schedules. We then use this model as a tool to simulate and compare the 
effect of specific calendars.  
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2.3.2. Model Structure  
To capture promotion response, we consider each shopping trip (t) of a household (h), and 
model the household’s decision to buy a specific brand (b) in a given category (c) (or: to not 
buy from that category), at a given retailer (store) (r), and this in a specific quantity (q). We 
describe the choice decision (incidence, retailer and brand) first, and then consider purchase 
quantity. 
Retailer, Category and Brand Selection. We adopt a utility-maximizing framework, in 
which the utility for household h of buying brand b from the considered category (we drop the 






ℎ  , (2.1a) 
where 𝜖𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ is a Gumbel-distributed random term, and 𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ  the systematic utility component. The 
latter is a function of (possibly household-specific) category-, retailer- and brand-related 
variables (including regular price and promotions), captured in the vector 𝑋𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ , with its 
associated parameter vector βh  (these variables are further specified below).  






ℎ  , (2.1b) 
where, like before, 𝜖0𝑟𝑡
ℎ , 𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ  and 𝑋0𝑟𝑡
ℎ  represent the Gumbel-distributed random component, the 
systematic utility component, and the vector of explanatory variables, respectively. As 
explained below, though 𝑋0𝑟𝑡
ℎ  does not comprise brand-promotion variables directly, it does 
include variables that govern dynamic effects (e.g. consumption flexibility) and the potential for 




The way these utilities for the various retailers, brands, and no-purchase options 
translate into consumer choices, depends on the specification of the random components - in 
particular, the correlation of these components among the choice alternatives. In the marketing 
literature, the nested logit (NL) specification has been the dominant approach to capture an 
array of nested choices and their interrelationships (e.g. Gordon, Goldfarb and Li 2013). 
However, the NL model imposes one single correlation or ‘nesting’ structure, which, especially 
in a setting involving category, brand and retailer selection, may oversimplify consumers’ 
actual decision structures. For instance: while Bucklin and Lattin (1992) use a store patronage, 
then category incidence ‘hierarchy’ in their NL model, Briesch, Dillon and Fox (2013) argue 
that category needs may ‘drive’ store choice. Or, while some consumers are willing to shop 
around for their favorite brand, brand selection also often takes place in-store (Campo, 
Gijsbrechts and Nisol 2000). Because the interplay between brand switching, store switching 
and category expansion is a key driver of promotion-calendar effects, we adopt a generalized 
nested logit (GNL) model here (e.g. Wen and Koppelman 2002). 
For our setting, we propose a three nesting-structure GNL model, depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Given a category c, this GNL model specifies the probability that household h buys brand b 
from the category at retailer r (𝑃𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ  ), or the probability that it visits retailer r but does not buy 
from the category (𝑃0𝑟𝑡
ℎ  ), as a sum of three parts, each corresponding to a different decision 
structure (please see the probability expressions in Figure 2.1). In the first 
(‘incidencestorebrand’) structure, brands are grouped, or ‘nested’ within a retailer (‘the 
retailer nest’), and retailers are nested within category-incidence options (purchase or no 
purchase). In the second (‘incidencebrandstore’) structure, retailers are nested within 
brands, which are nested within category purchases. The third structure, 
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(‘storeincidencebrand’), nests brands within the category-purchase decisions, which are 
then nested within a retailer (see Figure 2.1).6 In each structure, the substitution patterns 
between the different choice alternatives are governed by the nesting parameters (𝛾𝑅1 and 𝛾𝐶1 in 
nesting structure 1, 𝛾𝐵2 and 𝛾𝐶2 in structure 2, 𝛾𝑅3 and 𝛾𝐶3 in structure 3). Like in the NL 
model, nesting parameters between zero and one, indicate that choice alternatives within the 
corresponding nest compete more strongly with one another than with other choice options. 
Conversely, nesting parameters above one imply that alternatives within a nest compete only 
weakly, and may even increase each other’s choice probability. If all nesting parameters equal 
1, the GNL model reduces to a multinomial logit (MNL) specification. 
--- Insert Figure 2.1 about here --- 
A key advantage of the GNL model is that it accounts for the different routes along 
which an alternative can be selected, and for the differences in promotion response that these 
routes entail.7 This is important because not all households have the same decision structure, 
and for a given household, decisions may come about differently at different points in time. The 
GNL model accommodates this by specifying the choice probability of a specific alternative 
(i.e. ‘buy a specific brand from the category at a given store’, or ‘visit a specific store without 
buying from the category’) as a mixture of the different routes or decision structures. The 
relative importance of the three routes is captured by the allocation parameters τi
h, i=1, 2, 3; 
                                                 
6 Because we expect consumers to trade off brands only when they are in need of the category, we do not model 
sequences in which the category incidence decision comes after the brand choice decision. Put differently, we 
assume people do not decide which brand to buy when they do not purchase from the category. 
7 E.g., in the second structure (Figure 2.1: ‘incidencebrandstore’) with 𝛾𝐵2 and 𝛾𝐶2 < 1, retailers strongly 
compete for the purchases of a given brand once the consumer has decided on a category purchase, which leads to 
disproportionally more store switching for the promoted brand, and less category expansion. Also the level of the 
nesting parameters matters: if 𝛾𝐵2were larger than one, retailers would compete disproportionally less for a given 
brand (making store switching a less predominant source of promotion response, and implying that brand 
promotions at one store may even leverage brand sales at other stores). Hence, different nesting structures and 
nesting parameters, place different weight on the sources of promo sales.  
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where 0 < τi




h approaches 1 for a specific structure i, the household’s 
choice probability is governed by that nesting structure alone, while intermediate levels of τi
h 
point to a mixture. In sum, the GNL model offers a parsimonious, yet flexible way to capture 
how households’ category purchases of specific brands in specific stores, are affected by the 
brands’ featured price cuts at these stores (which enter the systematic utility component). 
Purchase quantity. Featured price cuts may also alter the quantity purchased for the 
chosen brand and store. Similar to previous authors (e.g. Ailawadi and Neslin 1998, Zhang and 
Krishnamurthi 2004), we define 𝑄𝑏𝑟𝑡
∗,ℎ
 as a latent variable that determines how much a household 
wants to buy of the chosen brand from the category and retailer during a given shopping trip. 
Given that a category purchase occurs, and that brand b of retailer r is chosen, the observed 
quantity 𝑄𝑏𝑟𝑡






   𝑖𝑓 ℎ 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑟
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (2.2a) 
The latent quantity is itself a function of observed explanatory variables 𝑊𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ  (see next section 
for details) - with parameter vector 𝜙ℎ, and a normally distributed random component 𝜉𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ with 
mean 0 and standard deviation 𝜎𝜉: 
  𝑄𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ∗ = 𝜙ℎ𝑊𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ + 𝜉𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ . (2.2b) 
Estimation 
To ensure values for the allocation parameters τ1, τ2,and τ3  within [0,1] and summing to 1, we 
estimate transformed parameters, η1 and η2, such that  τ1=exp(η1)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1); 
τ2=exp(η2)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1) and τ3=1- τ1 –τ2. To accommodate unobserved household 
heterogeneity, we adopt a random-effects approach and let the parameters of the utility drivers 
of category-brand-retailer choice and purchase quantity, and the (transformed) GNL allocation 
                                                 
8 Although the summation to 1 is no strict requirement, it facilitates interpretation and is the dominant practice. 
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parameters, be normally distributed across households. We estimate the model using simulated 
maximum likelihood (Train 2009). 
Because of its multiple, intertwined decision layers, estimation of the random-effects 
GNL model on our data presents several practical challenges. The model includes a large 
number of choice alternatives, and must be estimated on data involving all household trips to all 
stores – including separate observations for individual brand purchases and the no-purchase 
option. This not only drives up estimation time, it also causes numerical problems in the 
likelihood calculation (please see Appendix A for details). Moreover, such a dataset is 
unbalanced and sparse – the number of no-purchase observations largely outweighing the 
number of actual brand choices – which further compounds assessment of the brand-promotion 
effects. Previous studies solved this problem by using a sequential estimation approach (e.g. 
Gordon et al. 2013) and/or considering only a small subset of retailers or brands. Because (i) the 
GNL model has overlapping nests, and (ii) we need to be able to track brand-specific purchase 
shifts across all retailers and brands, over time, neither of these approaches is feasible in our 
setting. To tackle the issue, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate the parameters of the 
quantity and incidence-retailer-brand choice models separately. Clearly, category purchase 
incidence and quantity are likely to be related when driven by promotion, and this is captured in 
the systematic part of the incidence and quantity models – both of which include the promotion 
variables (see Table 2.3). Still, by estimating the GNL and quantity model separately, we 
assume that the unobserved components of these models are uncorrelated for reasons of 
tractability. Second, within the choice model, we disproportionately sample from the no-
purchase and purchase trips, and then obtain the parameters using the Conditional ML 
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estimation procedure discussed in Manski and McFadden (1981) and Cosslett (1981). Details on 
the GNL estimation are given in Appendix 2.A. 
2.4. Data and Operationalizations  
2.4.1. Data  
We calibrate the models on GfK household panel data in four categories: beer, liquid laundry 
detergents, coffee and chips. These categories differ in the degree of storability, necessity, 
expensiveness and purchase frequency and, hence, in their promotional response (Bell, Chiang 
and Padmanabhan 1999). Consequently, they constitute a rich set to test of our calendar effects. 
Our data contain information on households’ purchase histories, as well as weekly prices and 
feature activities for each brand and category, over 424 weeks, across all Dutch retail chains. 
We consider the top five retail chains in the Dutch market and a ‘rest retailer’ that comprises the 
remaining smaller chains. We retain only households that remain in the panel throughout the 
observation period (to avoid confounding calendar effects with household differences, see e.g. 
Geyskens, Gielens and Gijsbrechts 2010 for a similar approach9): these form the basis for our 
category-specific datasets. For each category, we then keep households with at least 2 category 
purchases, of which the last 10% purchases (rounded up to the next integer) are set aside for the 
holdout sample. The average number of purchases per household ranges from 15 (laundry 
detergents), over 51 (beer) and 63 (coffee), up to 86 (chips). Similar to, e.g., Geyskens et al. 
(2010) and Gielens (2012), we consider the top-selling brands in the category that account for at 
least 80% of total category purchases (or, if that calls for too many brands, include the top 5 
national brands (NBs), and the private labels (PLs) with at least 5% of the store’s category 
                                                 
9 As pointed out in a review process of this paper, these households are possibly also more promotion-sensitive. 
However, because our main focus is on cross-calendar comparisons, rather than promotion effects per se, this is not 
a major problem here. 
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sales), and group the remaining brands in a ‘rest brand’ alternative. For one retailer, two 
(distinct) PLs account for a non-negligible portion of beer sales and, as such, are included as 
separate brands (PL1 and PL3 for beer). 
--- Insert Table 2.1 about here --- 
 Table 2.1 presents descriptives on the chains’ and brands’ category shares (Panel A), 
along with their unit prices (mean and standard deviation, Panel B), for each of the four 
categories. In all categories, retailer 1 (R1) has the highest share, followed by R2; while R4 and 
R5 are smaller chains. The categories exhibit different levels of market share concentration (the 
leading brand covering over 50% of category sales in the chips and coffee categories, compared 
to about 20% for beer and laundry detergents) and private label share (almost 30% for coffee, 
compared to less than 5% for beer). Next to price differences between brands (e.g. in the beer 
category, NB5 is almost three times as expensive as R1’s economy private label, PL3) and 
retailers (R1 typically being higher priced), the table also points to price variation within brands 
and retailers over time. This already reveals the presence of promotional activity - something we 
turn to below. 
2.4.2. Promotion Calendar: Descriptive Statistics  
The brands’ price cuts that are featured in the retailers’ store flyer are focal to our analysis. 
Table 2.2 provides descriptives on the featured price cuts in the beer category (Figures for the 
other three categories yield similar patterns, and are provided in Appendix 2.B). Table 2.2, 
Panel A shows that the bulk of the feature promotions occurs for national brands. Among these 
NBs, featured price cuts are very popular: on average, inter-promotion times for a brand at a 
given retailer range between 5.5 weeks (NB1) and 11.32 weeks (NB5). The standard deviations 
of inter-promotion time indicate that the feature timing is quite irregular. 
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--- Insert Table 2.2 about here --- 
 For our purposes, the scheduling of the brands’ promotions across retailers is elemental. 
Table 2.2, Panel B documents the patterns observed in the beer category (similar patterns are 
found for coffee, chips and laundry detergents – see Appendix 2.B). The table reveals that 34% 
of the featured price cuts occur at more than one retailer simultaneously. A breakdown by brand 
shows a similar pattern: the fraction of retailer-promotion weeks running concurrently at more 
than one retailer ranges between 27% (for NB4) and 40% (for NB1). Hence, though out-of-
phase promotions appear to be more common, in-phase promotions do occur, and involve 
mostly the larger NBs (NB1 and NB2). 
 To further examine the observed patterns in promotion calendars, we correlated the 
week-to-week occurrence of featured price cuts among brands and retailers (as in Rao, Arjunji 
and Murthi 1995). While promotions of different brands within the same retailer do not seem 
related (e.g. for beer only two out of the 61 correlations are significant, one positive and one 
negative), we find slightly more significant correlations between the same brands across 
retailers (e.g. for beer: 4 out of 50 correlations, positive). To further explore this, we compared, 
for each national brand, (i) the actual percentage of weeks in the observation period in which it 
is promoted at two or more retailers simultaneously, to (ii) the percentage under random 
assignment (of its total retailer-promotion events across observation weeks). For each brand, the 
actual fraction of weeks with overlapping promotions (i.e. between 4.7% for NB4 and 11.1% 
for NB1) is lower than by chance (i.e. between 10.6% for NB4, and 28.3% for NB1). Finally, 
we conducted logistic regressions for each of the national brands at each of the top five chains, 
linking the presence (absence) of a promotion for the brand at the chain in a given week, to (i) 
the brand’s promotion activity at the chain in that same week the year before, (ii) the brand’s 
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concurrent promotions at competing chains, (iii) same-week promotions of competing brands at 
the same and competing chains, and (iv) year fixed-effects. With only few coefficients 
significant, we do not find evidence of a ‘set’ pattern used by brands or retailers.10  
 In sum, these observations are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the (semi-)annual 
promotion calendar is the outcome of a negotiated agreement between the manufacturer and the 
retailer, in which (i) retailers often pressure the manufacturer not to promote at other retailers, 
while (ii) manufacturers may look for exclusivity in a given promotion period. Moreover, our 
exchanges with manufacturers indicate that they typically delegate negotiations to brand-
account managers, whose interest is in optimizing the promotion calendar for their account 
rather than across stores. In all, this leads to observed diversity in the pattern of promotions – 
which will allow us to reliably estimate the impact of alternative schedules across retailers and 
their performance implications. 
2.4.3. Variables and Operationalizations 
To flexibly capture all relevant promotional effects, we include – next to the depth of the price 
cut DiscDepthbrt – several variables related to the promoted brands’ appearance in the retailer 
store flyers. Table 2.3 provides an overview of these variables and their operationalizations. 
--- Insert Table 2.3 about here ---  
Immediate effects are captured through a dummy Promobrt, indicating a featured price cut for the 
brand at the retailer. We also incorporate the presence of such a promotion for the same brand at 
a different retailer, Promo_otherbrt: while the GNL model captures the overall patterns of brand-
store competition, this term – in the spirit of Carpenter, Cooper, Hanssens and Midgley 1988 – 
                                                 
10 E.g. for beer, with 2 out of 25 same-week last-year coefficients significant and positive, the results show that the 
promotion calendar is not simply transferred from last year. Moreover, focusing on within-brand cross-retailer 
promotions, we find the number of significant positive coefficients (8, pointing to likely concurrent actions) to 
almost equal the number of significant negative effects (9, indicating non-overlapping promotions across chains). 
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captures any additional cross-effects specifically due to the promotion activity. Moreover, we 
include an interaction term 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑟𝑡 ∗  𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ , to capture the possibility that the 
longer the brand has not been on promotion at the chain, the more effective its promotion 
becomes. As dynamic variables, we further include a lagged promotion dummy Promobrt-1 (to 
capture a post-promotion dip, van Heerde et al. 2004 or, conversely, a positive post-promotion 
effect reflecting consumer repeat purchases or inertia in the promotion implementation in-store, 
van Heerde, Leeflang and Wittink 2000), and (a main effect for) the number of weeks since the 
last feature promotion at any retailer (with household-specific retailer weights), 
𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ . As advocated by Neslin and van Heerde (2009), the latter can capture a 
lead effect: consumers postponing their purchases in anticipation of the next promotion. Given 
the differences in brand inter-promotion times, we center this variable by subtracting the mean 
inter-promotion time for the brand in an initialization period (such that a positive value would 
suggest that, based on past experience, an offer for that brand is considered ‘overdue’). 
Moreover, because anticipation effects will be weaker if the brand exhibited an irregular pattern 
in the past, we model the lead effect as a process function, influenced by the variance in inter-
promotion time for that brand in an initialization period (see Table 2.3). In each category, the 
correlation table for the different promotion variables (see Appendix 2.C) does not point to 
overly high correlations (the highest correlation – between discount depth and the feature 
promotion dummy – ranges between .53 (laundry detergents) and .719 (beer), all other 
correlations are below .318) – suggesting that their separate impact can be assessed.   
 The promotion variables directly enter the utility associated with a specific brand-
retailer choice and purchase quantity. Similar to previous models (e.g. Ailawadi and Neslin 
1998, Fox, Montgomery and Lodish, 2004, Geyskens et al. 2010, Briesch, Chintagunta and Fox 
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2009), we add a number of controls to further capture category-, retailer- and brand-differences; 
as well as purchase dynamics. Category characteristics include seasonal variables, next to the 
household’s category purchase rate (CRh) and inventory (𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡
ℎ
 ). The latter is defined as in 
Ailawadi and Neslin (1998), to capture the possibility of increased consumption due to 
inventory pressure (see Table 2.3). Retailer characteristics pertain to the considered category 
(i.e. whether the household’s previous category purchase occurred in that store, 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑡
ℎ )  as 
well as to the store overall (i.e. distance, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑡
ℎ ; the retailer’s initial share of household visits, 
𝑅𝑒𝑡_𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑟
ℎ  ; whether the store was visited on the previous trip, 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑉_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑡
ℎ  ; and the stores’ 
overall appeal, which can be split into a fixed part (retailer dummies) and a variable part 
(Ret_Attrrt) capturing the appeal of the promotion activities in categories other than the focal 
category). The latter reflect the chain’s attractiveness to the consumer in general (i.e. for 
purchases other than the focal category), which, in turn, will drive the potential for indirect store 
switching. As for the brand-specific controls, these include, next to brand dummies and a brand 
state-dependence variable 𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑃_𝐵𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑡
ℎ , the regular unit price for the brand at the chain, Pricebrt; 
and the size of the brand line carried by the retailer, Assortbrt. The last column of Table 2.3 
indicates how these drivers enter equations (2.1a-2.1b) and (2.2b). Our random effects approach 
allows the retailer and brands’ baseline and the slopes of all marketing mix variables (price, 
assortment, discount depth, and the promotions’ immediate, lead, lag and cross-retailer effect) 
to follow a normal mixing distribution (see Table 2.4).  
2.5. Estimation Results 
Table 2.4 presents the fit statistics and estimation results (means and standard deviations 
of the mixing distributions) for the estimated models. The GNL model offers a significant 
improvement over an MNL specification (LR-test: p<.01). Moreover, in each category, the 
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GNL model points to a mixture of different nesting structures (allocation parameters in Table 
2.4, Panel B, different from both zero and one), indicating that a simplified (nested logit) model 
would fail to fully capture households’ decisions. Hit rates range between .295 and .303 in-
sample, and between .270 and .290 for the holdout sample - satisfactory figures, considering the 
large number of choice alternatives (between 30 for coffee, and 47 for laundry detergents).  
Turning to the model parameters, we find that the coefficients related to state 
dependence, initial household differences, and brand/store characteristics (e.g. distance, price, 
or assortment) all have face validity. To save space, we only discuss the promotion-related 
parameters (including those that govern the dynamics and the consumers’ decision structure), 
and focus on the mean estimates (cross-household standard deviations are given in Table 2.4).  
--- Insert Table 2.4 about here --- 
In all categories, the presence of a featured price cut significantly enhances brand-
retailer choice during the promotion week, as well as the quantity purchased (p<.01, except for 
laundry detergents, where the quantity effect is insignificant). The depth of the discount may 
further enhance the propensity to buy (beer and chips) or, if a purchase occurs, stimulate 
consumers to procure larger amounts (p<.01, beer and coffee). Concurrent promotions of the 
brand at another chain exert an ‘extra’ negative effect on the appeal of a brand-retailer 
combination, over and above the competitive interplay inherent in the GNL structure, for beer 
(p<.01). Interestingly, they create positive spillovers for coffee and chips (p<.01) – possibly 
because the feature ads ‘remind’ consumers to buy these products in their usual store (Anderson 
and Simester 2013).  
Turning to the dynamic effects, larger inventories reduce consumers’ propensity to buy 
(p<.01, beer, laundry detergents and chips) or amount purchased (p<.01, coffee). Whereas 
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negative inventory-variable effects pertain to all brands and retailers, the lagged promotion 
coefficient indicates to what extent post-promotion effects differ between the previously 
promoted retailer-brand, and others, in the week following the first promotion. This coefficient 
is negative for coffee – suggesting that having bought a specific brand on deal at a given chain, 
especially reduces the purchase rate for that brand and chain in the week after. It is significantly 
positive for laundry detergents (incidence) and beer (incidence and quantity). This may follow 
from inertia in the promotion implementation (van Heerde et al. 2004), or point to ‘momentum’ 
– the recent promotion temporarily making the brand-retailer the more likely option-of-choice. 
We do not find a positive interaction between promotion effectiveness and weeks since 
the last brand promotion at the same store. This suggests that, within the data range, low 
promotion frequency of a brand within a chain does not enhance its impact. In contrast, brand 
promotions at retailers where they have not been on deal for long, appear less effective. One 
explanation is that consumers are less alert to promotions by these brands at these chains, and 
less likely to organize their purchases around these promotion events.11 In the same spirit, we do 
obtain lead effects (as evidenced by the main effects of weeks since promotions at any retailer, 
and its interaction with the brand’s promotion regularity) for coffee and chips: consumers being 
less likely to buy the brand if they believe a promotion is due, especially if there is high 
regularity in the brand’s promotion schedule (as the process function in Table 2.3 indicates, a 
positive coefficient of the standard deviation of inter-promotion time, implies that more regular 
promotions enhance the anticipation effect). The consumption flexibility parameter is highest 
for laundry detergents, followed by coffee, beer and chips. Given that a more positive (negative) 
                                                 
11 Another explanation is that brands that promote infrequently do so because they know their promotions are less 
effective. We thank the editor for pointing this out. 
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parameter for consumption flexibility points to less (more) flexible consumption (Ailawadi and 
Neslin 1998, see also Table 2.3), these results make intuitive sense.  
The routes along which these utility drivers affect consumers’ choices are shown in 
Table 2.4, Panel B, which reports the relative importance of the three decision sequences (as 
reflected in the allocation parameters), and the implied competitive patterns (as reflected in the 
nesting parameters). Interestingly, among the wide range of possible decision patterns 
accommodated by the GNL model in Figure 2.1, only four main patterns emerge across the 
different categories – as described in Figure 2.2. These decision patterns are characterized by a 
sequence, combined with a level of the higher and lower nesting parameter (each of which can 
be equal to, higher than, or lower than 1, see also footnote 7). For each category, a mixture of 
these patterns is at work, but with different degrees of importance – which is not surprising, 
given the different category characteristics (which we further explore below). 
--- Insert Figure 2.2 about here --- 
The mean estimates of the allocation parameters show that in the beer category, Pattern 
B is predominant (82%), with some influence of Pattern A (17%). The opposite holds for 
laundry detergents (Pattern A (60%), Pattern B (34%)). For coffee, Patterns A (38%) and D 
(37%) dominate, while the chips category exhibits a mixture of Patterns A (60%), C (16%) and 
D (24%). To explore whether these mixtures only reflect differences in choice strategies 
between households, or also imply that a given household may ‘switch’ strategies across 
purchase occasions, we consider the household-specific posterior estimates of the allocation 
parameters (We obtain these posteriors following the procedure described in Train 2009, p. 
266). In the beer category, all households primarily stick to Pattern B, with some occasional 
switching to Pattern A. In the remaining three categories, individual households, rather than 
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being ‘assigned’ to one choice pattern, typically exhibit a mixture of strategies across their 
category purchase trips (Details are available upon request).  
In sum, it appears that, across categories, the promotion effects materialize through a 
different mixture of these main routes, both across and within households, with different 
propensities for category expansion\stockpiling, store switching, and brand-store switching. 
How this shapes the impact of alternative calendars is something we turn to below.  
2.6. Implications 
2.6.1. Simulation Setup 
To assess the effects of different promotion calendars, we use our estimates as inputs for 
simulations on the actual data involving a 26-week period (and promotion calendars, at all 
brands and retailers, in this period) as a backdrop. Such a half-yearly scenario corresponds to 
the typical calendar-planning horizon in practice. We consider changes in the calendar of 
featured price cuts for the leading brand, at two retailers (the leading chain in the category and 
the runner-up), with promotions for other brands (at any chain) at their actual level. Shifting the 
brand calendar at only two chains makes it easier to trace the underlying mechanisms and – 
given that concurrent promotions often occur at two chains (see Table 2.2 and Appendix 2.B) – 
is realistic. The number of feature promotions at the two retailers is set roughly equal to the 
actual total in the observation period, and then equally split between the chains. Each feature 
lasts one week, with a price cut equal to the brand’s actual mean discount at the two chains. 
Appendix 2.D provides an overview of the simulation setup. 
To realistically assess the calendar effects and avoid the Lucas critique (van Heerde, 
Dekimpe and Putsis 2005), we consider schedules that fall within the data range. In the out-of-
phase schedule, none of the brand promotions concurrently run at the two retailers. Such a 
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calendar is actually observed in a number of (half-year) planning periods. For the in-phase 
schedule, we let two-thirds of the promotion events coincide at the two retailers – the maximum 
‘simultaneity’ in the dataset over 26 consecutive weeks. The remaining one-third still takes 
place at the two retailers in different weeks (along with any other-brand promotions, which are 
kept common across the two scenarios). We then compare the results across the two calendars 
(fully out-of-phase vs. two-thirds in-phase/one-third out-of-phase, or simply: out-of-phase vs. 
in-phase hereafter), and with the benchmark setting of no featured price cuts for the brand at the 
two retailers. To distinguish idiosyncratic sequencing and contemporaneous effects from 
systematic calendar-type effects, we verify these effects for different implementations within 
each calendar type (see Appendix 2.D).  
2.6.2. Simulation Results 
 Figure 2.3 reports, for each promotion calendar: (i) the gross sales lift (i.e. volume 
increase over the baseline during promotion weeks, Panel A), (ii) the net volume gain (obtained 
as sales volume in units under the promotion calendar across the 26 weeks12, minus the baseline 
volume for that same period, Panel B), and (iii) the net revenue gain (calculated as the net 
volume gain minus the discount fraction (i.e. 0.25) times the total brand volume sold under 
promotional conditions (= baseline + gross sales lift), Panel C). It provides these figures for the 
manufacturer (brand) and the two retailers (category) in absolute terms, and also reports the % 
differences between calendars (relative to the in-phase calendar).  
In all categories, both calendars lead to substantial gross sales lifts and significant net 
volume and revenue gains compared to the benchmark setting, for all parties involved. The size 
                                                 
12 Because of differences in seasonality, the absolute promotion effects obtained in our 26-week period may not 
generalize to the remaining 26 weeks of the year. However, because we are mainly interested in the differences 
between calendars, and we compare calendars for the same period, this is not a key problem here. Also note that the 
correlations between the promotion variables and seasonal variables are very low (below .05 in absolute value), 
indicating that the promotion calendar itself does not systematically differ across the 26-week periods. 
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of the gross sales lift relative to the baseline ranges from 169% (chips) to 244% (laundry 
detergents). These figures are comparable to extant findings (Ailawadi et al. 2006) and support 
the face validity of the results.  
--- Insert Figure 2.3 about here --- 
Gross Sales Lift. Zooming in on the calendar differences in gross sales lift first, we 
observe a mixed pattern of effects across categories. For laundry detergents and chips, the 
number of extra units sold on deal is the same for both calendars (p>.10). For beer and coffee, 
Figure 2.3 shows that out-of-phase calendars lead to significantly higher gross sales lifts, for the 
manufacturer and both retailers: on average, alternating schedules yield between 6.8% and 
17.9% larger immediate sales bumps than their in-phase counterparts.  
Net Volume Gains. The picture changes when it comes to net volume gains. In the beer 
and coffee category, out-of-phase calendars no longer entail higher incremental sales volume 
for the manufacturer (p>.10). Retailers continue to enjoy higher net volume in the out-of-phase 
schedule for beer and coffee (p<.05). However, though the % difference between calendars 
remains important (4.7% to 12.1%, see Figure 2.3, Panel B), the absolute gains are now more 
modest. In the laundry detergents and chips categories, the promotion timing does not affect the 
retailers’ net volume gains (p>.10). In contrast, for chips, the out-of-phase calendar leads to 
higher incremental brand volume (6.35% higher than in-phase), with absolute differences that 
are strongly significant (p<.01). So, even if this is not apparent from the gross sales lift, 
manufacturers do incur a net sales gain from promoting out-of-phase in this category.  
Net Revenue Gains. Because the gross sales lift (and, hence, the amount of 
subsidization) does not significantly differ between the calendars for laundry detergents and 
chips, moving from net volume (Panel B) to net revenue gains (Panel C) does not change our 
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findings. In laundry detergents, all parties continue to be indifferent to the promotion calendar 
(p>.10). For chips, the manufacturer continues to enjoy a (modest) absolute performance 
increase from promoting out-of-phase. In the beer and coffee category, where the sales bump is 
calendar-specific, the volume and revenue implications are somewhat different. For the 
manufacturer, the net revenue gain under in-phase promotions exceeds that of out-of-phase 
schedules, and significantly so for coffee (p<.01). For retailers, though the % differences 
between calendars remain sizable, the calendar differences become smaller in absolute terms.  
Sources. Where do these differences come from? Comparing the calendars’ category 
sales across all chains throughout the 26-week period, we find that, though the out-of-phase 
schedule leads to category expansion for coffee (p<.05) and chips (p<.01), the effect is very 
modest (.1% to .2%), and we do not observe it for beer or laundry detergents. As such, calendar 
effects seem to primarily stem from differences in (brand-) store switching. To further explore 
this, we consider a breakdown of the promotion bump by comparing, for each household, the 
purchases under the simulated promotion calendars, to those in a benchmark setting without 
promotions for the brand at the two chains (see Appendix 2.D for details).  
--- Insert Figure 2.4 about here --- 
Figure 2.4 shows the sales shifts underlying the promotion calendars, for each category. 
For laundry detergents, there are no systematic calendar differences in the sales bump 
components. This is no surprise: as the model estimates reveal, consumption in this category is 
inflexible, and competition primarily occurs among brands within the store (Pattern A). For beer 
and coffee, out-of-phase promotions only trigger more store switching than in-phase schedules 
(p<.05) – which could stem from Patterns B and D, respectively. This explains the absence of a 
net volume gain for the manufacturer: the higher gross sales lift at the promoting retailer in the 
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out-of-phase schedule, comes at the expense of brand sales in other stores. The picture is very 
different for chips, where the out-of-phase calendar implies more brand switching (p<.01), and a 
significantly higher sales lift at non-promoting stores (negative difference for store switching in 
Figure 2.4, p<.10). A tentative explanation can, again, be found in the model estimates: 
promotions for chips do not warrant shifts toward the promoting stores,13 yet, they lead to 
significant positive ‘cross-store spillover’ effects for the brand even in stores where it is not on 
deal (decision Pattern C, reinforced by a positive coefficient for ‘promo at other stores’ in Table 
2.4). Out-of-phase calendars, which imply more promotion weeks, may thus benefit the 
manufacturer: whenever the brand is on deal, this raises attention to the brand at all stores, and 
triggers extra brand purchases. 
Robustness checks. To check the generalizability of the findings, we replicate the 
simulations for a scenario with the leading and a smaller (lower-end) retailer. The outcomes are 
largely similar, with significant retailer effects for beer and coffee (the results are reported in 
Appendix 2.D). To explore asymmetries between the two chains, we isolate store shifts at the 
expense of the rival promoting store versus other stores. We find that the larger retailer enjoys 
lower sales shifts at the expense of the smaller store, than vice versa. At the same time, the large 
retailer reaps more sales from other stores than its smaller adversary, possibly because, being a 
larger (higher-end) player, its feature ads are more visible (attractive), or it has more potential 
for indirect store switching. In sum, promoting out-of-phase allows (both small and large) 
retailers to draw more sales away from rival stores, and entails (albeit modest) net volume 
gains.  
                                                 
13 Though Pattern D, to some extent, also occurs for chips (Table 2.4, Panel B), the ‘last purchase’ and ‘last visit’ 
coefficients for this category are high (consumers being inclined to buy chips in the same store), which dampens 
the store switching effects. 
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2.7. Discussion, Limitations and Future Research 
2.7.1. Discussion 
 Our results show that promotion calendars lead to notable performance differences in 
categories where promotions drive the brand’s purchase-location-of-choice, either in the form of 
direct store switching (as is the case for destination categories, like beer), or indirect store 
switching (consumers shifting the category purchase to a store already visited for other purposes 
– a pattern observed for coffee). In such categories, out-of-phase calendars lead to much higher 
volume bumps in promotion weeks. However, when it comes to net volume gains, we show that 
in these categories, manufacturers no longer benefit from out-of-phase calendars. Retailers 
continue to incur higher net volume from alternating promotions, but the gains turn out to be 
more modest. This shift is reinforced when it comes to net revenue. Because a larger portion of 
sales in the out-of-phase calendars occurs at deal prices, the average revenue per unit sold 
further drops. It follows that, even if out-of-phase promotions have intuitively appeal because of 
the larger gross sales lifts, promoting out-of-sync leads to only small net revenue gains for 
retailers, and actually lowers them for manufacturers.  
In ‘non-destination’ categories (in which a brand promotion typically does not warrant a 
store shift), out-of-phase calendars do not trigger more store switching than in-phase schedules, 
and hardly alter retailer performance. Interestingly, our chips results suggest that in such 
categories, calendars may still matter for the manufacturer, but for different reasons. This 
happens if brand promotions in one chain create positive spillovers for (the brand in) rival 
chains (where the brand is not on deal) – a phenomenon recently documented by Anderson and 
Simester (2013) that seems to be at work in the chips category. For the manufacturer alternating 
schedules thus seem to create more weeks in which the featured price cut attracts attention to 
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the brand and, with positive chain spillovers, trigger more brand switching at any store. Of 
course, because it is based on only one category, this reasoning is still speculative, and needs to 
be verified in other categories. 
Our results have several implications for managers. First, we show that though 
promotion calendars may matter, the presence and direction of their effects depend on the 
consumers’ dominant decision processes for the category. The question is: what drives these 
processes, and can managers anticipate them? To explore this, and further check the validity of 
our estimated decision processes, we tie them with category factors collected by Steenkamp, 
Geyskens, Gielens and Koll (2004), through a survey on 62 categories among a representative 
sample of Dutch consumers14. The categories where our calendar differences are most 
pronounced (i.e. where out-of-phase schedules lead to higher gross sales lift for each party, and 
higher net gains for the retailers – beer and coffee) – have below-average category-specific store 
loyalty and impulse buying, yet rather high performance risk15. In contrast, laundry detergents 
and chips are marked as categories in which the consumer does not shop around for his favorite 
brand (high store loyalty and low performance risk). This makes the calendar decision quite 
inconsequential for retailers. For items that score high on ‘impulsiveness’ like chips, though, 
having seen a store flyer ad may act as a purchase trigger upon encountering the brand in-store 
(even if that is a store where the brand is not on deal), and out-of-phase calendars may benefit 
the manufacturer.    
Second, we find that immediate sales shifts are a poor indicator of which calendar yields 
the highest net gains. In settings where out-of-phase calendars lead to substantially more sales 
on deal, they end up generating about the same (for retailers) or lower (for manufacturers) net 
                                                 
14 We thank the authors for making these data available.  
15 Details available on request. 
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revenue gains than in-phase schedules. Conversely, settings with similar gross sales lift may 
hide net revenue gains for the manufacturer under the out-of-phase regime. Hence, practitioners 
interested in their bottom line, should not be (mis)guided by calendar differences within the 
promotion period.  
Third, our results cast doubt on the prevailing view that retailers are better off promoting 
out-of-phase. We show that striving for out-of-phase brand promotions with rival chains does 
not necessarily boost retailers’ net revenue gains, even in categories where brand promotions 
influence the purchase-location-of-choice. Because in such categories retailers often grant high 
levels of pass through, the profit implications of out-of-phase calendars may actually be worse. 
For instance, in the beer category, traditionally considered a ‘traffic builder’, Besanko, Dube 
and Gupta (2005) report pass-through levels of over 500%. With regular retailer beer margins of 
about 18% (Besanko et al. 2005), this would imply lower simulated profits from out-of-phase 
than in-phase calendars, for both retailers.   
Still, to the extent that out-of-phase calendars generate additional traffic for the retailer, 
they may imply more cross-category sales (halo effects) to compensate the category losses. To 
explore this issue, we compared the number of store visits in our simulations under the two 
calendars. We find that, even in categories where alternating promotions lead to more category 
purchase shifts across stores (beer and coffee), traffic to the two stores across the planning 
period hardly increases (i.e. 0.1% of total visits). This suggests that much of the store switching 
is indirect – consumers shifting category purchases among stores they would have visited 
anyway – and extra cross-shopping probably limited. It follows that even if retailers are in a 




Finally, we find that with net volume gains as the performance metric, manufacturer and 
retailer interests are not incongruent. In categories where featured price cuts produce shifts in 
category (brand) sales to the promoting store, retailers may prefer out-of-phase schedules, while 
manufacturers are indifferent. Conversely, if featured price cuts primarily generate attention to 
the brand (at any store) to the detriment of rival brands, manufacturers may prefer out-of-phase 
promotions, while retailers do not care. These insights suggest that, when it comes to promotion 
calendar negotiations, the interests of both parties are not necessarily unaligned. 
2.7.2. Limitations and Future Research  
Clearly, our study has limitations that set the stage for further research. First, our 
empirical analysis pertained to only one country, and consumers’ propensity to switch 
brands/stores may be different in other settings. Second, we focused on outcomes for the 
promoted brand (for the manufacturer) and category (for the retailer), and it would be 
interesting to study cross-brand and cross-category effects. Given that halo effects are typically 
small (Ailawadi et al.’s 2006), and that out-of-phase schedules do not seem to substantially 
increase traffic over the planning period, we do not expect them to change calendar preferences 
-  something future studies could verify. Third, while we considered the brand as a whole, 
consumers’ inclination to switch stores may vary with the promoted SKUs (e.g. package size or 
type), and our study sets the stage for an analysis of SKU level-calendars. Fourth, we studied 
price cuts featured in the retailers’ store flyer – which, being visible to consumers outside the 
store, are most prone to trigger store switching. Still, it may be useful to analyze how the 
scheduling of in-store promotions across retailers plays out for different parties. Fifth, while we 
documented sales volume and revenue implications, managers may ultimately be more 
interested in profit – which we could only roughly reflect on, for lack of data. With per-unit 
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promotional funding and retailer pass-through below one, manufacturers are likely to profit 
more from in-phase calendars. At the same time, such calendars may lead to higher sales 
volatility, rendering the logistics more complex and costly (see, e.g., Cachon, Randall and 
Schmidt 2007). These are interesting topics for future study. Sixth, our analysis used the 
perspective of a leading national brand, and it would be interesting to check whether similar 
patterns can be found for all brands. Finally, we empirically documented the implications of 
moving towards a more in-phase calendar for a given brand, against the backdrop of rival brand 
promotions, which we kept constant. Because (i) we considered gradual calendar changes, 
within the boundaries of the data and (ii) in line with extant findings (Steenkamp, Nijs, 
Hanssens and Dekimpe 2005), we did not find any clear pattern of competitive reactions in our 
data, this approach seems justified. Still, more radical calendar changes may cause rivals to 
follow suit, and call for a structural analysis of the calendar effects – which we leave as a topic 




Figure 2.1: GNL Model for Joint Brand-Choice, Store-Choice and Category Purchase Incidence Decision 
 Nesting Structure 






















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.2: Main Decision Patterns in the Estimated GNL Model 
Patterna Characteristicsb 
A: ‘IncidenceStoreBrand’ 
γR1 <1, γC1 ~=1 
 Strong competition among brands within a store 
 Category purchase depends on stores’ attractiveness in the category as a whole 
B: ‘IncidenceBrandStore’ 
γB2 <1, γC2 < 1 
 Consumers are brand-loyal with high (possibly direct) store-switching 
 Category incidence is need-based (brands strongly compete for a category purchase) 
C: ‘IncidenceBrandStore’ 
γB2≥1, γC2 >1 
 Increased brand appeal at one store (e.g. through promotions) may spill over to other stores  
 Enhanced appeal for one brand may increase category incidence overall (including other-brand purchases) 
D:  ‘StoreIncidenceBrand’ 
γR3<1, γC3 >1 
 Attractiveness of the focal category enhances overall store appeal (which may lead to direct and indirect 
store switching) 
 Brand compete heavily within store for a category purchase 
a See Figure 2.1 for the GNL model structure. b Note that, as indicated in the methodology section, a nesting parameter below 1 implies disproportionally high 
competition within the corresponding nest, while a parameter above 1 implies disproportionally low competition or even leverage effects.
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Figure 2.3: Simulation Results 


















Notes: Calendar differences are calculated as Out-of-Phase minus In-Phase, divided by In-Phase. Significances based on 100 
simulations. Measures are calculated over the 26 week period for the retailers and manufacturer. For the retailer, the figures pertain 












Notes: For each calendar, the ‘bars’ are calculated as (i) the difference in sales between the no-promotion benchmark scenario 
(baseline) and the considered calendar, (ii) across the two retailers, (iii) during the promotion weeks (for brand-switching, brand-
store switching and store-switching) or in the week following those promotions (for pre-emptive switches – including pre-emptive 
brand-, store-, and brand-store switches – and stockpiling). For instance, ‘brand-switching’ is the baseline sales minus calendar 
sales (totaled across promotion weeks and the two retailers) for rival brands within the promoting store (such that a ‘positive’ 
number means that rival brands in the same store lose when the focal brand is on promotion, and ‘contribute’ to the focal brand’s 
sales bump). Similarly, ‘store-switching’ is the difference between baseline-sales and calendar sales, across promotion weeks and 
the two retailers, for the focal brand at rival stores; and ‘stockpiling’ is the difference between baseline and calendar sales for the 
focal brand at the promoting store across periods immediately following a promotion week. Note that the figures can also be 
negative (for instance: a negative figure for store switching would mean that a promotion for the focal brand at a promoting chain 
implies higher same-week sales for the focal brand at rival chains, a negative figure for stockpiling means that the focal brand 
continues to sell more at the promoting chain in the week following the promotion, etc.). More details on the calculations are given 






Table 2.1: Brand and Retailer Descriptives 
 
Panel A: Volume Market Shares (in %) 
Category Beer Chips 
Retailer NB1 NB2 NB3 NB4 NB5 PL1 PL2 PL3  Ret. NB1 NB2 NB3 PL1 PL2 PL3 Ret. 
R1 18.6 12.8 16.3 7.9 6.2 7.5 0 5.4  16.9 52.9 24.9 2.8 15.3 0 0 20.8 
R2 20.2 18.3 22.3 7.0 4.2 0 6.0 0  16.1 60.9 14.0 2.6 0 18.3 0 16.9 
R3 15.1 18.2 20.9 6.5 5.3 0 0 0  7.8 55.4 19.7 4.8 0 0 0 7.4 
R4 20.9 13.8 20.7 9.0 4.1 0 .4 0  5.8 66.9 11.0 4.4 0 0 12.1 5.0 
R5 9.0 12.6 16.8 20.1 3.9 0 0 0  4.9 63.3 8.1 6.5 0 0 0 6.0 
Meana 16.3 15.0 17.9 9.6 4.6 1.9 1.6 1.4   57.8 14.9 4.4 3.2 3.1 3.0  
   
Category Laundry Detergents Coffee 
Retailer NB1 NB2 NB3 NB4 NB5 PL1 PL2 PL3 PL4 Ret. NB1 NB2 PL1 PL2 PL3 PL4 Ret. 
R1 27.7 20.9 7.7 8.7 2.1 15.8 0 0 0 22.8 36.9 1.8 56.4 0 0 0 21.9 
R2 24.5 21.0 4.9 3.3 1.0 0 19.9 0 0 11.2 58.0 8.4 0 29.0 0 0 14.8 
R3 22.6 19.0 8.8 9.7 8.4 0 0 10.6 0 6.6 56.4 6.8 0 0 30.5 0 7.5 
R4 25.9 22.7 5.0 7.7 5.9 0 0 0 12.2 4.4 61.3 9.0 0 0 0 23.3 5.0 
R5 18.6 24.4 6.8 2.9 6.3 0 0 0 0 4.4 64.7 6.5 0 0 0 0 4.8 
Mean 22.1 20.0 6.5 6.4 5.3 4.0 6.6 2.7 4.1  54.1 6.4 11.5 5.8 6.2 4.7  
 
Panel B: Unit Prices (in Eurocents per volume unit) 
Category Beer Chips 














































































































   
   
Category Laundry Detergents Coffee 









































































































    
a  Mean share in the total market, including ‘rest’ retailers  
b Volume units : ml for beer and laundry detergents, grams for chips and coffee
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Table 2.2: Feature Promotion Calendar Descriptives: Beera 
 
Panel A: Promotion Frequency by Brand and Retailer 
 Frequency of promotions 
(weeks in promotion) 
Inter-promo time 
(in weeks) 
 Retailer    
Brand R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Total Mean SD 
NB1 60 63 65 50 17 256 5.50 8.39 
NB2 29 51 44 34 14 174 8.19 7.97 
NB3 42 43 38 41 18 182 8.70 12.69 
NB4 31 37 45 27 15 156 8.18 6.87 
NB5 34 17 44 27 16 145 11.32 15.56 
PL1 4 0 0 0 0 4 7.33 7.77 
PL2 0 5 0 0 0 5 77.00 85.93 
PL3 12 0 0 0 0 12 21.73 30.76 
Total 215 218 245 184 80 953   
 
Panel B: Number of Promotions per Week by National Brand and Retailerb 
 
Number of promotions per week (% of total promotions) 
 
Brand 1 2 3 4 5 
NB1 153 (59.8) 39 (30.4) 7 (8.2) 1 (1.6) 0 
NB2 117 (67.2) 21 (24.2) 5 (8.6) 0 0 
NB3 115 (63.1) 26 (28.6) 5 (8.3) 0 0 
NB4 114 (73.1) 18 (23.1) 2 (3.8) 0 0 
NB5 92 (63.9) 18 (25.0) 4 (8.3) 1 (2.8) 0 
PL1 4 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL2 5 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL3 12 (1) 0 0 0 0 
Total 629 (66.0) 123 (25.8) 23 (7.4) 1 (.04) 1 (.05) 
      
Retailer 1 2 3 4 5 6 
R1 160 (73.4) 21 (19.3) 3 (5.5) 1 (1.8) 0 0 
R2 142 (65.7) 28 (25.9) 3 (4.2) 1 (1.9) 1 (2.3) 0 
R3 165 (67.3) 34 (27.8) 4 (4.9) 0 0 0 
R4 130 (70.0) 17 (18.5) 4 (6.5) 2 (4.3) 0 0 
R5 61 (76.2) 5 (12.5) 3 (11.3) 0 0 0 
Total 667 (70.0) 106 (22.2) 17 (5.4) 3 (1.3) 1 (0.5) 1 (0) 
 
a The totals include the ‘rest’ brand or retailer.  
b 
The table should be read as follows: For brand NB1, there were 153 weeks with a promotion at one retailer, 39 weeks with a 
simultaneous promotion at two retailers, 7 weeks with a simultaneous promotion at three retailers, and 1 week with a promotion at 
4 retailers. Hence, of the total number of retailer-promotion weeks for NB1 (256, see Panel A), 153 (or 153/256 = 59.8%) did not 
run concurrently with any other chain, 2*39 promotions (or 68/256=30.4%) were scheduled simultaneously at two retailers, 3*21 
promotions (or: 63/256=8.2%) were scheduled simultaneously at three retailers, and 4*1 promotions (or: 4/256=1.6%) occurred  
simultaneously at four retailers.  
46 
 
Table 2.3: Variables and Operationalizations  
Variable Operationalization Model (Utility)a 
Promotion variables   
(Feature) Promotion 
Dummy equal to one if there was a feature promotion for (more than half of the 
brand’s SKU line) at the retailer in that week, and zero otherwise 
GNL (𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Promotion at other retailer 
Dummy equal to one if the same brand was on feature at another retailer in the 
same week, and zero otherwise 
GNL (𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Lagged promotion 
Dummy equal to one if the same brand was on feature at the same  retailer in the 
previous week, and zero otherwise 
GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Weeks_since_last_same 
Time (log-transformed number of weeks) since previous feature promotion for the 
brand at the retailer, weighted by retailer household share in init. period 
GNL (𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ )+ Q 
Promotion lead effect 
𝑎1(𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠_𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑡
ℎ ) ∗ exp (−exp (𝑎2 ∗ 𝑆𝐷_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑡
ℎ ), where 
Weeks_since_last_all is the log-number of weeks since the last promo for that 
brand at any retailer (weighted by the retailer’s share of household purchases in an 
initialization period), mean-centered by brand; SD_Inter_Promo_Time is the st. 




Difference between the brands’ regular and promotion price, where promotion 
prices are identified as prices more than one standard deviation below the mean 
GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Retailer variables   
Distance to retailer 
Log-transformed distance (in km) of household to closest outlet of each retailer 
(updated quarterly) 
GNL(𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ ;  𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Ret. pref. (init. visit share) Household-specific retailer share of visits in initialization period GNL(𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ ;  𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Last visit retailer 
Dummy equal to one if household’s last shopping trip occurred at the same retailer, 
and zero otherwise 
GNL(𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ ;  𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Last purchase retailer 
Dummy equal to one if household’s last purchase in the category occurred at the 
same retailer, and zero otherwise 
GNL(𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ ;  𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Ret. attraction other cats 
The mean-centered promotion pressure for each retailer, weighted by category and 
retailer share (in initialization period) of each household. 
GNL(𝑌0𝑟𝑡
ℎ ;  𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Category variables   
Purchase rate hh (init) 
Household purchase incidence rate in focal category, calculated as fraction of trips 
with a category purchase in the initialization period 
GNL( 𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
Lagged cat. purchase 
Dummy equal to one if household’s last shopping trip included a category 









ℎ  , where 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑡
ℎ = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡




], with Ch= hh’s average (weekly) consumption 
rate in the initialization period, and a3 is the consumption flexibility parameter. 
GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Seasonality: Temperature Average temperature during week GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Seasonality: Christmas Dummies for Christmas (last 2 weeks of December) GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) (beer) 
Seasonality: Summer  Dummies for summer (July & August) GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) (beer) 
Brand variables   
Last purchase brand 
Dummy equal to one if same brand was purchased on household’s last purchase in 




Average price per unit volume (across SKUs) for a brand in a given week, as 
observed in the panel data. Missing observations were replaced by 4 week moving 
average of the brand price at the same retailer, outliers (> 5 SD) were replaced by 
series mean 
GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) + Q 
Assortment 
Number of SKUs in the brand’s line at the retailer (prior moving average of 
number of SKUs encountered in the panel, over 26 weeks 
GNL(𝑌𝑏𝑟𝑡
ℎ ) 
a: Model GNL: Retailer, Brand and Incidence choice, Model Q: Quantity   
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results 
 
Panel A: Parameter Estimates 
Model Variable 
Beer Laundry Detergents Coffee Chips 












      
(Feature) Promotion .461*** .161*** 1.047*** .543*** .932*** .000 .635*** .009 
Promotion at other retailer -.068*** .046*** -.035 .002 .073*** .039 .101*** .139*** 
Promo*Weeks_since_last_same  -4.102*** - -.721  -.394  -1.719***  
Lagged promotion .104*** .129*** .052*** .094*** -.065*** .029* -.158 .034*** 
Weeks_since_last_all .001 .003*** .006*** .004 -74.831 38.976 -.001*** .001 
Weeks since last_all *SD. IPtime 3.973 - .287 - 4.563***  .210 - 
Discount depth .734*** .197** -.038 .180*** .134 .245** .998*** .006 
Retailer variablesc         
Distance to retailer -.572*** .221*** -.563*** .274*** -.853*** .727*** -.628*** .374*** 
Ret. pref. (initial visit share) 3.533*** - 2.859***  3.361***  3.587***  
Last visit retailer .036*** .004 .067*** .043 -.086*** .080*** .442*** .290*** 
Last purchase retailer .389*** .074*** .291*** .047 .343*** .004 .588*** .020 
Ret. attr. other cats .028 .032 .003 .110*** .131*** .089* .218*** .088*** 
Category variables         
Purchase rate hh (init) .868*** - .891*** - 2.231*** - 1.638*** - 
Lagged cat purchase .152*** .119*** -.216* .344*** -.812*** .048 -.158*** .342*** 
Inventory -.871*** .294* -.157*** .081*** -.735 .250*** -25.137*** 21.885*** 
Consumption flexibility .350*** - 1.569 - .911 - -1.002 - 
Seasonality: Temperature .325*** - .028* - -.081* - .144*** - 
Seasonality: Christmas .612*** - - - - - - - 
Seasonality: Summer  .033 - - - - - - - 
Brand variablesc         
Last purchase brand .130*** .063*** .692*** .108*** .450*** .019 1.419*** .294*** 
Regular price -1.940*** 1.402*** -1.260*** .671*** -.246*** .344*** -1.040*** .652*** 
Assortment .034*** .138*** .336*** .207*** .279*** .061*** .332*** .125*** 
Model-Structure parameters 
  
      
Allocation par. (transformed) η1
b 3.005*** .500*** 2.298*** .705*** .019 .985*** .916*** .749*** 
Allocation par. (transformed) η2
b 4.594*** .016 1.708*** 2.265*** -.392 .761*** -.383*** 1.201*** 
Nesting par. log(γR1) -1.965*** - -3.537*** - -1.478* - .242*** - 
Nesting par. log(γC1) .027 - -.077*** - .069*** - .379*** - 
Nesting par. log(γB2) -.144*** - -.192*** - -.033 - -.674*** - 
Nesting par. log(γC2) -1.283*** - -.188*** - .516* - .163*** - 
Nesting par. log(γR3) .802*** - -.420*** - -.526*** - -.491*** - 
Nesting par. log(γC3) .873*** - .724*** - 1.485*** - 1.381*** - 
Loglikelihood(sig)d -71462*** -28816***   
Quantity 
model 
Promotion-related variables         
(Feature) Promotion 1.125*** 1.700*** .249 .267 .066*** .034*** .056*** .034*** 
Promotion at other retailer -.301*** .083 .015 .060 .007 .003 .004** .005 
Promo*Weeks since last  .000 - .003 - -.001  .001  
Lagged promotion .132** .131 -.074 .015 .002 .019 .007 .005 
Discount  4.648*** 1.102*** .061 .075 .411*** .482*** -.030 .046*** 
Controlsc         
Mean quantity hh (init) 0.015***  .012***  .016***  .003  
Price -9.317*** 16.535*** -3.002*** .065 -.059 .484*** -.219*** .146*** 
Inventory 1.032*** 2.370*** .004 .089*** -.038** .152*** -.383 .012 
Seasonality: Temperature .002  .000  .000  -.001  





Panel B: Estimated GNL Structure 
  Beer Laundry Detergents Coffee Chips 
ISB IBS SIB ISB IBS SIB ISB IBS SIB ISB IBS SIB 
Allocation Parsb .17 .82 .01 .60 .34 .06 .38 .25 .37 .60 .16 .24 
Nesting Par. Lower 
level 
.140 .866 2.231 .029 .826 .657 .228 .967 .591 0.510 1.273 .612 
Nesting Par. Higher 
level 
1.027 .277 2.394 .926 .829 2.062 1.071 1.675 4.416 1.1772 1.461 3.980 
 
a: Estimated means and standard deviations of the household mixing distributions; *: p<0.10, **:  p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
b: Such that: τ1=exp(η1)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1); τ2=exp(η2)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1) and τ3=1- τ1 –τ2 (see Appendix 2.A for details). 
c: Retailer and brand constants are not reported to save space, but can be obtained from the first author.  




Appendix 2.A: Estimation Issues 
Identification and transformations 
The GNL and Quantity models include (random) intercepts for the retailers and brands. For identification of 
the brand constants, the ‘rest brand’ (for which no separate constant is estimated) serves as the reference 
brand in the Quantity model, and ‘no choice’ is the reference in the GNL model. For the retailer constants, 
the ‘rest retailer’ is the reference in both models.  
To ensure values for the allocation parameters τ1, τ2,and τ3  within [0,1] and summing to 1, we estimated a 
transformation of these parameters, η1 and η2, such that: τ1=exp(η1)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1); 
τ2=exp(η2)/(exp(η1)+exp(η2)+1) and τ3=1- τ1 –τ2. Similarly, we estimate the log of the nesting parameters to 
ensure positive values.  
Issues in GNL model estimation 
Simulated maximum likelihood estimation of the random-effects GNL model involves maximization of the 
following function: 




















ℎ are household-specific draws of the parameter vector from the mixing distribution, with means and 




ℎ are the 
probabilities in Figure 2.1 in the main text calculated at the parameter-vector draw 𝛽𝑑
ℎ, and 𝑦0,𝑟𝑡
ℎ  and 𝑦𝑏,𝑟𝑡
ℎ  are 
variables indicating whether a no-purchase trip (purchase of brand b) actually occurred at time t and retailer r 
for household h. Because the GNL model (and the corresponding likelihood expression above) contains (i) 
observations for all household shopping trips at all stores (irrespective of a category purchase), and (ii) 
choice probabilities for a large set of alternatives, i.e. (number of brands in the category + no purchase) times 
(number of retailers), three problems arise in the heterogeneous (random-effects) GNL specification. First, 
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estimation time becomes prohibitive. Second, because of the large number of (potentially small) probabilities 
to be multiplied (i.e. the large number of trips), calculation of the likelihood for each household leads to 
numerical problems, which cannot be resolved with (clever) rescaling. Third, obtaining proper parameter 
estimates for the promotion variables (which are crucial to our analysis) is further compounded by the large 
number of trips without category purchases (Note that the promotion parameters only enter the utilities 
involving a brand purchase, see Table 2.3). 
To resolve these problems, we use insights from the literature on discrete-choice model estimation with 
choice-based sampling. Building on this literature, instead of estimating the model on the complete data set, 
we first obtain a stratified sample from the households’ shopping trips, in which we (i) use all the 
households’ trips that involve a category purchase, but (ii) randomly sample from its trips without a purchase 
in the focal category (the ‘no-incidence trips’). We do so separately for each product category, where we set 
the sampling rate from the no-incidence trips such that we have the same number of trips with incidence and 
without incidence. To illustrate, consider the beer category, for which close to 10% of household trips in the 
estimation sample contain a category purchase, and 90% do not. By randomly sampling one out of nine trips 
without a purchase, we get a balanced distribution of incidence and no-incidence trips.  
Because we know the fraction Q of no-incidence trips in the ‘population’ (i.e. our data set including 
all trips, obtained from the GfK panel; e.g. for beer: Q=10%) as well as our corresponding sampling rate H 
(in the above example for beer: 1/9), we can then use the weighted estimation procedure described by 
Manski and McFadden (1981) and Cosslett (1981) to obtain unbiased estimates of our parameters. This 
approach maximizes the following expression, using simulated log-likelihood to obtain the maximum: 
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Though the procedure does not yield efficient estimates, this is not really an issue here, given our large 
number of observations. For our random effects GNL model, this speeds up estimation considerably and, 
more importantly, removes convergence problems from numerical underflow. We tested the procedure by 
comparing its outcomes with those obtained from the full sample of observations, for the homogeneous 
models (in which computation time is far lower as is, and numerical problems can be avoided by expressing 
the loglikelihood as the sum of loglikelihoods across household-trip observations). The results (both in terms 
of parameter estimates and their significance) were substantively the same – in support of the procedure.  




Appendix 2.B: Promotion Calendar Descriptives 
Table 2.B.1: Feature Promotion Calendar: Descriptives: Beer 
 
Panel A: Promotion Frequency by Brand and Retailer 
 Frequency of promotions 
(weeks in promotion) 
Inter-promo time 
(in weeks) 
 Retailer    
Brand R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Totala Mean SD 
NB1 60 63 65 50 17 256 5.50 8.39 
NB2 29 51 44 34 14 174 8.19 7.97 
NB3 42 43 38 41 18 182 8.70 12.69 
NB4 31 37 45 27 15 156 8.18 6.87 
NB5 34 17 44 27 16 145 11.32 15.56 
PL1 4 0 0 0 0 4 7.33 7.77 
PL2 0 5 0 0 0 5 77.00 85.93 
PL3 12 0 0 0 0 12 21.73 30.76 
Totala 215 218 245 184 80 953   
aThe column totals include the ‘rest’ brand, the row totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 
 
Panel B: Number of Promotions per Week by National Brand and Retailer 
 Number of promotions per week (% of total promotions) 
Brand 1 2 3 4 5 
NB1d 153 (59.8) 39 (30.4) 7 (8.2) 1 (1.6) 0 
NB2 117 (67.2) 21 (24.2) 5 (8.6) 0 0 
NB3 115 (63.1) 26 (28.6) 5 (8.3) 0 0 
NB4 114 (73.1) 18 (23.1) 2 (3.8) 0 0 
NB5 92 (63.9) 18 (25.0) 4 (8.3) 1 (2.8) 0 
PL1 4 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL2 5 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL3 12 (1) 0 0 0 0 
Totalb 629 (66) 123 (25.8) 23 (7.4) 1 (.04) 1 (.05) 
Retailer 1 2 3 4 5 6 
R1 160 (74.4) 21 (19.6) 3 (4.2) 1 (1.8) 0 0 
R2 142 (65.7) 28 (25.9) 3 (4.2) 1 (1.9) 1 (2.3) 0 
R3 165 (67.3) 34 (27.8) 4 (4.9) 0 0 0 
R4 130 (70.0) 17 (18.5) 4 (6.5) 2 (4.3) 0 0 
R5 61 (76.2) 5 (12.5) 3 (11.3) 0 0 0 
Totalc 667 (70.0) 106 (22.2) 17 (5.4) 3 (1.3) 1 (0.5) 1 (0) 
b The totals include the ‘rest’ brand, c the totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 
d The table should be read as follows: For brand NB1, there were 153 weeks with a promotion at one retailer, 39 weeks with a 
simultaneous promotion at two retailers, 7 weeks with a simultaneous promotion at three retailers, and 1 week with a promotion at 
4 retailers. Hence, of the total number of retailer-promotion weeks for NB1 (256, see Panel A), 153 (or 153/256 = 59.8%) did not 
run concurrently with any other chain, 2*39 promotions (or 68/256=30.4%) were scheduled simultaneously at two retailers, 3*21 
promotions (or: 63/256=8.2%) were scheduled simultaneously at three retailers, and 4*1 promotions (or: 4/256=1.6%) occurred 
simultaneously at four retailers. 
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Table 2.B.2: Feature Promotion Calendar: Descriptives: Laundry Detergents 
 
Panel A: Promotion Frequency by Brand and Retailer 
 Frequency of promotions 
(weeks in promotion) 
Inter-promo time 
(in weeks) 
 Retailer    
Brand R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Totala Mean SD 
NB1 81 68 67 80 20 359 5.75 6.45 
NB2 102 80 95 81 26 428 4.94 4.67 
NB3 63 25 48 40 20 237 8.74 10.02 
NB4 86 17 55 58 9 285 7.20 8.45 
NB5 21 0 40 52 21 197 10.83 17.43 
PL1 25 0 0 0 0 28 13.88 14.82 
PL2 0 4 0 0 0 4 102.00 96.81 
PL3 0 0 18 0 0 18 20.59 23.92 
PL4 0 0 0 25 0 25 15.54 21.84 
Totala 483 303 426 439 99 2004   
a The column totals include the ‘rest’ brand, the row totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 
 
Panel B: Number of Promotions per Week by National Brand and Retailer 
 Number of promotions (% of total promotions) per week 
Brand 1 2 3 4 5 
NB1 164 (45.7) 54 (30.1) 18 (15.0) 7 (7.8) 1 (1.4) 
NB2 171 (40.0) 75 (35.0) 30 (21.0) 3 (2.8) 1 (1.2) 
NB3 127 (53.5) 31 (26.2) 13 (16.5) 1 (1.7) 1 (2.1) 
NB4 161 (56.5) 50 (35.1) 8 (8.4) 0 0 
NB5 118 (74.3) 27 (17.6) 7 (6.8) 1 (1.3) 0 
PL1 24 (85.7) 2 (14.3) 0 0 0 
PL2 4 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL3 18 (1) 0 0 0 0 
PL4 25 (1) 0 0 0 0 
Totalb 958 (47.8) 333 (33.3) 103 (15.4) 14 (2.8) 3 (0.7) 
       
Retailer 1 2 3 4 6 7 
R1 216 (44.7) 107 (44.3) 12 (7.5) 1 (0.8) 1 (1.2) 1 (1.5) 
R2 205 (67.7) 40 (26.4) 6 (5.9) 0 0 0 
R3 212 (49.8) 74 (34.7) 18 (12.7) 3 (2.8) 0 0 
R4 207 (53.8) 84 (43.6) 20 (1.6) 1 (1.0) 0 0 
R5 63 (63.6) 15 (30.3) 2 (6.1) 0 0 0 
Totalc 932 (46.5) 355 (35.4) 87 (13.2) 22 (4.4) 1 (0.2) 1 (0.3) 
    b The totals include the ‘rest’ brand.  
    c The totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 




Table 2.B.3: Feature Promotion Calendar: Descriptives: Coffee 
 
Panel A: Promotion Frequency by Brand and Retailer 
 Frequency of promotions 
(weeks in promotion) 
Inter-promo time 
(in weeks) 
 Retailer    
Brand R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Totala Mean SD 
NB1 60 83 74 106 0 323 5.17 5.78 
NB2 10 36 44 60 1 156 11.03 19.09 
PL1 65 0 0 0 0 80 6.56 5.55 
PL2 0 31 0 0 0 31 13.30 15.34 
PL3 0 0 118 0 0 132 3.61 3.00 
PL4 0 0 0 110 0 110 3.83 3.61 
Totala 138 154 263 290 1 880   
a The column totals include the ‘rest’ brand, the row totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 
 
Panel B: Number of Promotions per Week by National Brand and Retailer 
 Number of promotions (% of total promotions) per week 
Brand 1 2 3 4 
NB1 168 (52.0) 68 (42.1) 5 (4.7) 1 (1.2) 
NB2 128 (82) 11 (14.1) 2 (3.9) 0 
PL1 52 (65) 14 (35) 0 0 
PL2 31 (1) 0 0 0 
PL3 132 (1) 0 0 0 
PL4 110 (1) 0 0 0 
Totalb 655 (73.6) 100 (22.5) 7 (3.5) 1 (0.4) 
      
Retailer 1 2 3 4 5 
R1 126 (91.3) 6 (8.7) 0 0 0 
R2 144 (93.5) 5 (6.5) 0 0 0 
R3 199 (75.7) 32 (24.3) 0 0 0 
R4 237 (81.7) 22 (15.2) 3 (3.1) 0 0 
R5 1 (1) 0 0 0 0 
Totalc 731 (83.2) 70 (15.7) 3 (1.1) 0 0 
     b The totals include the ‘rest’ brand.  
   c The totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 





Table 2.B.4: Feature Promotion Calendar: Descriptives: Chips 
 
Panel A: Promotion Frequency by Brand and Retailer 
 Frequency of promotions 
(weeks in promotion) 
Inter-promo time 
(in weeks) 
 Retailer    
Brand R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 Totala Mean SD 
NB1 65 61 56 40 0 222 7.16 7.48 
NB2 31 30 41 24 19 178 8.22 14.38 
NB3 18 21 50 31 4 141 13.14 29.80 
PL1 20 0 0 0 0 23 21.84 20.55 
PL2 0 6 0 0 0 6 71.00 70.71 
PL3 0 0 0 32 0 32 11.32 16.29 
Totala 144 125 189 142 24 677   
a The column totals include the ‘rest’ brand, the row totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 
 
Panel B: Number of Promotions per Week by National Brand and Retailer 
 Number of promotions (% of total promotions) per week 
Brand 1 2 3 4 
NB1 138 (62.2) 39 (35.1) 2 (2.7) 0 
NB2 71 (39.9) 29 (32.6) 11 (18.5) 4 (9.0) 
NB3 94 (66.7) 22 (31.2) 1 (2.1) 0 
PL1 23 (100.0) 0 0 0 
PL2 6 (100.0) 0 0 0 
PL3 32 (100.0) 0 0 0 
Totalb 431 (14.5) 94 (3.2) 14 (.5) 4 (.1) 
      
Retailer 1 2 3 4 5 
R1 130 (90.3) 7 (6.7) 0 0 0 
R2 111 (88.8) 7 (11.0) 0 0 0 
R3 157 (83.1) 16 (16.9) 0 0 0 
R4 122 (85.9) 10 (14.1) 0 0 0 
R5 24 (100.0) 0 0 0 0 
Totalc 589 (87.0) 44 (13.0) 0 0 0 
     b The totals include the ‘rest’ brand.  
     c The totals include the ‘rest’ retailer. 






Appendix 2.C: Correlation Tables  
Table 2.C.1: Correlation Price and Promotion Variables 
 










Weeks since last 





(Feature) Promotion               
Promotion at other retailer .062** 
      
Promo*Weeks_since_last_same .004 .013 
     
Lagged Promotion .214** .105** .002 
    
Weeks since last all * SD. IPtime -.012 -.052** -.001 -.012 
   
Weeks_since_last_all -.040** -.105** .033** -.093** .155** 
  
Discount depth .719** .020* .013 .138** -.013 -.031** 
 
Regular Price -.092** .054** .000 .006 -.340** .062** -.120** 
*: p<0.05, **:  p<0.01 
 










Weeks since last 






       
Promotion at other retailer .094** 
      
Promo*Weeks_since_last_same .024** .010 
     
Lagged Promotion .221** .108** .000 
    
Weeks since last all * SD. IPtime -.040** -.079** -.001 -.040** 
   
Weeks_since_last_all -.046** -.074** .042** -.102** -.110** 
  
Discount depth .682** .060** .082** .184** -.024* -.030** 
 
Regular Price -.015 .147** .010 .053** -.099** -.141** -.049** 















Weeks since last 






       
Promotion at other retailer .016 
      
Promo*Weeks_since_last_same .044** -.002 
     
Lagged Promotion .208** .002 -.001 
    
Weeks since last all * SD. IPtime -.104** -.073** -.008 -.104** 
   
Weeks_since_last_all -.043** -.040** .030** -.111** .170** 
  
Discount depth .550** -.008 .081** .138** -.061** -.022* 
 
Regular Price -.011 .128** .023* .062** -.272** .013 -.131** 
*: p<0.05, **:  p<0.01 
 










Weeks since last 






       
Promotion at other retailer .167** 
      
Promo*Weeks_since_last_same .030** .017* 
     
Lagged Promotion .318** .134** .002 
    
Weeks since last all * SD. IPtime -.083** -.043** .002 -.082** 
   
Weeks_since_last_all -.053** -.003 .038** -.084** .097** 
  
Discount depth .532** .093** .038** .177** -.048** -.030** 
 
Regular Price -.086** .031** -.007 .000 .212** -.120** -.147** 






Appendix 2.D: Simulation Procedure  
Simulation Setup 
To assess the implications of the parameter estimates for the effectiveness of different 
promotion calendars, we use them as inputs for simulations, in which we use the actual data in a 
26-week period (and promotion calendars, at all brands and retailers, in this period) as a 
backdrop. We then consider a number of simulation cases, in which we implement changes in 
the promotion calendars. In each simulation case, we consider changes in the calendar of 
featured price cuts for a given brand (hereafter; the focal brand), at two retailers. We consider 
two alternative retailer combinations: (i) scenario A: the two dominant players in the category, 
and (ii) scenario B: the highest-share chain with a lower share retailer. The number of feature 
promotions at these two retailers is set roughly equal to the actual total in the observation period, 
and then equally split between the retailers. Each feature lasts one week, and involves a price cut 
equal to the brand’s observed mean discount at the two chains. Table 2.C.1 provides an overview 
of the simulation setup for the different categories. 
To realistically assess the calendar effects (and avoid the Lucas critique), we consider 
simulation setups that fall within the data range. In the out-of-phase schedule, none of the focal-
brand promotions concurrently occur at the two retailers. For the in-phase schedule, we let 
two/thirds of the promotion events coincide at the two retailers – the maximum ‘simultaneity’ 
observed in the dataset for a period of 26 consecutive weeks. The remaining promotions still take 
place at the two retailers in different weeks (along with any other-brand promotions, which are 
kept common across the two scenarios). We then compare the results across the two calendars 
(fully out-of-phase vs. half in-phase/half out-of-phase, or simply: out-of-phase vs. in-phase 
hereafter), and also confront them with the benchmark setting of no featured price cuts for the 
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focal brand at the two promoting retailers. Specifically, using the estimated parameter estimates 
(means and standard deviations of the mixing distributions across households), we predict the 
households’ probabilities of retailer choice, category purchase incidence, brand choice and 
quantity, (for each observed shopping trip) in each week of our planning period, under the two 
calendars. Households are randomly assigned parameter estimates from the mixing distribution 
obtained in the estimation procedure (for each household, 100 such draws are considered, the 
outcomes of which are then averaged to obtain the household-level results). We dynamically 
update all the relevant variables (e.g. state dependence retailer/brand, last time purchased, last 
quantity purchased, inventory, etc.), by taking draws from the outcome predictions in the 
previous period. Aggregating these predictions across panelists then yields the overall 
implications of the different calendars. Given that our parameters are estimated with uncertainty, 
we repeat these simulations for 100 draws from the parameter sampling distributions, to assess 
the significance of the calendar differences.  
 As indicated above, our calendar simulations run against the backdrop of other-brand 
promotions. Changing the calendars will also change their interplay with these other actions. To 
distinguish highly idiosyncratic sequencing and contemporaneous effects from systematic 
calendar-type effects, we verify these effects for different implementations within each calendar 
type, by changing the ordering of the promotions across retailers in the out-of-phase calendar, 
and reversing the specific week in which promotions occur in the in-phase calendar (see Table 
2.C.2. for an illustration for the beer category). Moreover, across categories, we also run the 
simulations for larger and smaller brands (see Table 2.C.1).  




To assess the total impact of calendar changes for the different parties, we first aggregate 
the panelists’ simulated purchases (i) of the focal brand and the category, (ii) at each of the two 
promoting retailers and across all retailers, (iii) over the entire planning horizon. We repeat this 
exercise by (i) aggregating the households’ predicted sales values (instead of volumes), and (ii) 
separating out these totals between volumes sold under promotional and non-promotional 
conditions. Comparing these metrics for the in-phase and out-of-phase calendars, then yields 
insights into the overall (differences in) calendar appeal – including all possible promotion 
dynamics (i.e. lead and lag effects, and category expansion effects). To assess the statistical 
significance, for each metric: we calculate the difference between calendars for a given 
parameter draw, and repeat this for each of the 100 draws from the parameter sampling 
distributions. We then consider the percentage of draws for which the calendar differences are 
positive (negative).  
Sales Bump Decomposition  
Next, to gain further insights into the differences in mechanisms, we zoom in on the sales 
bump for the focal brand within the promotion weeks/chains, and trace the sources of this sales 
lift, for each promotion calendar, and this for each of the two promoting retailers. We note that 
this sales bump may not cover all promotional sales increases, e.g. if the promotion would 
enhance sales/consumption of non-focal brands and/or non-promoting stores, this would not 
show up in the sales bump. Moreover, because of the high promotion frequency, we separate out 
the pre-emptive switches and stockpiling effects only in the post-promotion week (Note though 
that the net sales and revenue effects mentioned in Figure 2.3 in the main text, do include 
dynamics across the whole planning horizon). As such, the decomposition only supplements the 
insights from the overall calendar-comparisons.  
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To obtain the decomposition, we follow a procedure similar to previous authors (see, e.g., 
Ailawadi et al. 2007, Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2010). First, to obtain the sales bump we compare 
the purchases of the focal brand at the promoting retailer during promotion weeks, with 
purchases in the simulated benchmark setting (without promotions for the focal brand at the 
promoting chains). Next, we calculate:  
- the difference in other-brand category purchases at the promoting store, between the 
promotion setting and the benchmark setting, within the promotion weeks. If this figure is 
negative, this is a first source of the observed sales lift, labeled brand-switching (if it is positive, 
it means that the promotion actually increases other-brand sales at the promoting store).  
- the difference in purchases of the focal brand at rival stores, between the promotion 
setting and the benchmark setting, within the promotion weeks. If this figure is negative, this is a 
second source of the observed sales lift, labeled store-switching.  
- the difference in purchases of other brands of the category at rival stores, between the 
promotion setting and the benchmark setting, within the promotion weeks. If this figure is 
negative, this is a third source of the observed sales lift, labeled brand-store switching.  
- the difference in purchases of the focal brand at the promoting store, between the 
promotion setting and the benchmark setting, in the week following the promotion. If this figure 
is negative, this is a fourth source of the observed sales lift, labeled stockpiling.  
- the difference in other-brand category purchases at the promoting store, between the 
promotion setting and the benchmark setting, in the week following the promotion. If this figure 
is negative, this is a fifth source of the observed sales lift, labeled pre-emptive brand switching. 
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- the difference in purchases of the focal brand at rival stores, between the promotion 
setting and the benchmark setting, in the week following the promotion. If this figure is negative, 
this is a sixth source of the observed sales lift, denoted as pre-emptive store switching. 
- the difference in purchases of other brands in the category at rival stores, between the 
promotion setting and the benchmark setting, in the week following the promotion. If this figure 
is negative, this is a seventh source of the observed sales lift, labeled pre-emptive brand-store 
switching.  
It is important to note that in the main text in Figure 2.5, for ease of exposition, we (i) 
reverse the sign of the promotional components (such that, for instance, a ‘positive’ figure for 
‘brand switching’ means that competing brand sales went down, and this component contributes 
to the promoted brand’s sales lift), and (ii) we group the pre-emptive brand-, store-, and brand-
store switching components into one ‘pre-emptive switches’ entry in Figure 2.5 (the full 
breakdown can be obtained from the first author).  
 






Discount Depth (%) 25 
Total # retailer-promo weeks  12 
Retailers in Simulation (share)     
Leading (R1) 16.9% 22.8% 21.9% 20.8% 
Secondary (R2) 16.1% 11.2% 14.8% 16.9% 
Small (R4) 5.8% 4.4% 5.0% 5.0% 











Table 2.C.2.: Alternative promotion schedules for the focal brand at the two retailers: Beer  
 
 Predominantly Out-of-Phase calendars Predominantly In-Phase calendars 
 Schedule 1 Schedule 2 Schedule 1 Schedule 2 
Week R1 R2/R4 R1 R2/R4 R1 R2/R4 R1 R2/R4 
1         
2         
3         
4         
5         
6         
7         
8         
9         
10         
11         
12         
13         
14         
15         
16         
17         
18         
19         
20         
21         
22         
23         
24         
25         





Figure C.1: Simulation Results (Leading and Smaller Retailer) 
















Notes: Calendar differences are calculated as Out-of-Phase minus In-Phase, divided by In-Phase. Significances 
based on 100 simulations. Measures are calculated over the 26 week period for the two retailers and manufacturer. 
For the retailer, the figures pertain to the whole category (all brands), for the manufacturer they pertain to the focal 












On Consumer Decision Structures and the Impact of 
Feature and Discount Promotions 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Sales promotions in consumer packaged goods (CPG) markets are ever-more pervasive. 
Consumers’ decreased willingness to pay a premium for national brands (Steenkamp et al. 2010) 
and their propensity to spread purchases across multiple stores (Baltas et al. 2010), have led both 
manufacturers and retailers to step up their promotion activities, in the form of price discounts 
and/or feature advertising, to attract shoppers to their brand and store (Ailawadi et al. 2009). 
However, whether this is money well spent, depends on how consumers choose among the 
available brands and stores for their CPG purchases, and on the role of different promotional 
actions therein. 
Extant studies have typically documented the impact of promotions on brand and store 
sales at the market level (e.g. Srinivasan et al. 2004; van Heerde et al. 2004) or considered the 
effect on individual households’ brand choice (e.g. Mehta and Ma 2012) or store choice (e.g. 
Gauri et al. 2008) separately. Little is known about how individual households trade off their 
category purchases across both brands and stores, and how these  ̶  possibly heterogeneous  ̶ 
decision patterns align with the effect of price discounts and feature promotions. Especially at 
times where the interplay between manufacturers and retailers has become increasingly strained, 
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understanding how shoppers choose among brands and stores, and the role of promotions 
therein, is critical for the effective allocation and targeting of manufacturer and retailer sales 
promotion budgets. 
The primary objective of this study is to shed light on the patterns of brand-retailer choice 
in consumer packaged goods categories, and to explore how they affect the impact of promotions 
on the manufacturer and retailer. To this end, we propose and estimate a generalized extreme 
value (GEV) model that flexibly captures shoppers’ brand and store choice for a given category 
purchase. We estimate this model on household scanner panel data across different categories, 
spanning a period of 4 years. Our GEV model allows the choice of a brand-retailer combination 
to materialize through different decision structures, i.e. a structure in which the household 
primarily selects a retailer, and brands disproportionately compete with each other within that 
retailer (‘store-focus’) or, alternatively, in which the household primarily chooses a brand, and 
retailers disproportionally compete for that brand (‘brand focus’). We expect a mixture of 
structures to prevail in each category, but possibly with different importance weights. Our model 
also allows the impact of feature ads and promotional discounts – on consumers’ choices to 
differ between the two decision structures. Accommodating these route-dependent influences not 
only avoids biases in the estimated effect of promotional actions, it also leads to more refined 
insights into the promotional benefits for manufacturers and retailers. We use the outcomes of 
this model to empirically document the prevailing mixture of decision routes in multiple CPG 
categories. Next, we gauge the differential impact of store flyer appearances and price cuts 
across these decision routes for the promoted brand in the promoting store. We also consider the 
underlying brand switching and store switching patterns, and quantify the net consequences for 
the promoting brand (across stores), and for (the entire category in) the promoting store. Finally, 
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we briefly explore the link between decision patterns and household characteristics, and reflect 
on managerial implications. 
We contribute to extant literature in several ways. To the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to (i) simultaneously consider (inter- and intra-) brand- and store-competition, taking an 
individual shopper perspective, and allowing for a flexible interplay between the two choice 
dimensions, (ii) empirically document the relative importance of these decision structures, across 
multiple shoppers and product categories, and (iii) explore the effectiveness of promotional price 
cuts and feature advertising in these decision structures. As such, our paper fits in with a 
‘shopper marketing’ perspective (Shankar et al. 2011), in which brands’ marketing activities are 
tailored to specific retail accounts for maximum shopper response (Kushwaha and Shankar 
2013). Effective shopper marketing hinges on fine-grained insights into shoppers’ purchase 
tradeoffs that are currently lacking (Shankar et al. 2011), and we answer a call to enhance such 
knowledge. Moreover, by shedding light on the choice shifts among brands and stores, we 
contribute to the promotion decomposition literature  ̶  indicating how the portion of the 
promotion lift that benefits the manufacturer or retailer is shaped by the consumers’ decision 
structure. Uncovering how these decision routes influence the ‘net’ share increase from price 
cuts and store-flyer appearances for both parties, may provide guidance for (negotiations on) 
promotional targeting, feature-ad payments and discount pass-through. 
Below, we briefly review relevant background literature. We then outline the 
methodology, followed by a description of the data and setting. Having presented the estimation 
results, we identify the resulting patterns of brand-store competition, and explore how they differ 
with shopper and category characteristics. We end with a discussion of implications, limitations, 




3.2.1. Impact of Price Discounts and Feature Promotions on Brand and Store Choice 
An extensive body of literature has documented the impact of price discounts and feature 
ads – two of the most commonly used promotion instruments – in a wide range of CPG 
categories. These papers have produced generalizable findings not only on the size of the 
promotion bump (e.g. Ataman et al. 2008; Bijmolt et al. 2005; Bolton 1989; Hoch et al. 1995; 
Narasimhan et al. 1996) but also on its ‘decomposition’– uncovering the sources of the sales lift 
of the promoted item (Ailawadi et al. 2007; Bell et al. 1999; Gupta 1988; Leeflang et al. 2008; 
van Heerde et al. 2003; van Heerde et al. 2004). An established finding from these papers is that 
promotions for CPG products may lead to both substantial brand switching and shifts in purchase 
location, where the latter mostly take the form of indirect store switching (consumers 
reallocating category purchases among stores they visit anyway) (see, e.g. van Heerde et al. 
2004). Moreover, extant studies indicate that the (relative) size of these brand and store 
switching components can differ  between feature promotions and discounts (e.g. Ailawadi et al. 
2009; Ailawadi et al. 2006; van Heerde et al. 2004), and strongly affects the net promotion 
benefits for the manufacturer and the retailer (Srinivasan et al. 2004). 
The majority of these studies, however, have been conducted on an aggregate level, using 
market- or store-wide data to document promotional changes in brand and store-category sales 
(e.g. Srinivasan et al. 2004; van Heerde et al. 2004). Yet, households are known to be 
heterogeneous in their purchase patterns and decisions: some being more committed to their 
favorite brand and/or likely to engage in cross-store shopping, others being more willing to 
switch brands yet stay with their usual store (Bucklin and Gupta 1999). Given that households’ 
decision processes determine the competitive shifts among choice options and drive the outcome 
71 
 
of marketing actions (Urban and Hauser 1992), the magnitude of the promotion response (i.e. 
whether a consumer is enticed by a deal for a certain brand and store) as well as the 
decomposition of the promotion bump (i.e. the portion that stems from brand and/or store 
switching) may well vary depending on their choice mechanisms regarding what and where to 
buy (e.g. Gupta 1988; Zhang 2006)). Yet, extant studies on individual households’ response to 
promotions have either focused on brand choice (e.g. Mehta and Ma 2012), or store choice (e.g. 
Gauri et al. 2008), but have not considered the interplay between these two decisions – 
something we turn to below.  
3.2.2. Decision Structures and Promotional Brand-Store Switching 
CPG categories present consumers with multiple options on what to buy (i.e. which 
brand), and where (at which retailer). We distinguish two decision structures that lead up to the 
purchase of a specific brand at a specific retailer/store. In one structure, brand selection is largely 
conditional upon store choice – consumers picking a supermarket and, once inside the store, 
make their choice among the available brands inside the store (we will label this the ‘retailer 
focus’ decision route). Alternatively, consumers may primarily decide on a brand, and compare 
the offer of different stores carrying this brand (we will call this the ‘brand focus’ decision 
route). These different decision routes may affect consumers’ promotion response and, from a 
managerial perspective, raise several questions. For the manufacturer: Will promoting its NB at a 
given store lead to share gains at the expense of other brands in the store (which is more likely in 
case of a store-focused decision route), or make consumers who currently decided on a brand 
purchase merely shift locations (as would be expected in a brand-focused decision structure)? 
Similarly, for the retailer: Will promoting a NB in the store primarily lead to within-store brand 
shifts (consistent with a retailer-focus), or also entice current non-customers to shift their 
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category purchases toward the store (in line with a brand-focus)? And: who wins more from the 
promotion: the retailer or the manufacturer?  
While previous studies documented promotional brand-store shifts in a category ‘in the 
aggregate’, we propose that consumers’ choice of brands/stores for a category purchase can be 
the outcome of different (brand- or retailer-focused) decision routes. We contend that within a 
given category, a mixture of these routes may be at work, and that each route comes with 
different ‘competitive shifts’ between manufacturers and retailers. We will gauge the relative 
importance of the alternative decision structures in a number of CPG categories, and shed light 
on the size of the promotion lift and its underlying brand-store shifts for each structure. In so 
doing, we will focus on consumers’ brand and store selection given their decision to purchase 
from the category at a certain point in time. Hence, from a managerial viewpoint, we will 
consider the manufacturer and retailer’s choice-share gains as our promotional outcome metric.    
3.2.3. Decision Structures and Promotion Effectiveness  
Not only will consumers’ decision structures affect the sources of promotional response 
(retailer-focus implying stronger within-store cannibalization, brand focus implying stronger 
cross-store shifts), they may also shape the relative effectiveness of different promotion 
instruments. As indicated by Swait et al. (2014), thinking patterns may drive attention and 
response to attributes of choice alternatives. Building on that insight, we expect consumers’ 
decision patterns to go along with different sensitivity to feature ads and temporary price 
discounts. For instance, consumers whose brand choices primarily materialize conditional upon 
store visit (the ‘retailer-focus’ decision structure), may be less influenced by store flyer ads. In 
contrast, consumers who primarily shop around for a particular brand (‘brand focus’), may more 
actively look for brand appearances in the store flyer and monitor price discounts. From the 
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managers’ viewpoint it follows that, depending on which decision structure prevails, a different 
mix of promotion instruments may be called for, or the impact of a given action on the 
manufacturer or retailer may change – issues that we explore in the empirical part. 
3.2.4. Heterogeneity in Decision Structures 
Consumers’ brand-retailer choice processes may differ between product categories. For 
one, category purchase frequency may play a role: for frequently needed categories, consumers 
are less likely to shop around for a particular brand, but rather engage in a category purchase 
(pick a product from the shelf) whenever they shop at a given store (Gijsbrechts et al. 2008; 
Krider and Weinberg 2000). Also, consumers are more likely to adopt a within-retailer focus for 
categories that are less ‘consequential’ and do not warrant a separate store visit (Briesch et al. 
2013), or for categories that are less planned/more impulsively bought - often more hedonic food 
items (Inman et al. 2009). So, depending on the considered category, the ‘what’ and ‘where’ 
decisions may be more or less prevalent. 
Within a category, the predominant brand-retailer decision structure may differ among 
households. For instance, time constraints, overall shopping needs and income constraints have 
been shown to affect consumers’ inclination towards one-stop shopping or, alternatively, 
willingness to shop around (Baltas et al. 2010). Also, households may differ in their category 
needs (e.g. Haans and Gijsbrechts 2011), planning of grocery purchases (e.g. Inman et al. 2009) 
and brand commitment (e.g. Steenkamp et al. 2010); and this, too, will affect how they shop for 
category products (Inman et al. 2009). As such, we need to accommodate heterogeneous decision 
routes within each category. 
In the remainder of this paper, we empirically examine the decision patterns and their 
associated importance of utility drivers. Next, we compare the implications of feature ads and 
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temporary discounts for the promoted brand-store alternative, as well as the brand and retailer as 
a whole; under different decision structures. In the next section, we first present the model that 
allows us to assess the consumers’ decision routes.  
3.3. Methodology 
Consider a specific category (c; to save space we will omit the category subscript), and 
let h be a household indicator, and t an indicator for a category purchase occasion (trip). We use 
b and j as indices for brands in the category, and r and s to denote stores in which the category 
can be bought. On each purchase occasion, t, the household selects a brand-retailer combination 
from the available brands and stores that maximizes its utility. The utility of buying brand b from 






ℎ  (3.1) 
where  𝑉𝑏𝑟,𝑡
ℎ  is the systematic utility component, specified as a function of drivers 𝑋𝑏𝑟,𝑡
ℎ , and 𝜀𝑏𝑟,𝑡
ℎ  
is the random component. 
To address our research questions, we need a flexible model that allows for (i) different 
decision routes/structures, and (ii) differences in effectiveness of marketing instruments 
depending on these decision routes. The generalized extreme-value (GEV) model that we 
propose meets these criteria.  
First, it incorporates two distinct decision patterns, each of which follows a nested logit-
type structure, but where alternatives are grouped (‘nested’) either along the ‘retailer dimension’ 
(the retailer-nesting structure, which corresponds to our retailer-focused decisions) or along the 
‘brand dimension’ (the brand-nesting structure, which captures the brand-focused decision 
route). As such, the model is more general than the (commonly used) nested logit specification, 
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which allows the grouping of alternatives along one dimension only. In our model, the choice 
probability for an alternative (i.e., a specific retailer-brand combination) is obtained as the sum 




ℎ  (3.2) 











































Note that for private labels, which are the sole member of their respective brand group, 










The GEV model thus allows products to compete differently with a set of (pre-defined) 
other products. The two nesting structures differ in the nature of the disproportionality, i.e. 
whether disproportional substitution occurs among alternatives of the same retailer (retailer 
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nesting structure) or of the same brand (brand nesting structure). The nesting parameters then 
further reflect the degree of disproportionality within each structure: In the retailer nesting 
structure, the ‘nesting parameter’ 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑡 governs the intensity of competition within retailers, in the 
brand-nesting structure, 𝛾𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 governs the degree of competition within the national-brand 
nests. In all, this implies that the substitution patterns can differ between (i) same-brand 
alternatives, (ii) same-retailer alternatives and (iii) alternatives that involve a different brand and 
retailer. A nesting parameter closer to (0) 1 indicates a (stronger) weaker within-group 
competition/substitution effect. In Equation (3.3), the allocation parameters 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 add up to 
1. We expand on their interpretation below. If 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑡 equals 1, equation (3.3) reduces to an MNL 
type choice pattern (and the model becomes a mixture of a multinomial logit structure and a 
nested logit structure with alternatives nested by brand). If 𝛾𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 equals 1, equation (3.4) 
becomes an MNL structure (and the model is a mixture of MNL and retailer-nested-logit 
structures). The model can collapse to simple MNL-model if both 𝛾𝑟𝑒𝑡 and 𝛾𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 equal 1. 
Second, in Equations (3.3)-(3.7), the systematic utility of a given brand-retailer 
combination may differ between the two decision structures (as indicated by the subscript dbrand 
or dretailer). Indeed, to account for possible differences in the effectiveness of marketing tools 
depending on the decision structure, we closely follow Swait et al. (2014) and allow households 
to have different ‘taste parameters’ in the brand-nesting and retailer-nesting structure (i.e.: we 
make 𝛽ℎ specific to the decision pattern: 𝛽𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑡
ℎ  and 𝛽𝑑𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
ℎ ). Specifically, this also implies that 
our feature and discount effects differ between the patterns. A consequence of this flexibility is 
that the allocation parameters (𝜏1 and 𝜏2) are not directly interpretable as the relative importance 
of each decision structure, given that the utility scales (and their nesting totals D1 and D2, in 
Equations (3.5)-(3.6)) need not be equal in both sub-structures. Rather, we will conceive the 
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‘probability contributions’ given by the two terms in Equation (3.2) - in which 𝜏1 and 𝜏2 
obviously play a role - as indicative of the relative importance of the two decision structures.  
3.3.1. Utility Drivers  
As drivers of brand-retailer choice we include promotional variables and a set of controls. 
To capture the effect of feature promotions we include a dummy variable (Feature), that 
indicates whether a brand-retailer combination is featured in a store flyer in a given week. The 
discount variable (Discount) captures the relative depth of the discount for all prices more than 
one S.D. below the regular price (we follow the approach used in Geyskens et al. 2010). Our 
controls include a set of brand dummies (to capture differences in ‘base’ preference between 
brands) and retailer dummies (which account for differences in ‘base’ appeal of the store for the 
considered category)16. To capture carry-over effects, we add two dummies that indicate whether 
the household’s last category purchase pertained to the same retailer and/or brand (State 
Dependence Retailer, State Dependence Brand). We include a regular price variable (Price) 
alongside an assortment variable (Assortment), capturing the effect of non-promotional price and 
assortment variation in the category on product choice. Moreover, because category purchases do 
not occur in isolation, we include a household-specific store-attractiveness variable measuring 
the store’s appeal in the remaining categories (Retailer Attraction) for a given household. This 
variable is calculated using the promotional pressure (the mean-centered percentage of products 
sold on promotion) in each remaining category in the store, weighted by the category’s spending 
share in the household’s overall shopping basket. We also incorporate a household-specific 
retailer visit-share variable (Retailer Share) to account for different levels of overall store 
patronage (irrespective of the category bought) among households, next to household distance to 
                                                 
16 Note that, because we estimate the model by category, the store intercepts are category-specific and reflect the 
appeal of the store for that category. 
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the retailer (Distance). These controls account for the fact that (i) store choice is not driven by 
one brand/category alone but also depends on store-wide characteristics and temporary offers in 
other categories, and (ii) households differ in their access to stores and tendency to (re)visit a 
given store. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the variables and the operationalization.  
--- Insert Table 3.1 about here --- 
3.3.2. Estimation 
To accommodate unobserved heterogeneity across households, we use normal mixing 
distributions for the parameter vectors, the means and standard deviations of which are decision-
structure specific, as are the idiosyncratic household-shocks: 𝛽𝑑
ℎ = ?̅?𝑑 + 𝜎𝛽,𝑑 ∗ 𝜀𝑑
ℎ, where 𝜀𝑑
ℎ is a 
decision-structure-specific vector of (i.i.d) standard-normally distributed errors. We estimate the 
model using simulated maximum likelihood. To ensure positive values of the nesting parameters, 
we estimate the log-transform of these parameters. Similarly, to ensure values of the allocation 
parameters (that will feed into the decision structures’ probability contributions) between zero 
and one and summing to one, we re-write them as 𝜏1 = exp() /(1 + exp()) and 𝜏2 = 1 − 𝜏1 , 
and estimate the parameter  (see, e.g. Zhang and Breugelmans 2012 for a similar approach).  
3.4. Data and Setting 
3.4.1. Setting  
To examine consumers’ brand-retailer choice patterns for grocery items, we use panel 
data comprising household purchases in the CPG-industry in the Netherlands, spanning a period 
of 4 years (2007-2011). We study these households’ purchases in 9 different categories, listed in 
Table 3.2. Using Dhar et al. (2001)’s terminology, these include staples (i.e. high penetration, 
high frequency categories: frozen pizza, chips, coffee, beer) and variety enhancers (high 
penetration, low frequency items: mayonnaise, ketchup and kitchen tissue), next to: niche (low 
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penetration, high frequency: beer) and fill in categories (low penetration, low frequency: muesli 
and liquid detergents)17, and hence constitute a varied set to explore consumers’ decision 
structures. For each shopping trip on which a category purchase is made, we consider which 
brand was chosen, and where the purchase took place. We include the top 7 retail chains, which 
jointly cover 60% of the Dutch grocery market, and group the remaining retailers into a ‘rest’ 
retailer. For each category, we consider the top brands that, together, make up 80% of the (cross-
retailer) sales within the category. Additionally, if a brand contributes to more than 10% of the 
sales within a specific retailer, we also consider it, leading to the inclusion of standard private 
labels in our setting.18 Lastly, we only consider a brand to be available within a retailer if its sales 
within the retailer exceed 1% of the total retailer sales. We group the remaining brands into a 
‘rest’ brand. Finally, for each category, we estimate the model on a randomly drawn subsample 
of 300 households that buy from the category, and remain in the panel for at least 2 years.  
3.4.2. Descriptives  
Table 3.2 presents some basic category descriptives. The number of brands considered in 
each category ranges from a minimum of 7 (frozen pizza) to a maximum of 16 (kitchen tissue). 
The purchase frequency differs highly between categories, with chips being the most, and liquid 
detergents the least often-bought categories. Each household typically buys more than one brand 
per category in the considered period, especially for the more frequently purchased items. 
Moreover, in each category under study, households not only buy different brands, they also 
patronize different retailers. For example, for mayonnaise, households on average purchase about 
                                                 
17 Category purchase frequency and penetration was based on the GfK purchase data. A priori, we excluded 
categories that did not contain branded items (e.g. fresh products) or were not part of the stores’ regular assortment. 
We also excluded categories with too many (or too few) brands – for which covering 80% of purchases would result 
in too many (few) choice alternatives – as well as categories with very low penetration or purchase frequency (for 
which our available scanner panel data would be too sparse). 
18 Some chains also offered economy private labels and premium private labels, but these were too small to be part 
of the ‘top brands’ list, and thus taken up in the ‘rest brand’.   
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three different brands, bought at more than two different retailers.19 This further underlines the 
need to take multiple retailers into account when analyzing household response to promotions. 
The category share of retailer sales varies between 1.82% (beer) and .1% (ketchup) – figures 
that, for a given category, are roughly similar across retailers.  
--- Insert Tables 3.2 and 3.3 about here --- 
Zooming in on brand-level characteristics, we also see a fair amount of variation within 
and across categories on key metrics. Table 3.3, Panel A displays the mean price and market 
share of the top 3 national brands (selected based on market share across all retailers) within the 
top 3 retailers (selected based on sales for the respective NBs) over our observation period. 
While some categories have one or two very strong national brands (e.g. ketchup, liquid 
detergents, mayonnaise), others are less concentrated (e.g. beer). Prices differ both across 
retailers and across brands, providing consumers with a differentiated supply of alternatives. 
Table 3.3, Panel B shows the promotional activity of brands and retailers, showcasing that there 
is ample opportunity and incentive for households to engage in promiscuous shopping behavior. 
In select categories (e.g. beer), brands are on feature within a single retailer roughly one out of 
every five weeks (e.g. NB1 is on feature in 21% of the weeks) and retailers advertise at least one 
product in their flyer every week (e.g. for Retailer 3 there is a likelihood of 1.29 that any NB has 
a promotion), whereas in other categories (e.g. mayonnaise), retailers tend to only have a product 
on feature once every 10 weeks (e.g. the likelihood of any NB being on promotion at retailer one 
in a given week is 0.11) and specific brands are promoted even less frequently. The average 
discounts that retailers offer tend to be largely similar within categories.  
                                                 
19 These figures pertain to the (estimation) period of observation for the considered households, which is 3.5 years 




On the whole, these descriptives show that households do patronize a variety of stores 
and opt for different brands, and that both feature ads and temporary price cuts are frequently 
used by manufacturers and retailers to influence this selection process. The question remains: 
how do these choices come about, and what are the shifts produced by the promotion actions 
under different decision routes? Our GEV model sheds light on this issue. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Model Fit 
For each category, we estimate a series of 4 different models (three benchmark models, 
and the ‘full’ GEV model). As benchmark models, we consider (i) an MNL model, (ii) a nested 
logit (NL) model with alternatives nested within a retailer and (iii) a NL model with alternatives 
nested within a brand. We note that our full GEV model is a generalized version of the 
benchmark models and under certain conditions is equivalent to the benchmark models. Table 
3.4 provides an overview of the models, along with some key fit statistics. The results show that 
in all categories under consideration, the GEV specification, which allows for a mixture of two 
different decision structures (retailer-nesting and brand-nesting) outperforms the MNL or NL 
models that accommodate only a single structure – with lower AIC and BIC values. Below, we 
therefore focus on the parameters of the full model. We note upfront that, for our promotion 
decomposition along decision structures to have practical relevance, two conditions have to be 
met. First, the subgroups have to be sufficiently sizable, i.e. each decision structure must explain 
a non-negligible portion of consumer choices in a category. Second, the decision structures must 
lead to distinct promotion effects, in terms of size and/or sources of the promotion lift for the 
considered instruments (feature ads and price cuts). We consider both aspects subsequently.  
--- Insert Table 3.4 about here --- 
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3.5.2. Estimation Results 
Table 3.5 summarizes the estimates of the GEV model for each category. To save space, 
we omit the brand- and retailer-constants, and report only the population-mean estimates for the 
heterogeneous parameters (an example of the full set of estimation results can be found in 
Appendix 3.A). Some interesting findings emerge. 
--- Insert Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 about here --- 
Decision structures. As the bottom row of Table 3.5 shows, the transformed parameters  
do not take on very high or low values (i.e. they range between -3.6 and 2.5), leading to 
allocation parameters for the brand and retailer structures that differ from both zero and one. 
Hence, as was already clear from the fit statistics, in each category a mixture of structures is 
present. This is further documented in Table 3.6, which provides the relative importance – 
measured as the (average) contribution to the overall probability, see Equation (3.2) – of each 
decision structure. As can be seen from the table, each decision structure contributes at least 30% 
to the category total. The retailer focus is slightly more predominant for the niche (beer) and 
staple (chips, coffee and frozen pizza) categories, with probability contributions between 51 and 
59%), while the less-frequently bought (fill in or variety enhancing) items show a somewhat 
higher brand focus (up to 70% for ketchup).  
Recall that the different decision structures reflect whether consumers disproportionally 
switch between alternatives within the same store (retailer focus) or within the same brand 
(brand focus). The estimated nesting parameters shed further light on the strength of the 
disproportionality, i.e. on the ‘degree’ of within store or brand switching for each of the two 
decision structures. On the whole, the nesting parameters in the retailer-focused route tend to be 
low (and lower than their brand-focus counterparts), pointing to strong within-store 
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cannibalization. In contrast, households in the brand-focus route have higher nesting-parameter 
values (for ketchup and liquid detergents, not significantly different from 1).20 So, even in 
categories where the brand-focus is more common, consumers still have a non-negligible 
propensity to switch brands. Overall, we find that choices in a category come about as a result of 
heterogeneous decision structures across households; with some differences in the nature and 
relative importance of these structures between categories. Thus, the different subgroups 
(households adopting one or the other decision structure) are sufficiently sizable to warrant 
further investigation – the question remaining: do they also lead to distinct promotion effects? 
The model parameters shed some first light on this point.  
Utility-driver estimates. Zooming in on the control variables first, we find that the 
estimates of the utility drivers in Table 3.5 show face validity, with parameter estimates that are 
mostly significant with the expected sign,21 in each category and overall. In both decision 
structures (Panel A: retailer focus, Panel B: brand focus), we find positive and significant effects 
of assortment, retailer share of household visits, and retailer attraction (i.e. overall store 
promotion activities in other categories). Also, the coefficients of retailer and brand state 
dependence are positively significant in both decision structures, indicating that households have 
some tendency to repurchase a same brand/revisit a same store over time, irrespective of whether 
                                                 
20 Our estimates pertain to the log of the nesting parameter. To assess whether the nesting parameter itself 
significantly differs from one – one implying proportional substitution – we used Monte Carlo simulation, which 
provides an easy way to get the empirical distribution of a non-linearly transformed variable and assess significance. 
We (i) took 1000 random draws from the (normal) distribution of the (log-transformed) estimate, (ii) computed the 
exponential function of each draw, and (iii) assessed what fraction of this empirical distribution was above (or 
below) one.  
21 The magnitude of the parameters, which depends on the measurement scale of the corresponding utility driver, is 
not indicative of the effect size as such, but must be converted into scale-free elasticities or marginal effects. 
Because the analytical elasticity (marginal effect-) expressions for our GEV model are quite involved, we do not 
separately calculate them for the non-focal (control) variables. For our focal (promotion) variables, the effect sizes 
will be documented through the simulations (which form the counterpart of such elasticities and, as advocated by 
van Heerde et al. 2003, also provide insights into the absolute promotion effects).  
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their primary focus is on retailer or brand choice. Price of the brand at the retailer, and retailer 
distance, have the expected negative impact.  
Next, we zoom in on the promotion variables. Considering the significance of the 
estimated parameters (Table 3.5) in each decision structure, an interesting pattern of effects 
emerges. Price discounts hardly play a role in the retailer-focused structure (Panel A): they exert 
a significant positive effect in only one category (frozen pizza), and the overall impact (across 
categories, based on a meta-analytic test)22 is insignificant (z=1.15, p>.10).23 The picture is 
somewhat different in the brand-focused decision structure (Panel B), where deeper discounts lift 
the purchase probability in several categories, and their impact is significant overall (z=5.64, 
p<.01). Hence, offering deeper price cuts does not pay off among households with a retailer 
focus, while it does increase the promoted alternative’s appeal among households primarily 
focused on the brand. Feature ads, in turn, exert a significant effect in virtually all settings. In the 
retailer-focused decision structure (Panel A), their effect is significant in most categories (7 out 
of 9), and overall (z=31.65, p<.01). Their influence appears even more systematic in the brand-
focused structure, with significant effects in each category, and overall (z=35.14, p<.01).  
Having established (the lack of) significance, interesting for our purposes is a comparison 
of the promotional effect sizes across decision structures in a given category. However, the 
parameter estimates are not comparable as such, because of possible differences in the ‘scale 
factor’ between the structures. Moreover, the coefficient estimates do not tell the whole story. 
The impact of feature and discount activities will interact with other utility drivers (i.e. state 
dependence, and intrinsic brand and store appeal as reflected in the brand and store constants). 
                                                 
22 Combined significance across categories is determined using a meta-analytic test of adding weighted Z’s (with 
weights equal to the sample size of the categories; Rosenthal 1991). 
23 In some categories, we even find a significant negative influence, indicating that discounts make the alternative 
less likely to be purchased within the retailer-focused decision structure (but not necessarily overall).  
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Moreover, the question remains how changes in the choice probability of a promoted brand-store 
alternative, will affect choices for the brand (manufacturer) or category at the store (retailer) as a 
whole. We explore these effects in the next section. 
3.5.3. Impact of Feature and Discount Promotions 
Having established the prevalence of different decision structures, the question remains 
whether they lead to distinct promotion effects. Do the decision routes influence the size of the 
promotion bump? Do they affect the sources of the choice-share increase for the promoted 
alternative (i.e. within-brand or within-store cannibalization), and thus the net manufacturer or 
retailer gains? Last, but not least, do they shape the relative effectiveness of feature ads and price 
discounts? To answer these questions, we simulate the impact of feature ads and promotional 
price cuts, using the estimates from the full GEV model. First, for each household-trip and 
choice alternative (national brand - traditional retailer combination) in the dataset, we predict the 
‘benchmark’ choice probability absent any promotional activity, as well as the portion of this 
probability stemming from the first and second decision route in the category. Next, for each 
choice alternative in turn, we introduce a feature ad, and calculate the new set of choice 
probabilities, as well as the split between decision structures (for the featured alternative and all 
other alternatives). We do the same for a 25% promotional price cut. Finally, we compare the 
choice probability contributions of each decision route, for the promotional conditions and the 
benchmark condition. 
--- Insert Table 3.7 about here --- 
Feature and discount impact on the promoted alternative. Table 3.7 summarizes how 
feature ads (Panel A) and price discounts (Panel B) differently change the probability of the 
promoted alternative (average across all NB alternatives at traditional supermarkets), by 
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reporting the probability shifts in each decision structure, along with the significance of the 
underlying discount or feature estimate. The table confirms that, in general, feature promotions 
are the more effective tool to increase the promoted alternative’s performance. They lead to 
increases in choice propensity between 1.1 and 2.1 percentage points (see last column of Table 
3.7, panel A), which, on average, comes down to a ‘doubling’ of the alternative’s choice 
propensity absent the flyer promotion. At the same time, these figures strongly differ within 
categories depending on the decision structure. On the whole, feature effects are much stronger 
in the brand-focused decision structure. This particularly holds true for the less-frequently 
purchased food categories (ketchup, mayonnaise, muesli) and non-food categories (kitchen towel 
and liquid detergents), where the feature effect tends to more than triple among brand-focused 
(compared to retailer-focused) households. Turning to the discount effects (Table 3.7, Panel B), 
we find that while the impact on the discounted alternatives’ overall choice propensity is small 
(on average: .15 percentage points, see last column of Table 3.7, panel A), with the exception of 
ketchup, we find no positive effect of discounts in the retailer-focused decision structure, and any 
significant positive effect stems from brand-focused households. In sum, the results underscore 
that (i) the impact of both promotion instruments differs between the two decision structures, (ii) 
features lift the choice propensity of the promoted alternative among all consumers, but typically 
more strongly so among brand-focused households, and (iii) discounts appear to only exert an 
impact on brand-focused households. These results, however, pertain to the specific brand-store 
alternative – the question remaining what happens for the brand or store (category) as a whole. 
This question is particularly relevant in light of the fact that the two decision structures imply 
different patterns of within-store and within-brand cannibalization. As such, the effects may play 
out differently for the manufacturer or the retailer as a whole – something we explore next. 
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Brand-level and retailer-category level impact of NB promotions. Table 3.8 displays the 
impact of feature ads (Panel A) and price discounts (Panel B) for a NB, on the choice probability 
of (i) the promoted brand-retailer alternative (see column: ‘Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative’), 
(ii) the promoting brand as a whole (i.e. at the promoting store plus other retailers, see column 
‘Focal Brand’), and (iii) the promoting retailer (including all alternatives within the category at 
that retailer, see column ‘Focal Retailer’), and this for the two decision structures (retailer focus 
or brand focus). As such, next to the lift for the promoted alternative, it reflects the ‘net brand 
gains’ from the promotion (after accounting for within-brand cannibalization, i.e. reduced own-
brand sales at rival stores), and the ‘net retailer gains’ (after accounting for within-store 
cannibalization, i.e. drops in choice propensity of other category-alternatives within the store). 
Moreover, for each category and decision structure, it reports the difference in net gains between 
the manufacturer and the retailer, as a fraction of the lift for the promoted alternative (see column 
‘(Focal Brand - Focal Retailer)/(Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative)’ in Table 3.8). Several points 
are worth noting.  
First, the table underscores that, for a given category, the portion of the probability gain 
of the promoted alternative that accrues to the manufacturer or the retailer, strongly differs 
between decision structures. Indeed, zooming in on the cases where significant promotion lifts 
occur, we find that overall, the manufacturer retains a much larger ‘net’ portion of this lift than 
the retailer in the retailer-focused compared to the brand-focused decision structure (i.e the 
entries in the column ‘(Brand-Retailer)/Alternative’ are larger in case of a retailer-focus 
compared to a brand-focus). A striking example is muesli, where in the retailer-focused decision 
structure, the brand hardly suffers any cannibalization but the retailer enjoys no net gains, 
whereas in the brand-focused structure both parties enjoy similar gains. This confirms that, for a 
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given player (manufacturer or retailer), the source of his sales gain from a given promotion in a 
given category, will be shaped by consumers’ decision routes. The implications in terms of 
absolute gains are not clear upfront, though. For instance, even with disproportional within-brand 
switching, the manufacturer may still enjoy higher absolute share increases than the retailer.24  
Second, this thus leads to the question: for a given party, which structure yields the 
largest net promotional effect? The results in Table 3.7 already revealed that the lift for the 
promoted alternative is typically larger among brand-focused households (with some exceptions, 
like coffee). Since such decision structure also comes with lower cannibalization for the retailer, 
it follows that his net gains will also be higher under that choice structure. So, on the whole, 
retailers enjoy larger net gains from promotions among brand-focused than retailer-focused 
households. For the manufacturer, this is not clear cut a priori: even if brand-focused decision 
structures come with larger lift for the promoted alternative, this may be offset by enhanced 
within-brand cannibalization. Interestingly, Table 3.8 shows that this is not the case. Comparing 
the net brand gains across the two decision structures we find that, in the majority of cases, the 
manufacturer still reaps more from brand-focused households. For instance, zooming in on the 
feature effects (Table 3.8, panel A - the picture is less clear for discounts across categories, a 
result mostly driven by the often insignificant effects), we observe that in all categories where a 
brand-focus lead to higher lift for the promoted alternative (7 out of 9 categories), such decision 
structure continues to also entail higher net brand gains. In all, this suggests that despite the 
difference in underlying switching patterns, when it comes to promotions the interests of 
                                                 
24 We note that the ‘proportional switching’ benchmark applies at the level of the specific brand-retailer choice 
alternatives. Because brands and retailers differ in the number and appeal of the choice alternatives that they offer, 
even among consumers with a brand focus, the manufacturer may still gain more in net terms (across his entire 
offer) than the retailer; and even among consumers with a retailer focus , the retailer may still gain more in net terms 
(across his entire offer) than the manufacturer.  
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manufacturers and retailers seem to be aligned – both parties getting higher promotional (net) 
gains from brand-focused households. 
Third, the question then remains: who benefits more within a given decision structure, is 
it the manufacturer or the retailer? Again, Table 3.8 provides some insights here. Comparison of 
the net gains for the brand and retailer within the retailer-focused decision structure, reveals that 
in the vast majority of cases (where a significant effect of the promoted alternative was found to 
begin with), the manufacturer gains exceed the retailer gains. For instance, zooming in on the 
feature effects (Panel A), we find this to be true for 8 out of 9 categories. In the brand-focused 
decision structure, the pattern becomes more mixed, with brand gains still exceeding retailer 
gains in 5 out of 9 categories, but the retailer gaining more in 3 categories.  
3.6. Discussion 
Feature promotions and discounts have become widely used tools to influence purchasing 
behavior in the retailing industry. Existing literature has extensively documented differences in 
effectiveness of these tools (e.g. van Heerde et al. 2004) and suggested different (and perhaps 
overlapping) roles for these types of promotions (e.g. Zhang 2006). We extend the previous 
literature by providing new insights into the roles of feature promotions and discounts in decision 
structure that consumers use.  
3.6.1. Main Findings  
First, we show that all categories are characterized by substantial differences in 
households’ decision routes, with some cross-category variation in the prevalence and nature of 
these routes. Frequently-purchased food items, including staples (frozen pizza, chips and coffee) 
and niche items (beer) exhibit a balanced mixture: in about half of the cases, households 
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primarily choose a retailer, and brands within the retailer more strongly compete; in the other 
half, households primarily pick the brand, and there is clear cannibalization within the brand. In 
less-frequently purchased variety-enhancing (mayonnaise, ketchup, kitchen tissue) and fill-in 
categories (liquid detergents, muesli), consumers are somewhat more brand than retailer focused, 
but among those who primarily select a brand (store), the degree of within-brand (within-store) 
cannibalization is less (more) pronounced. Hence, within each category, observed choice patterns 
are quite heterogeneous in nature.  
Second, these shopper decision processes influence the impact of different promotion 
instruments. Overall, we find the feature ad effect to be significant in either decision structure, 
but – especially for less-frequently purchased items – stronger among brand-focused households. 
Price cuts, by and large, do not exert a significant effect in case of a retailer focus, but do play a 
role in the brand-focused decision structure. Hence, promotions appear more effective among 
households for whom brand choice has prevalence over store choice.  
Third, decision routes not only lead to different effectiveness of promotion instruments 
for the promoted alternative, but also entail different sources of the sales lift. We find that, 
despite the cannibalization (for the manufacturer: especially in the brand-focused, for the retailer 
in the retailer-focused decision structures), the above pattern of effects is maintained - both the 
manufacturer and the retailer incur larger net benefits from discounts, and especially flyer ads, 
among the more brand-focused households.  
Fourth, who wins the most, and how does that depend on the consumers’ decision 
structure? On the whole, the manufacturer appears to reap the highest net promotion benefits. 
Even in settings with disproportional within-brand-switching, the absolute net sales gains of the 
manufacturer exceed, or at least match, those of the retailer in the majority of categories. Hence, 
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whereas the decision routes strongly shape the (difference in) effectiveness of store flyer ads and 
price cuts, they do not dictate who gains most from the promotion – manufacturers often still 
benefitting more despite brand cannibalization. 
3.6.2. Implications 
Our results have several implications. First, they shed further light on the role and 
interplay of different promotion instruments. Consumers for whom brand choice supersedes store 
choice appear to be purposefully cross-shopping for the best brand offer, as they are responsive 
to both the announcements in store flyer ads and the depth of the discount. Consumers who 
mainly trade off different brands from the category inside the store, are not only less influenced 
by feature ads for most categories but, perhaps surprisingly, also less sensitive to (the depth of) 
in-store price cuts. This may be so because they are more convenience than price-oriented 
(reacting to signals of the promotion presence rather than processing the discount depth) or 
because, given that they are already inside the store, switching to the promoted alternative comes 
at no extra transaction cost and even a small price cut is thus advantageous. On the whole, it 
seems that both instruments work (better) in one decision structure than the other – a pattern that 
appears particularly prevalent for less-frequently bought items. A tentative implication is that, 
especially in such categories, deeper price cuts and store flyer announcements should be used 
jointly, rather than as alternative/alternating mechanisms.  
Given that both manufacturers and retailers seem to enjoy higher net promotion response 
among brand-focused households, a relevant question is whether such households can be 
targeted. Exploratory regressions suggest that there is a link between (i) the household’ 
propensity to use a retailer-focused as opposed to brand-focused decision structure (as measured 
by the contribution of that decision structure to the household’s overall choice probabilities) and 
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(ii) their shopper characteristics as indicated in the conceptual part.25 On the whole, we find that 
a retailer-focus is more common among smaller and higher-income households. We also find 
that these households are less brand-loyal (which underscores the face validity of our results), 
and tend to be light (and, thus, possible less-involved) category users who are less inclined to 
plan their purchases in advance. When it comes to promo-related characteristics, these retailer-
focused households – though neither more nor less price-conscious – report lower readership of 
store flyers yet a higher interest in store loyalty programs. Finally, time constraints lead up to a 
stronger store-focus only for the frequently-purchased categories in our set. Clearly, the opposite 
profile will pertain to brand-focused households, and managers may use these exploratory 
insights to tailor their promotions to this more-responsive segment. 
Finally, by shedding light on who is likely to gain most (in which type of decision 
setting), these outcomes may feed into the promotion negotiation process – suggesting who 
should bear the promotional costs. We find that, overall, the manufacturer appears to enjoy the 
larger net gains - in line with earlier findings from Srinivasan et al. (2004). At the same time, this 
does not hold in all settings and categories: especially among more brand-focused households, 
the retailer may reap comparable benefits from store flyer ads – an insight manufacturers may 
bring to the negotiation table. 
3.6.3. Limitations and Future Research 
While our study provides new insights, it also opens up new research opportunities.  
First, we considered the decision routes’ promotion effects conditional on a category 
purchase, and hence only documented differential shifts in brand-store choice. Though we expect 
these to be the most distinct, it is possible that consumers’ decision structures also influence their 
                                                 
25 Please see Appendix 3.B for a detailed exposition on this analysis. 
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category-purchase incidence and hence trigger different stockpiling effects – something we leave 
for future study.  
Second, from a methodological perspective, though our GEV model is already quite 
flexible, further refinements may be called for. For one, while we allowed for different 
promotion effectiveness between the two different decision structures, we used common 
coefficients across brands within each focus. Though this is not uncommon in the literature (e.g. 
Ailawadi et al. 2007; Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2007; Zhang and Wedel 2009), allowing for 
differential parameters across brand types may be a fruitful extension. When it comes to store 
choice, a nested structure that distinguishes traditional supermarkets from hard discounters may 
be called for, if there is sufficient variety within hard discounters to allow for such as a structure. 
Last but not least, it may be instructive to make the allocation parameter brand- and/or retailer- 
specific, or a function of brand/retailer characteristics, and thereby allow stronger or weaker 
brands or chains to involve different decision structures.  
Third, for reasons of tractability, we only considered a limited number of categories, and 
estimated the models separately for each category, using a random sample of panel members. 
Unfortunately, this implies that we have only a limited number of households in common for the 
different categories. Future analyses could estimate and compare the decision patterns by 
household across categories, and, for that matter, expand the number of categories.  
Fourth, though we relied on behavioral data to infer consumers’ decision routes, it may 
be instructive to combine and verify the outcomes of the GEV models with more direct (survey) 
measures on the underlying process. Ideally, such data should be collected not only at the level 




Fifth, our dataset does not include information on in-store advertising. As feature and/or 
discounts can be supported by a retailer using in-store advertising, information on in-store 
advertising could aid in explaining their effects. 
Finally, from a managerial standpoint, the heterogeneity of decision routes and associated 
promotion effects offers opportunities for targeting, but also raises new issues. For one, the 
mixture of decision patterns, which are driving the promotional outcomes, differs across 
categories, and more insights are needed into the underlying category drivers. Also, though we 
provide preliminary insights into household factors driving the decision structures, further 
profiling of the segments of shoppers that differ in their decision routes for particular categories 
is a fruitful next step. Finally, not only category and shopper differences, but also shopping trip 
characteristics may shape consumers’ decision routes and promotion responsiveness. Future 
studies could track how decision structures vary with the type of shopping trip, such as its 
timing, size, location relative to the household’s home or work, and type of format/channel – 




Table 3.1: Variables and Operationalization 




Dummy equal to 1 if household’s last purchase in the category 
occurred at the same retailer, and 0 otherwise 
State Dependence 
Brand 
Dummy equal to one if same brand was purchased on household’s 
last purchase in the category, and zero otherwise 
Assortment 
Number of SKUs in the brand’s line at the retailer (prior moving 
average of number of SKUs encountered in the panel, over 26 
weeks 
Price 
Average price per unit volume (across SKUs) for a brand in a 
given week, as observed in the panel data. Missing observations 
were replaced by four-week moving average of the brand price at 
the same retailer, outliers (>5 SD) were replaced by series mean 
Distance 
Log-transformed distance (in km) of household to closest outlet of 
each retailer (updated quarterly) 
Retailer Share (hh) Household-specific retailer share of visits in initialization period 
Retailer Attraction 
The mean-centered promotion pressure across categories for each 
retailer, weighted by category and retailer share (in initialization 




Dummy equal to 1 if there was a feature promotion for (more than 
half of the brand’s SKU line) at the retailer in that week, and 0 
otherwise 
Discount 
Difference between the brands’ regular and promotion price, 
where promotion prices are identified as prices more than one 
































(mean % of 
total sales 
within retailer) 
Chips 9 25 28682 96 5.59 3.88 3.19 .44 
Coffee 9 25 19225 64 4.42 3.16 2.98 1.55 
Beer 13 52 15819 53 6.04 4.10 2.90 1.82 
Frozen Pizza 7 20 10633 35 4.05 3.04 2.54 .32 
Ketchup 9 31 4708 16 3.54 2.69 2.29 .10 
Mayonnaise 10 35 6545 22 3.89 2.95 2.37 .11 
Muesli 13 31 8368 28 3.76 3.16 2.47 .15 
Liquid Detergent 13 46 5365 18 4.37 3.49 2.42 .40 
Kitchen Tissue 16 39 6349 21 3.74 3.46 2.40 .28 
a: Three other originally considered categories, corn flakes, soft drinks and custard, were removed after all, because the large number of brands (soft drinks) or 
low number of purchase observations (corn flakes, custard) led to unstable and face-invalid estimates.  
97 
 
Table 3.3: Category Descriptives  
 
Panel A: Price and Market Share - Frequently Purchased Food Categories 
 Chips Coffee Beer Frozen Pizza 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean 
Price  
NB 1 
66.34 59.41 51.03 58.69 303.06 294.27 285.80 289.42 90.72 74.01 73.75 77.70 237.78 225.32 237.81 223.87 
Price  
NB 2 
149.72 130.47 146.36 141.11 250.75 236.62 226.40 235.13 64.17 60.93 58.48 61.35 254.36 238.12 216.15 229.06 
Price  
NB 3 
        73.71 75.71 71.48 74.31     
Mean 
Price NB 
87.32 76.60 88.22  269.92 251.17 252.53  67.49 68.97 65.79  208.18 200.21 200.01  
     
Share  
NB 1 
.50 .59 .61 .52 .36 .55 .57 .44 .19 .18 .10 .15 .70 .71 .78 .56 
Share  
NB 2 
.19 .13 .10 .12 .02 .07 .07 .05 .12 .17 .13 .14 .01 .10 .26 .15 
Share  
NB 3 
        .16 .22 .16 .14     
Retailer 
Share 





Panel B: Price and Market Share - Non-Frequently Purchased Food Categories 
 Ketchup Mayonnaise Muesli 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean 
Price NB 1 .35 .32 .31 .33 164.16 151.09 144.75 153.17 281.06 241.27 252.80 255.81 
Price NB 2 .30 .29 .27 .29 73.46 56.80 54.63 56.91 281.66 277.72 226.09 258.99 
Price NB 3 .21 .21 .21 .21 121.01 109.52 107.41 113.82 301.92 282.54 274.65 285.40 
Mean Price NB .25 .26 .25  120.28 112.95 111.69  251.52 220.14 212.06  
    
Share NB 1 .38 .29 .31 .38 .36 .46 .40 .34 .41 .32 .33 .34 
Share NB 2 .21 .26 .53 .21 .20 .19 .20 .07 .08 .05 .10 .07 
Share NB 3 .07 .13 .06 .07 .06 .06 .11 .04 .04 .05 .05 .04 






Panel C: Price and Market Share - Non-Food Categories 
 Liquid Detergents Kitchen Tissue 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Mean 
Price NB 1 519.68 498.32 535.30 481.58 275.29 279.96 193.63 257.09 
Price NB 2 663.69 598.06 636.03 599.77 298.23 174.44 227.15 259.79 
Price NB 3 519.47 469.39 466.41 463.98 360.25 319.93 261.07 304.95 
Mean Price NB 506.25 459.54 457.63  245.41 212.59 170.65  
   
Share NB 1 .28 .27 .18 .20 .24 .33 .08 .14 
Share NB 2 .23 .22 .26 .19 .08 .03 .07 .07 
Share NB 3 .08 .09 .04 .06 .08 .01 .06 .07 
Retailer Share .27 .11 .06  .23 .12 .06  
 
 
Panel E: Promo Characteristics - Frequently Purchased Food Categories 
 Chips Coffee Beer Frozen Pizza 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 
Promo likelihooda NB 1 .08 .10 .00 .15 .18 .00 .21 .17 .14 .17 .11 .17 
Promo likelihood NB 2 .15 .14 .22 .01 .01 .02 .09 .14 .11 .00 .05 .12 
Promo likelihood NB 3       .10 .12 .18    
Likelihood of a feature at 
retailerb 
.23 .24 .22 .16 .20 .02 .80 .92 1.29 .17 .16 .17 
     
Mean Discount NB 1 .18 .40 .26 .18 .20 .08 .77 .73 .82 .25 .25 .19 
Mean Discount NB 2 .35 .47 .39 .10 .07 .09 .48 .59 .43 .78 .63 .20 
Mean Discount NB 3       .56 .70 .65    
a: Likelihood of a promotion for the focal brand in any given week at the focal retailer. 
b: Likelihood of a promotion of any of the NBs or PLs included in the category in a given week. 
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Panel F: Promo Characteristics - Non-Frequently Purchased Food Categories 
 Ketchup Mayonnaise Muesli 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 
Promo likelihooda NB 1 .02 .00 .03 .03 .04 .02 .06 .07 .06 
Promo likelihood NB 2 .01 .01 .01 .00 .00 .02 .03 .02 .06 
Promo likelihood NB 3 .08 .04 .06 .06 .06 .03 .03 .02 .03 
Likelihood of a feature at retailerb .11 .06 .10 .11 .10 .08 .12 .11 .15 
    
Mean Discount NB 1 .15 .16 .16 .12 .28 .08 .25 .18 .15 
Mean Discount NB 2 .09 .10 .05 .07 .07 .11 .42 .55 .24 
Mean Discount NB 3 .18 .28 .13 .19 .45 .19 .27 .19 .07 
a: Likelihood of a promotion for the focal brand in any given week at the focal retailer 
b: Likelihood of a promotion of any of the NBs or PLs included in the category in a given week. 
 
Panel G: Promo Characteristics - Non-Food Categories 
 Liquid Detergents Kitchen Tissues 
 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret3 Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret3 
Promo likelihooda NB 1 .15 .19 .13 .09 .12 .03 
Promo likelihood NB 2 .19 .19 .18 .09 .04 .02 
Promo likelihood NB 3 .22 .13 .14 .05 .00 .00 
Likelihood of a feature at retailerb 1.22 .79 .96 .25 .17 .07 
   
Mean Discount NB 1 .28 .43 .65 .34 .66 .25 
Mean Discount NB 2 .47 .54 .60 .78 .95 .55 
Mean Discount NB 3 .47 .41 .45 .44 .25 .62 
a: Likelihood of a promotion for the focal brand in any given week at the focal retailer 
b: Likelihood of a promotion of any of the NBs or PLs included in the category in a given week. 
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Table 3.4: Overview of Models 
 Model Nesting Structure -2LL BIC # parameters 
Chips 
MNL - 54058 54633 56 
NL Retailer 53643 54228 57 
NL Brand 53710 54295 57 
GEV Brand + Retailer 51259 52439 115 
Coffee 
MNL - 38345 38897 56 
NL Retailer 38020 38582 57 
NL Brand 38276 38838 57 
GEV Brand + Retailer 36928 38062 115 
Beer 
MNL - 53463 54082 64 
NL Retailer 53506 54134 65 
NL Brand 53393 54021 65 
GEV Brand + Retailer 51823 53090 131 
Frozen Pizza 
MNL - 23816 24298 52 
NL Retailer 23606 24098 53 
NL Brand 23722 24213 53 
GEV Brand + Retailer 23059 24051 107 
Ketchup 
MNL - 14572 15063 58 
NL Retailer 14452 14951 59 
NL Brand 14567 15066 59 
GEV Brand + Retailer 14180 15186 119 
Mayonnaise 
MNL - 18103 18612 58 
NL Retailer 17952 18470 59 
NL Brand 18080 18599 59 
GEV Brand + Retailer 17458 18503 119 
Muesli 
MNL - 19823 20383 62 
NL Retailer 19768 20337 63 
NL Brand 19815 20384 63 
GEV Brand + Retailer 19123 20270 127 
Liquid Detergents 
MNL - 17008 17559 64 
NL Retailer 16930 17490 65 
NL Brand 16984 17544 65 
GEV Brand + Retailer 16345 17474 131 
Kitchen Tissue 
MNL - 15951 16547 68 
NL Retailer 15710 16314 69 
NL Brand 15912 16516 69 
GEV Brand + Retailer 14899 16116 139 
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results 
Panel A: Retailer Focus 
 
Chips Coffee Beer 
Frozen  
Pizza 







β t β t β t β t β t β t β t β t β t Z-Value 
Controls 
State Dep. Retailer 0.28 4.38 1.38 35.08 1.63 33.63 0.82 11.55 1.63 13.31 0.13 1.26 0.24 2.40 2.99 20.26 1.36 13.45 45.11 
State Dep. Brand 0.42 10.78 1.80 31.06 1.46 17.55 0.45 9.69 0.55 3.96 0.20 4.69 0.06 1.72 1.97 13.01 0.58 5.82 44.45 
Assortment 0.02 3.14 0.01 1.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 2.56 -0.02 1.09 0.09 4.23 0.13 6.83 0.08 1.56 0.08 4.11 12.67 
Price -0.23 2.62 -0.72 6.01 -0.07 1.40 -0.40 2.59 -0.06 1.22 -0.04 0.63 0.06 0.53 -0.15 3.73 0.00 0.08 -6.53 
Distance -0.60 26.42 -0.53 24.15 -0.55 20.02 -1.34 21.99 -0.85 11.46 -0.74 12.84 -1.22 17.30 -0.62 8.70 -0.80 11.07 -53.32 
Retailer Share (hh) 3.83 52.88 2.64 40.43 2.29 27.60 2.76 21.98 1.81 10.32 4.46 24.38 3.86 24.02 0.43 2.33 2.63 16.62 65.47 
Retailer Attraction 0.22 0.38 2.39 3.65 0.40 0.51 4.24 3.97 2.19 1.50 1.02 0.79 -3.12 1.89 2.99 1.81 1.36 13.45 21.54 
Promotion 
parameters 
Feature 0.64 10.67 0.88 15.48 0.72 11.50 0.22 2.89 0.09 1.71 0.13 1.74 0.56 5.03 1.21 11.71 0.18 3.16 31.65 
Discount 0.12 1.50 -0.68 2.00 0.06 1.07 0.88 3.12 0.45 1.74 -0.08 0.44 -0.06 0.16 0.04 0.71 -0.70 3.13 1.15 
Model structure 
parameters 
Nesting par. (retailer)v -0.60 7.57 -0.42 10.12 -0.41 6.87 -0.85 9.02 -4.16 13.37 -2.33 10.94 -1.41 8.72 -0.53 5.82 -1.42 8.16 -25.64 
Panel B: Brand Focus 
 
Chips Coffee Beer 
Frozen  
Pizza 







β t β t β t β t β t β t β t β t β t Z-Value 
Controls 
State Dep. Retailer  3.81 17.24 0.20 3.05 0.71 17.72 2.02 21.60 0.71 9.97 0.93 12.70 1.06 16.21 -0.43 3.61 -0.08 0.79 27.99 
State Dep. Brand 3.49 37.96 0.28 4.15 0.81 16.43 1.33 22.72 0.30 4.37 1.42 18.45 2.26 36.64 0.60 6.90 1.21 10.84 53.84 
Assortment -0.02 1.32 0.08 4.12 0.19 6.68 0.00 0.18 0.20 2.46 0.15 3.18 0.08 2.86 0.07 1.25 0.63 6.80 10.62 
Price -2.32 9.52 -0.21 1.19 0.05 0.54 -0.90 3.82 -0.93 3.75 -1.01 3.51 -0.70 4.54 -0.39 7.23 0.33 4.86 -8.56 
Distance -0.11 3.65 -0.60 19.23 -0.82 26.31 -0.50 11.28 -0.67 13.80 -0.68 14.89 -0.47 11.98 -1.08 16.50 -0.66 13.05 -43.96 
Retailer Share (hh) 0.12 1.20 4.94 39.36 3.15 32.47 0.64 4.99 3.45 20.23 1.48 13.29 2.67 20.56 3.33 20.36 3.78 24.73 52.65 
Retailer Attraction 4.33 5.68 -1.59 1.81 0.92 1.60 2.62 2.19 0.54 0.43 0.61 0.61 3.82 4.09 1.63 1.18 1.14 1.03 18.12 
Promotion 
parameters 
Feature 1.07 11.48 0.57 5.64 1.44 20.62 0.67 7.62 1.34 10.79 1.23 9.34 1.14 10.61 1.34 15.10 1.42 10.08 35.14 
Discount 0.21 1.52 1.21 2.49 -0.01 0.06 0.90 2.27 -0.69 1.12 -0.64 1.46 1.94 5.87 0.01 0.13 0.89 3.15 5.64 
Model structure 
parameters 
Nesting par. (brand)v -0.63 7.81 -0.12 2.14 -0.10 2.86 -0.54 9.11 0.00 0.00 -0.41 5.90 -0.06 1.30 0.00 0.01 -0.93 3.82 -11.58 
Allocation par. -3.57 11.22 -2.46 9.17 -1.12 4.48 2.43 6.42 -0.69 1.31 -0.34 0.97 0.42 0.90 -0.89 1.81 -0.79 1.65 -8.47 
a: Overall significance based on meta-analytic test across coefficients. 
b: Nesting parameter is log-transformed for estimation purposes.  
c: Allocation parameter is estimated using a logit transformation: 𝜏1 =
exp (𝜌)
exp (1+𝜌)
, with 𝜌 reported.  
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Table 3.6: Overview of Decision Patternsa 
 
a: Table entries indicate average probability contribution of the decision structure and nesting parameter for both 
decision structures. 
*: significantly different from 1, based on a sign test on the simulated distribution of the nesting parameter, p<.05.  
  










Chips 51% 0.552* 49% 0.531* 
Coffee 59% 0.660* 41% 0.886* 
Beer 54% 0.661* 46% 0.905* 
Frozen Pizza 56% 0.427* 44% 0.581* 
Ketchup 30% 0.016* 70% 1.000 
Mayonnaise 47% 0.097* 53% 0.662* 
Muesli 33% 0.245* 67% 0.941 
Liquid Detergents 41% 0.590* 59% 1.001 
Kitchen Tissue 37% 0.241* 63% 0.395* 
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Table 3.7: Feature and Discount Effects by Category and Decision Structure: Promoted 
Alternativea 
 
Panel A: Feature Effect 
 Retailer Focusa Brand Focusa Totalb 
Chips .97** .67** 1.64 
Coffee 1.12** .24** 1.36 
Beer .75** 1.08** 1.83 
Frozen Pizza .27** 1.11** 1.39 
Ketchup .02* 1.9** 1.92 
Mayonnaise .2* 1.9** 2.1 
Muesli .14** 1.19** 1.33 
Liquid Detergents .91** 1** 1.91 
Kitchen Tissue .14** 1.0** 1.14 
a: Column entries give the change in probability contribution relative to the no-promotion setting, for each 
decision structure, in absolute terms (percentage points).  
b: Total probability change  
*: change significantly positive at p<.10; **: change significantly positive at p<.05 (based on the promotion 
instrument’s parameter estimate in Table 3.4).  
 
Panel B: Discount Effect 
 Retailer Focusa Brand Focusa Totalb 
Chips 0.08 0.04 0.12 
Coffee -0.22 0.2* -0.02 
Beer 0.02 0 0.02 
Frozen Pizza 0.5 0.4** 0.9 
Ketchup 0.25* -0.21 0.04 
Mayonnaise -0.04 -0.19 -0.23 
Muesli -0.02 0.57** 0.55 
Liquid Detergents 0.01 0 0.01 
Kitchen Tissue -0.16** 0.16** 0 
a: Column entries give the change in probability contribution relative to the no-promotion setting, for each 
decision structure, in absolute terms (percentage points).  
b: Total probability change, across the two decision structures  
*: change significantly positive at p<.10; **: change significantly positive at p<.05 (based on the promotion 
instrument’s parameter estimate in Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.8: Comparison of Net Manufacturer and Retailer Gains from Discount and Featurea 
 
Panel A: Feature Effect 





















/ (Focal Brand_Retailer 
Alternative) 
Chips .97 .77 .35 0.43 .67 .49 .49 0.00 
Coffee 1.12 .76 .83 -0.06 .24 .19 -.01 0.83 
Beer .75 .62 .2 0.56 1.08 .92 .82 0.09 
Frozen Pizza .27 .09 .03 0.22 1.11 .79 .92 -0.12 
Ketchup .02 -.09 -.19 5.00 1.9 1.54 1.79 -0.13 
Mayonnaise .2 .09 -.2 1.45 1.9 1.29 1.52 -0.12 
Muesli .14 .11 -.03 1.00 1.19 .97 .87 0.08 
Liquid Det. .91 .8 .57 0.25 1 .89 .64 0.25 
Kitchen Tissue .14 .11 -.03 1.00 1.0 .95 .77 0.18 
 
a: Entries give the absolute probability increase/decrease of national brand – traditional retailer alternatives for both the Retailer and Brand focus. (The 
calculations are done for each national brand – traditional retailer combination in the category, and then averaged). Within each decision structure/focus, the 
“Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative” indicates the (average) lift for the promoted brand-store combination, the “Focal Brand” column indicates the (average) net 
result for the promoting manufacturer (total for the brand across retailers) and the “Focal Retailer” column indicates the (average) net outcome for the promoting 
retailer (total category change within retailer). “(Focal Brand -Focal Retailer)/(Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative)” then represents the difference in share gain 
between the promoting manufacturer (column 2) and retailer (column 3), expressed as a fraction of the focal alternative’s promotion lift (column 1). For instance, 
the entry ‘.43” for chips in panel A, implies that on average, the manufacturer reaps higher net gains than the retailer (the  number is positive), and that the size of 
this net-gain difference is about 40% of the absolute lift for the promoted brand-store combination.  
106 
 
Panel B: Discount Effect 
 








(Focal Brand -Focal 
Retailer) 











/ (Focal Brand_Retailer 
Alternative) 
Chips 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 
Coffee -0.22 -0.17 -0.21 -0.18 0.2 0.19 0.17 0.10 
Beer 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.50 0 0 0 - 
Frozen Pizza 0.5 0.39 0.23 0.32 0.4 0.24 0.3 -0.15 
Ketchup 0.25 0.25 0.1 0.60 -0.21 -0.18 -0.17 0.05 
Mayonnaise -0.04 -0.03 0.02 1.25 -0.19 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 
Muesli -0.02 -0.04 -0.07 -1.50 0.57 0.47 0.43 0.07 
Liquid Det. 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0 0 0 - 
Kitchen 
Tissue 
-0.16 -0.16 -0.06 0.63 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.13 
 
a: Entries give the absolute probability increase/decrease of national brand – traditional retailer alternatives for both the Retailer and Brand focus. (The 
calculations are done for each national brand – traditional retailer combination in the category, and then averaged). Within each decision structure/focus, the 
“Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative” indicates the (average) lift for the promoted brand-store combination, the “Focal Brand” column indicates the (average) net 
result for the promoting manufacturer (total for the brand across retailers) and the “Focal Retailer” column indicates the (average) net outcome for the promoting 
retailer (total category change within retailer). “(Focal Brand -Focal Retailer)/(Focal Brand_Retailer Alternative)” then represents the difference in share gain 
between the promoting manufacturer (column 2) and retailer (column 3), expressed as a fraction of the focal alternative’s promotion lift (column 1). For instance, 
the entry ‘.38” for chips in panel A, implies that on average, the manufacturer reaps higher net gains than the retailer (the  number is positive), and that the size of 
this net-gain difference is about 38% of the absolute lift for the promoted brand-store combination.  
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Appendix 3.A: Estimation Results for Beer 
 Structure 1 Structure 2 
Variable Mean T value SD T value Mean T value SD T value 
State Dependence Retailer 1.63 33.63 -0.96 19.82 0.70 17.71 -0.15 4.73 
State Dependence Brand 1.46 17.55 0.24 6.74 0.81 16.43 0.76 19.28 
Assortment 0.00 0.16 -0.08 4.03 0.19 6.68 -0.09 3.90 
Price -0.07 1.40 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.54 0.28 4.17 
Distance -0.55 20.02 0.15 5.72 -0.82 26.31 -0.45 16.23 
Retailer share hh 2.28 27.60 -1.40 21.36 3.15 32.47 -0.85 15.83 
Retailer attraction 0.40 0.51 -1.78 2.11 0.92 1.60 1.06 1.64 
Feature 0.72 11.50 0.64 11.97 1.43 20.62 0.18 2.88 
Discount 0.06 1.07 0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.06 -0.79 6.33 
Brand constant: #1 -0.21 3.00 0.60 10.02 -1.46 6.28 3.22 19.59 
Brand constant: #2 -0.33 4.89 0.08 1.26 -0.60 4.15 2.08 25.10 
Brand constant: #3 -0.21 2.85 1.01 12.28 -0.11 0.89 0.58 7.46 
Brand constant: #4 -0.64 6.13 -1.12 12.06 -2.30 6.16 0.10 0.40 
Brand constant: #5 -1.06 5.74 0.74 5.39 -3.17 3.88 1.81 3.95 
Brand constant: #6 -1.94 6.32 -1.04 6.26 -2.01 6.99 -0.28 1.18 
Brand constant: #7 -0.84 7.77 -0.21 2.37 -3.52 6.36 2.18 8.39 
Brand constant: #8 -1.07 6.82 0.35 2.73 -1.65 6.42 1.73 13.02 
Brand constant: #9 -1.33 7.08 0.87 6.91 -4.56 4.66 -2.04 6.49 
Brand constant: #10 -1.04 5.79 -0.50 3.81 -0.11 0.80 -1.88 25.79 
Brand constant: #11 1.83 10.19 0.18 0.99 2.09 7.68 2.01 14.82 
Brand constant: #12 -1.94 2.56 -3.19 7.22 4.15 23.83 0.88 15.09 
Brand constant: #13 -0.65 1.51 -0.73 1.63 2.21 10.14 1.05 9.57 
Brand constant: #14 0.70 5.83 -0.85 5.89 1.25 6.24 -1.31 11.98 
Brand constant: #15 0.73 9.21 0.47 6.04 1.42 7.44 -2.70 20.20 
Brand constant: #16 -0.20 0.60 -0.58 1.98 1.71 12.13 0.05 0.38 
Brand constant: #17 1.05 11.29 -0.42 8.78 1.33 7.99 -0.18 1.21 
Brand constant: #18 0.82 9.90 -0.50 10.13 -1.19 1.54 -1.94 5.01 
Retailer constant: #1 0.33 2.72 0.84 8.10 0.07 0.52 -0.03 0.36 
Retailer constant: #2 0.66 6.01 -0.89 17.49 -0.60 4.45 -0.89 15.70 
Retailer constant: #3 -0.68 4.18 0.33 1.98 -0.17 1.22 1.44 19.99 
Retailer constant: #4 -0.14 0.99 -1.27 14.86 -0.49 3.08 -0.78 9.76 
Retailer constant: #5 0.26 2.19 -0.93 13.75 0.11 0.87 0.47 10.77 
Nesting Parameter -0.41 (t-value = 6.87) -0.10 (t-value = 2.86) 
Tau -1.12 (t-value = 4.48) 
* Estimation results for Beer category. First author can be contacted for estimation results of all other categories. 
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Appendix 3.B: The link between Decision Patterns and Shopper Characteristics 
To explore whether households with different decision structures can be profiled, we 
proceed as follows. In each category, we first obtain the posterior utility-function parameters for 
each household, as described in (Train 2009). Next, we use these parameters to calculate the 
portion of the households’ choice probabilities accounted for by the retailer-focused decision 
structure (i.e. the ratio of 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑟.𝑡|𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟  / 𝑃ℎ,𝑏𝑟.𝑡). Because this number may vary across purchase 
occasions within a household, we calculate the average as well as the standard deviation across 
choice alternatives and trips.  
In each category, we then run a weighted least squares regression, with the households’ 
average choice-probability portion in the retailer-focused decision structure as the dependent 
variable, the inverse of the households’ standard deviation (of the allocation parameter, τ) as 
weight, and a number of household-related drivers obtained from GfK’s panel-member survey as 
explanatory variables. Specifically, from the GfK survey, we retained a number of household 
characteristics potentially related to households’ brand or store focus. We then factor-analyzed 
these characteristics (retaining 8 factors with an eigenvalue higher than or close to one that were 
easy to interpret), and retained a representative (the highest-loading) characteristic for each 
factor. The latter characteristics were used as explanatory variables in the regression, to which 
we added the household’s category use rate as a separate driver – as shown in Table 3.A.1 
(Details on the measures can be obtained on request). The table also reports the regression 
coefficients for each category, next to a meta-analytic significance test across categories. 
Combined significance across categories is determined using a meta-analytic test of adding 
weighted Z’s (with weights equal to the sample size of the categories; Rosenthal 1991).  
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Table 3.A.1: Impact of Shopper Characteristics on Prevalence of Decision Structures 
 
Chips Coffee Beer 
Frozen  
Pizza 












Constant 0.85 0.00 1.19 0.00 2.03 0.00 -0.01 0.96 -0.53 0.01 0.55 0.00 -0.45 0.00 0.86 0.02 1.19 0.00   
Price consciousness 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.06 0.10 -0.20 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.00 + 0.14 
Household Size  -0.13 0.00 -0.02 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.01 0.11 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.31 - 0.00 
Brand commitment -0.03 0.42 -0.07 0.10 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.04 0.36 0.00 0.03 0.23 -0.03 0.15 -0.28 0.00 -0.07 0.10 - 0.00 
Loyalty Program Interest 0.16 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.45 0.11 0.00 0.35 0.00 -0.12 0.00 + 0.00 
Income 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.21 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.00 + 0.00 
Degree of Planning -0.44 0.00 0.09 0.05 -0.17 0.17 -0.08 0.07 0.35 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.79 0.09 0.05 - 0.05 
Store Flyer Readership 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.14 - 0.00 
Time Pressure 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.61 0.15 0.01 -0.33 0.00 -0.26 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.56 0.05 0.02 + 0.53 







Retailer Savings Weeks: The New Promotional Mantra? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
A recent and as of yet largely unstudied phenomenon in grocery retailing is the use of 
“Savings Weeks”, i.e. large scale promotional events in which supermarket chains advertise 
promotions across multiple categories simultaneously, under a common theme, and across 
several weeks. These promotional events shift the focus away from business-as-usual 
discounts on particular products; towards “unusual” savings opportunities on the entire 
shopping basket purchased at the retailer. Examples are Belgian retailer Delhaize’s “Crazy 
Prices Event”, Kroger’s “Cart Buster Savings Event” during which the American retailer 
claims to offer over $100 in savings on a set of products; or leading Dutch retailer Albert 
Heijn (a subsidiary of Ahold)’s “Hamsterweken”, which entice consumers to massively buy 
groceries in bulk and stock them up at home through a broad set of ‘buy-one-get-one-free’ 
offers, renewed each week, over consecutive weeks.  
Through such events, retailers hope to revive their customer base (i.e. attract extra 
visitors to the store), and increase current customers’ spending at the store (Garstenveld 
2015). Indeed, by advertising the promotions as store-wide deals and integrating them under 
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a common theme, the events may generate extra attention and signal unusual bargain-
opportunities, both to consumers who otherwise would or would not visit the store. Still, 
several caveats arise. For instance, the question remains whether newly attracted visitors will 
be retained in post-event weeks, when the retailer’s promotional activity returns to ‘business-
as-usual’. Or, the store-wide and uniformly-tagged promotions may direct more of the 
consumers’ basket towards (stocking up) promoted items, thereby dampening the amount 
spent - especially in weeks following the event. Hence, though anecdotal evidence suggests 
that traffic and basket-size increases do come about during the event period (e.g. Bijlsma 
2009; Garstenveld 2015), industry analysts express doubts about the net outcomes of these 
large-scale “Savings Week” events (Meijsen 2014; Rooijers 2014; van Der Werf 2013).  
A rigorous analysis of the countervailing forces is currently lacking, and this sets the 
stage for our current research. Specifically, we aim to address the following questions. First, 
how do large scale “Savings Week” events at grocery chains affect store traffic and spending 
during promotion weeks? Do they attract extra visitors to the store? Do they increase current 
customers’ spending at the store? And: to what extent do similar competitive events offset the 
impact of the retailer’s own initiatives? Second, what are the dynamics involved? Do the 
Savings Weeks, given their ‘recurrent’ and ‘recognizable’ character, lead to negative lead 
effects? Do they come along with post-event dips in store traffic and spending? To answer 
these questions, we study weekly store visit and spending of a panel of Dutch households, 
across the top seven grocery chains (of which four engage in Savings Weeks), during a three 
year period covering 25 Savings Week events (five types/themes, each with several 
occurrences).  
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of background literature, we 
start by describing the “Savings Week” events that are the focus of our study – outlining 
several of their defining characteristics. Next, we develop a framework for their anticipated 
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effects. We then present the models to test this framework, followed by the empirical 
estimates. We conclude with summary insights relevant to academics and retail managers.  
4.2. Regular versus “Savings Week” Promotion Events 
4.2.1. Background  
A large body of literature has studied the effect of sales promotions in the consumer 
packaged goods industry. The literature has mapped out consumer responses to specific 
(typically brand or SKU-level) promotions and discounts, which often pertain to the re-
allocation of purchases over time and location (e.g. Gauri et al. 2008) and looked at the 
implications for retailers and/or manufacturers (e.g. Srinivasan et al. 2004). In addition, the 
effect of different types of promotions has been studied, showcasing how consumers react to 
price discounts (Bijmolt et al. 2005), multi-buy (Foubert and Gijsbrechts 2010) and premium 
promotions (e.g. d’Astous and Jacob 2002). While the number of papers dealing with sales 
promotions is impressive, extant literature has predominantly focused on the effect of such 
promotions in isolation (see van Heerde and Neslin (2008), and Ailawadi et al. (2009) for an 
excellent discussion). Some studies have documented the impact of loyalty programs (van 
Heerde and Bijmolt 2005), which grant economic benefits and extra promotional discounts to 
current store customers (i.e. loyalty card holders), often linked to some ‘savings’ objective 
(accumulation of purchases at the store). Others have studied the effect of promotional 
calendars, i.e. sequence of promotional actions over time by a specific brand or retailer (e.g. 
Guyt and Gijsbrechts 2014; Mehta and Ma 2012; Silva-Risso et al. 1999; Tellis and Zufryden 
1995), or the effect of an increase in number of products on promotion (Volle 2001) on store 
patronage. Still, as of yet, the impact of large-scale promotional ‘events’, initiated by a 
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grocery retailer offering multiple discounts under a common ‘Savings Theme’, remains 
unstudied.26  
4.2.2. “Savings Week” Promotion Events: Defining Characteristics 
 “Savings Week” promotion events, as we study them here, differ from HiLo retailers’ 
regular promotional activities in content, communication, and timing.  
As for content, one distinguishing characteristic is that the promotions are presented 
to consumers under an overarching, unifying “Savings” theme, chosen by and specific to that 
retailer. Another common aspect of these events is that they promote store-wide savings, i.e. 
offer deals on a broad range of categories throughout the store. Finally, in many instances, 
even if the number of items on-deal within these promoted categories is not excessive, the 
deal-offers are unusually deep, and often quantity-based (e.g. buy-one-get-one-free).  
The communication of the promo events also differs from regular promotions. This 
theme is not just apparent in-store, but supported with increased out-of-store advertising 
(typically around the start of the campaign). The nation-wide advertising is catered to the 
specific theme of the Savings week and stresses the (storewide) savings that can be reaped for 
consumers. 
In terms of timing: even though the items promoted under the theme-heading may 
rotate on a weekly basis, Savings Week events within a given retailer typically extend over a 
longer period (about three weeks on average, compared to one week for business-as-usual 
store-flyer promotions). Also, they are recurring events, often once or twice a year, mostly 
around the same time each year.  
                                                 
26 Savings weeks share several characteristics with clearance sales. However, there are also important 
differences, as clearance sales are often aligned with seasonal and/or product cycles (i.e. pertain to products that 
are near-obsolete) and, hence, often occur simultaneously at all competitors. Also, the savings weeks that we 
study should be distinguished from promotions where retailers capitalize on the theme and media attention of 
large-scale exogenous/external events, such as the Olympics (Keller, Deleersnyder and Gedenk 2015). 
114 
 
Because of these characteristics, we expect the impact of such events on store visits 
and basket sizes to differ from the usual, day-to-day-business retailer promotions - as further 
developed below.  
4.3. Differential Impact of Savings Week Promotion Events 
The literature to date has extensively examined how retailers’ promotional activities 
(e.g. price cuts, displays and feature ads) for specific brands/SKUs in specific categories 
influence their store visits and sales, within and beyond the promotion period (see, e.g. 
Ailawadi et al. 2009 for an overview). By their very nature, we expect the effects of Savings 
Week promotion events on store traffic and spending to be more pronounced and potentially 
different from those of retailers’ ‘business-as-usual’ weekly promotional activity. Below, we 
explain why. 
4.3.1. Immediate Impact during Event Weeks  
Traffic. A first, and important, aspect of Savings Week events is that they create extra 
awareness. The launch of these promotional events is typically supported with increased 
retailer (TV and print) media advertising featuring the common savings theme of the retailer, 
which draws more attention than regular promotions, and informs a larger consumer base 
(who may not consult store flyers or come across the promotions in-store) about big potential 
savings at the retailer. This is important, because search cost strongly impedes promotional 
cross-shopping (Gauri et al. 2008), and regular promotions at the store are mostly 
communicated through store flyers for which readership remains limited (see, e.g., 
NOM/GFK 2014, reporting that only 18% of the population receives store flyers). Second, 
Savings Week promotions typically cover items across a wider range of categories, and signal 
the potential for larger savings on the entire basket than the non-Savings weeks. As such, 
they are more likely to circumvent threshold effects: they may attract consumers who 
otherwise would not consider the store, or for whom the offered advantage would not justify 
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the extra shopping effort (e.g. Baltas et al. 2010). While the literature so far pointed to rather 
weak direct store-switching effects for promotions (Srinivasan et al. 2004), we thus expect 
Savings Weeks to trigger more important changes in store patronage: a higher level of 
awareness, combined with larger and easier-to-spot potential savings triggering consumers to 
redirect their trips towards the promoting store.  
Spending. The impact of Savings Week events on visitors’ total store spending during 
promotional weeks is somewhat less equivocal. Of course, for new customers, any amount 
spent is an increase (even though new visitors may spend less at the store than regular 
customers, in which case the mean weekly basket size across all visitors may become 
smaller). For loyal consumers who already visit the store absent the event, weekly spending 
at the store may go up or down during Savings Weeks. On the one hand, the range of 
promoted items creates potential for savings across-the-board, and may stimulate (even 
current) customers to purchase categories at the store they regularly would have bought 
elsewhere (or not at all) and/or in future periods. Moreover, the fact that these promotions do 
not appear as separate stimuli, but carry a common theme, may create a “reminder” effect – 
reinforcing the impression that there are important savings to be reaped in (almost) all 
categories (Zhang and Breugelmans 2012), and the synergy that arises from increased usage 
of both mass media and in-store promotions may intensify this effect further (Naik et al. 
2005). In addition, consumers can be less incentivised to plan due to the slack generated by 
the larger savings, which may result in more impulse purchases (Bell et al. 2011; Stilley et al. 
2010). Finally, the unusual depth of the discount and/or use of quantity-based promotions 
during Savings Weeks may stimulate more stockpiling. For instance, similar to Kroger’s Cart 
Buster Savings Event, the tagline for one of these events at a leading Dutch retail chain was: 
116 
 
“Massive Discounts, Massive Stocking”27, encouraging consumers to stock up (or even 
hoard) on the products that were on offer. Based on the above, we expect to see an increase in 
the quantity (i.e. number of categories, and within a category, the number of units) bought. 
On the other hand, the vivid announcements or deep offers may produce more-than-
usual shifts from non-promoted (or: shallowly-promoted) towards lower-priced promoted 
items. This is facilitated by the uniform format of the promotions and presentation under a 
common and easy-to-process savings theme, which makes it easy for the consumer to spot 
and recognize the deals in-store. Especially coupled with an unusual discount depth, this may 
dampen current customers’ (increase in) monetary spending. If the increased quantity is 
offset by large reductions in the prices consumers pay due to large savings, total monetary 
spending during the Savings Weeks will decrease. Our empirical analysis will shed light on 
which of the two forces dominates.  
4.3.2. Dynamic Effects  
Traffic. Even if new customers are attracted to the store during the Savings Weeks, 
the question remains what will happen in pre- and post-event weeks. On the one hand, new 
customers may have ‘found their way to the store’ and, having become somewhat familiar 
with it (in the course of subsequent event-weeks), or realizing its attractive features in-store, 
may return even after the Savings Weeks are over (van Lin and Gijsbrechts 2014). On the 
other hand, consumers whose sole objective was to benefit from the temporary deep and 
easy-to-spot offers, are more likely to renege in the post-promotion period (see, e.g. Gedenk 
and Neslin 2000). Regular store visitors, from their part, may have a reduced visit propensity 
in the post-event week because of the built-up inventory.  
                                                 
27 Albert Heijn supported the “Hamsterweken” in television ads using the slogan: “Grootse korting, groots 
inslaan” – freely translated to: “Massive Discounts, Massive Stocking”, encouraging consumers to buy in bulk 
and stock up on the products that were on offer. A literal translation of Hamsterweken would be: Hamster 
Weeks, referring to the European Hamster that hoards food in storage chambers and hibernates during winter, 
during which it lives of the food it has hoarded. 
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Spending. The Savings Week advertisements typically inform consumers about the 
time frame in which they can benefit from the offers, and urge them to ‘benefit NOW’. 
Hence, consumers are more aware that the larger potential savings are limited to the duration 
of the promotional event and encouraged to engage in aggressive stockpiling behavior. 
Though higher inventories may stimulate consumption (Ailawadi et al. 2007; Ailawadi and 
Neslin 1998; van Maanen 2012), we expect consumers to be left with an unusually high 
inventory following the event weeks, which may produce deeper post-event dips in spending 
at the store.28 Moreover, because the promotional events are recurring, they may come with 
important lead effects (Neslin and van Heerde 2009). The Savings Week ads ‘educate’ 
consumers to capitalize on savings offered during event-weeks and, as consumer learn about 
the probable event timing, this may produce more pronounced anticipation effects (in the 
spirit of Sun 2005) and pre-event dips in store level spending. In contrast, promotional cycles 
for individual categories and brands during regular promotion weeks are less easy to detect 
and anticipate for consumers. 
How will these different forces net out? This is not clear a priori, and we leave it as an 
empirical issue. In the remainder of the paper, we empirically examine the impact of promo 
events on households’ shopping behavior, after which we will discuss the implications for 
retailers. In the next section, we present the household-level store visit and spending model.  
4.4. Methodology 
As indicated above, a Savings Week event has the potential to influence both the decision of 
a consumer to visit a retailer in a given week, and the basket size at that retailer in that week. 
Similar to Fox et al. (2004) and Zhang and Breugelmans (2012), we capture these two 
decisions through a model with two layers. In the first layer, a household (h) decides on 
                                                 
28 Although the set of promoted SKUs may rotate during these Saving Weeks, households may stock up on 
multiple categories and thereby still see a drop in total spending in the week following the event. However, the 
rotation of the set of SKUs may merely shift around expenses during the event weeks. 
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whether or not to visit a retailer (r) in a given week (w).29 The second layer models the 
household’s spending level (𝑦𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ), conditional on a visit to the retailer in that week (𝑣𝑟,𝑤
ℎ =
1). A household may visit multiple retailers: 𝑣𝑟,𝑤
ℎ  equals 1 for all retailers that the household 









To capture visit incidence, we introduce a latent variable 𝑣𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ∗which is modelled as: 
 𝑣𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ∗ = 𝛼𝑟
ℎ + 𝑥𝑟,𝑤
ℎ 𝜁ℎ + 𝑢𝑟,𝑤
ℎ  (4.2) 
where 𝛼𝑟
ℎ;  𝜁ℎ are the parameters, 𝑥𝑟,𝑤
ℎ  is a vector of household-, retailer- and/or week-
specific drivers of the utility of visiting the store (further specified below), and 𝑢𝑟𝑤
ℎ  is a 
random component assumed to follow an extreme value distribution. The probability for an 














where 𝜎𝑟 is a retailer-specific scale parameter. The decision to visit a specific retailer may be 
correlated with visit decisions for other retailers. To account for the interdependence of 
retailer patronage within a given week, we use a copula-based approach, as developed by 
Bhat and Sener (2009). This approach allows us to use a closed-form analytic expression for 
the joint probability of visiting a set of retailers in a given week. For notational purposes, we 
re-write equation 4.3 as follows: The joint probability of visiting a set of retailers in a given 
week for a household is then modelled as follows30: 
                                                 
29 Note that, like Zhang and Breugelmans 2012, we focus on consumers’ decision whether or not to visit a 
retailer in a given week, rather than on their retailer choice given a visit, because large scale events may well 
affect consumers’ trip organization and number of trips (e.g. they may start to spread their grocery purchases 
across their regular and the promoting store in a given week).  











































where dr indicates whether or not the retailer has been visited and subscript k denotes a 
competing retailer. The copula-based approach allows for correlations between pairs of 
observations, by allowing 𝜃𝑟𝑘 to take on unique values for each retailer (r,k) combination. 
We allow for three different levels of correlation, based on the format used by the 
supermarket (Hard Discounter - Hard Discounter, Hard Discounter – Traditional 
Supermarket, Traditional Supermarket – Traditional Supermarket). Furthermore, we allow for 
a different scale factor 𝜎𝑟, based on the format employed by the supermarket (HD or TS). If 
𝜃𝑞𝑘 takes on the value of 0, expression 4.4 collapses to a heteroskedastic logit. If 𝜃𝑞𝑘  equals 0 
and 𝜎𝑟= 1 for all retailers, expression 4.4 collapses to an ordinary logit for each retailer. 
Spending in the store, conditional upon a retailer visit by the household in the 
considered week (𝑦𝑟,𝑤
ℎ |𝑣𝑟,𝑤
ℎ = 1), is modelled as follows: 
 𝑦𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ∗ = 𝜄𝑟
ℎ + 𝑧𝑟𝑤
ℎ 𝛽ℎ + 𝜏 (log(𝑃𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ) +
(1 − 𝑃𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ) ∗ log (1 − 𝑃𝑟,𝑤
ℎ )
𝑃𝑟,𝑤
ℎ ) + 𝜀𝑟𝑤
ℎ  (4.5) 
where 𝜄𝑟
ℎ;  𝛽ℎare parameters to be estimated, 𝑧𝑟𝑤
ℎ  a vector of household-, retailer- and/or 
week-specific variables related to expenditures (specified in the next section), and 𝜀𝑟𝑤
ℎ  a 
random component, assumed to be normally distributed: 𝜀𝑟𝑤
ℎ ~𝑁(0,𝜔). Similar to 
Krishnamurthi and Raj (1988), we link the visit and spending equations, by using the 






ℎ )) correcting for the non-random occurrence of the store visits to ensure 
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unbiased parameter estimates.31 The Dubin and McFadden correction term is the analogue to 
the Inverse Mills Ratio in Heckman correction models for logit models. To accommodate 
unobserved household heterogeneity, all household-specific parameters follow a normal 
mixing distribution (the means and standard deviations of which will be assessed). Equations 
4.4 – 4.5 are estimated with simulated maximum likelihood, using 100 draws from the 
mixing distributions. 
4.5. Data and Operationalizations  
4.5.1. Data  
The model is calibrated on GfK panel data comprising household purchases for the period 
2009-2011. The dataset contains information on households’ purchase histories, as well as 
weekly information on price levels and promotional activities of all Dutch retailers. In this 
study, we consider household spending at the top 7 retailers in terms of market share. Table 
4.1 provides some descriptive statistics for the considered retailers - which, together, cover 
about 60% of the Dutch grocery market. We estimate the models using 312 households32 on 
94 weeks of data, ranging from the start of 2010 up to late 2011. On average, a household 
visits 1.20 retailers in a given week and spends 36.42 euro per visit. Comparison of the 
chains’ relative share in the entire market (panel) and for our estimation sample (subset of 
households) suggests that our data are quite representative.  
--- Insert Table 4.1 about here --- 
Table 4.1 further shows that Albert Heijn has by far the highest weekly visit rate (i.e. fraction 
of weeks with a chain visit, averaged across households), followed by Aldi, C1000 and Lidl. 
                                                 
31 The Dubin and McFadden term requires individual probabilities for each retailer-week combination. As 
equation 4 estimates the joint likelihood of visits to all retailers within a given week, we first ‘integrate out’ the 
likelihood per retailer. 
32 To keep estimation tractable, we start with a random sample of 500 households from the total set of panel 
members. We then retain only households that are part of the panel throughout the period 2009-2011 (our 
initialization plus estimation period), and who do most of their shopping at the included chains.  
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Weekly spending among store visitors is more comparable across chains, with somewhat 
higher levels for market leader Albert Heijn, and lower levels for the hard discounters.  
4.5.2. Promotion Events: Descriptive Statistics 
To identify the promotional weeks that qualify as “Savings Week events”, we 
combine several sources. We start from a data set containing descriptive information on the 
events. This data set contains the name of the event as communicated by the retailer in the 
media,33 as well as the event timing. Next, we couple these events with retailers’ actual 
promotional activity. Specifically, we use GfK scanner panel data to calculate, for each 
retailer-week, the total number of SKUs on offer under promotional conditions, and how this 
deviates from the regular number of SKUs on deal. We then retain events that carry an 
overarching theme, run at least twice during our 3-year data period (with a combined duration 
that exceeds 6 weeks), and have above-normal promotional activity (i.e. mean number of 
SKUs on promotion during event-weeks at least one standard deviation above the weekly 
average number of SKUs on promotion at that retailer).34 Next, we cross-verify this list of 
events by consulting industry experts. Out of the 6 identified events; five are classified 
correctly according to experts, while one is considered a ‘loyalty’ event and excluded from 
our list.35 All selected events occur at HiLo retailers, whereas EDLP retailers do not have any 
savings events. 
Table 4.2 contains descriptive information on the Savings Week promo events 
included in our study. On average, a promotional event lasts three weeks, with a maximum of 
4 weeks. As can be seen from Table 4.2, promotional events carry more SKUs on themed 
promotion compared to other weeks within the focal retailer (p < 0.01 for all events). 
--- Insert Table 4.2 about here --- 
                                                 
33 Examples of these names, Euroweeks and Hamsterweeks, indicating the goal and theme of these weeks. 
34 Promo events tend to run for multiple weeks on a row. Using a more stringent selection criteria (e.g. 2 
standard-deviations) would only leave one promo event. 




To assess whether and when these promo events are supported by extra retailer advertising, 
we regress the retailers’ weekly advertising spending levels (stacked for the 4 retailers 
involved in these events), against retailer-specific constants (reflecting the retailers’ ‘regular’ 
ad spending), as well as time-dummies related to (i) the week prior to the start of an event, 
(ii) the first event week and (iii) all event weeks. The results show that there is no significant 
lead-week advertising effect, but advertising is stepped up in the first week of the event (and 
then lowered during remaining event weeks). Hence, while there do not seem to be pre-
announcements for the Saving-Weeks, this points to increased advertising support that peaks 
in the starting week.  
4.5.3. Variables and Operationalization 
Our models incorporate several drivers of store visits and spending identified in the literature 
(see, e.g. Fox et al. 2004; van Heerde et al. 2008). Next to retailer constants, these include a 
household-specific retailer price index, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ , (calculated using the weighted average of 
category-level price indices at that retailer in a given week and the households propensity to 
purchase from these categories, see Table 4.3), in addition to the sum of the price indices for 
competing retailers, 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ , a household-specific retailer assortment variable 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  (reflecting the assortment available weighted by household-category importance), 
the (log of) advertising spending by the retailer 𝑎𝑑_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤, and the household’s log-
transformed distance to the nearest retailer outlet 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟
ℎ (which we calculate for each 
household and update quarterly to account for store openings and households that move). To 
account for seasonality, we include the weekly aggregate cross-store and cross-household 
visit and expenditure indices; 𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑤  and s𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑤 . Moreover, the visit-
incidence model includes a state-dependence variable 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝑟𝑤
ℎ  (indicating the 
number of weeks with a visit by a given household at the focal retailer in the previous four-
week period), and a retailer-share variable 𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ (measured as the share of household 
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visits to the focal retailer over the entire observation period, see Zhang and Breugelmans 
(2012) for a similar operationalization), which controls for multi-store shopping. Likewise, in 
the retailer spending equation, we include four lagged-spending variables 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−𝑥
ℎ , to capture carry-over / stockpiling effects, and the average weekly 
household expenditure at the retailer, 𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟
ℎ.  
--- Insert Table 4.3 about here --- 
Next to these controls, we include separate variables related to the Savings Week 
events. For each of the five events, we include a dummy variable 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 that equals one 
during event weeks at the retailer (and zero otherwise); and captures the immediate event-
effect on retailer visit incidence and spending. An event at a competing retailer can impact 
visit likelihood through 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤, which equals one if there is a competing event at any 
of the other retailers during the focal week. Note that, because the price and advertising 
variables discussed above also include price cuts and media spending during Savings Weeks, 
the event-dummy and competing-event coefficients capture the ‘extra’ impact of the Savings 
Week events, over and above their effect through store-wide price and advertising levels. To 
allow for a differential event-effect on retailer visit incidence and spending of more vs. less 
‘customary’ store shoppers, we include an interaction variable 𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 in both 
equations. A positive (negative) coefficient for this variable signifies that the event more 
(less) strongly increases visit incidence or spending among regular customers of the store.36  
--- Insert Table 4.4 and 4.5 about here --- 
As for the dynamics, we include a lead dummy 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤, capturing the 
anticipation effect in the week prior to the promotion event. Moreover, to accommodate that 
carry-over effects (i.e. the tendency to revisit the store, or the impact of previous on current 
                                                 
36 We note that even though households may be completely retailer loyal, they can still have an increase in visit 
propensity if they do not visit the retailer every week. 
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spending) may be different for shoppers intercepted during the event, we also include a 
variable 𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  in the visit-incidence equation that is activated only in the post-
event week (zero otherwise), and takes on the value of 1 for households that visited the 
retailer during the promotional event. Similarly, we add a variable 𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤
ℎ  in 
the expenditure equation that equals the total expenditure at the retailer during event weeks, 
in the post-event week; and zero in all other weeks. Because these variables operate over and 
above the ‘regular’ dynamic variables last_visitweeks and last_spending, they capture 
deviations from business-as-usual carry-over effects due to the Savings Week event. 
Correlation between the variables used in the store visit model can be found in Table 4.4, 
whereas Table 4.5 displays the correlation for the variables used in the spending mode. 
4.6. Estimation Results 
We first focus on the store visit equation, after which we will discuss the expenditure model.  
4.6.1. Store Visit Incidence 
Table 4.6 reports parameter estimates for the visit-incidence model. For simplicity of 
exposition, we discuss the estimated population means below (standard deviations of the 
mixing distributions are also reported in Table 4.6). The control-variable coefficients are 
significant, with the expected sign. Price and distance negatively affect the propensity to visit 
a store, while prices at competing retailers, assortment and ad spending exert a positive 
impact. The coefficient of retailer share is positive – pointing to ‘explained heterogeneity’– as 
is the last_visitweeks parameter – indicating that shoppers have a tendency to revisit a retailer 
they shopped at before. These results are in line with previous findings. The scale parameter 
for HDs is 1.14 (compared to a scale parameter for TDs fixed to 1). Whereas the correlation 
between the error terms of hard-discounters and traditional supermarkets is not significantly 
different from zero (suggesting that visiting a traditional chain in a certain week does not 
necessarily come at the expense of visiting a hard discounter), the error correlation for 
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traditional supermarkets is -.24, and between hard-discounters -0.04, illustrating that 
traditional supermarkets seem to be closer substitutes than hard-discounters. 
--- Insert Table 4.6 about here --- 
Turning to the Savings Week effects, we find positive and significant dummy 
coefficients for all five events. Not all events affect retailer patronage equally: compared to 
the other events, “Euroweken” and “Hamsterweken” lead to much larger increases in store 
visits during promotion weeks. Competing events do not systematically lower the likelihood 
to visit competitor stores, if anything, the model results indicate that consumers may increase 
the likelihood to visit competing retailers. Possibly because in Saving Weeks they are more 
included to visit multiple stores simultaneously. Albeit the magnitude of this effect is very 
small and not economically significant, it implies that the systematic negative correlation 
between retailers appears to be less in weeks with events. The negative parameter associated 
with the retailer share-event interaction indicates that Savings Week events draw 
disproportionately more from non-loyal households – suggesting that the events, indeed, may 
haul in new customers for the retailer. 
We find evidence that consumers postpone store visits in anticipation of the event: the 
lead effect is negative and significant. In addition, the coefficient of the lagged-event variable 
is negative, pointing to a negative effect of event weeks on regular revisit-tendency of 
households. Hence, we find both a pre- and post-promotion effect.  
--- Insert Table 4.7 about here --- 
4.6.2. Conditional Spending 
Table 4.7 contains parameter estimates for the expenditure model. The store-dummy 
coefficients represent the average expenditure across households for each store. The control-
variable coefficients indicate that households tend to spend more at their customary store 
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(positive and significant coefficients for the retailer share and average spending variables), 
and when the retailer is located further away – making big trips more worthwhile. Also, 
households that spent a lot at the store in previous weeks, also spend more in the current 
week, possibly as a result of habitual buying. Price is positively related to spending within a 
retailer, which, given that the dependent variable is expressed in monetary value (i.e. unit 
price multiplied by the number of units purchased), may simply point to inelastic demand. 
We find an own-price elasticity of 0.35, comparable to basket effects found in previous 
studies (van Heerde et al. 2008), which points to inelastic demand; increases in quantity being 
more than compensated by drops in unit price. A negative cross-price was found, that may be 
consistent with a temporary income or windfall effect (Chandon et al. 2000) that was also 
observed in previous studies (van Heerde et al. 2008), consumers’ lower expenses in one 
chain may lead them to spend more in another (visited) store. The advertising effect is 
positive, which may indicate that media spending attracts larger-basket shoppers, or directs 
their purchases towards higher-priced items. The size of the assortment does not significantly 
influence the amount spent at a retailer, once in store. Lastly, the coefficient of the correction 
factor is highly significant, underscoring the need to incorporate a selection-bias correction.  
Three out of the five Savings Week events have a positive effect on spending within 
the focal store (positive coefficients for the event-dummies in Table 4.7, only “Hollandse 
Prijsweken” and “Euroweken” have insignificant spending coefficients).37 Given that these 
events are often thought of as ‘big saving’ opportunities, it is not surprising that people buy 
larger quantities (by stocking up, and/or shifting purchases away from other stores) during 
these promotional events, and that this quantity increase more than compensates for the lower 
prices. Interestingly, unlike the effect on store visits, especially customary store shoppers 
spend more during the promotion event, as evidenced by the positive coefficient of the 
                                                 
37 During the “Hollandse Prijsweken” there were deals on fruit and vegetables, one of the factors that may 
explain a differential effect for this event, as baskets may have been smaller rather than larger.  
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retailer share-event interaction. An alternative explanation is that non-loyal customers buy the 
majority of their purchases from their regular store and only buy a subset of products on deal 
during the savings weeks. 
The impact of the competitor-event variable is negative, but small in comparison to all 
the other event effects (less than 3%). Moreover, in addition to the evidence found of 
consumers postponing their store visits, Table 4.7 points to a negative lead-effect on 
spending. So, although events are not advertised beforehand, their recurring nature may lead 
consumers to both visit and buy less at the store if they suspect an upcoming event. In 
contrast, we find evidence of increased spending in the week immediately following the 
event.  
4.7. Implications 
While the coefficients in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 shed light on the significance of different 
event-effects, they do not give a clear picture of the overall effect sizes, nor of the net 
implications of the (sometimes countervailing) dynamics. In this section, we therefore use 
some stylized simulations to provide such insights.  
4.7.1. Average Effects During Event Weeks 
First, to get a grip on the magnitude of the impact during event-weeks, we proceed as 
follows. For each household in the data set, we first determine its posterior parameters (based 
on the estimates in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, and using the approach described in Train 2009). We 
then calculate for each household, retailer and event-week; the average visit-propensity 
(weekly spending conditional on a visit) when the Savings Weeks event dummy for a specific 
event at the retailer is turned on and, for each Savings Weeks event; obtain the average store 
visits rates and spending across households and event-weeks. Next, we compare these figures 
to the households’ average observed baseline propensity to visit the retailer (baseline 
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spending at the retailer).38 Specifically, we calculate the percentage change in weekly visit 
propensity (conditional store spending) for each Savings Weeks event. Table 4.8 summarizes 
the results.  
--- Insert Table 4.8 about here --- 
The left-side column shows that Savings Weeks events lead to substantial and 
economically relevant increases in store visit propensity. On average, the fraction of 
households with a visit during event weeks goes up by 9.61%. At the same time, the effect 
varies strongly across events. Two events stand out, “Euroweken” and “Hollandse 
Prijsweken”: with 13.0% and 13.3% increases relative to the baseline visit propensity - these 
events appear very successful at drawing households to the retailer.39 Hamsterweken and 
Super Toeter weken have a slightly smaller draw, ranging from 8.6-9.8%, whereas I Love 
Gratis weken has the smallest lift in visits (3.4%). 
The right-side column reveals that, given that a store is visited, households spend 
substantially more during event weeks for four out of five events. The two most successful 
events at increasing spending (Hamsterweken and Super Toeter weken, with spending 
increases of 8.77% and 8.01% compared to the baseline, respectively) and “I Love Gratis 
Weeks” (1.53%) have a positive effect on spending, whereas Euroweken and Hollandse 
Prijsweken do not have any significant effect on consumer spending. An interesting 
observation is that Plus decided to stop “Hollandse Prijsweken” in 2012 (beyond the span of 
our data), corroborating our not-so- favorable findings for this event. 
While Table 4.8 gives an overall flavor of the magnitude of effects during event 
weeks, several refinements are in order. For one, the estimation results in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 
                                                 
38 We also used an alternative approach, in which we first compared the ratio of the retailer visit propensity with 
and without the event by household, and then averaged over households. This results in much higher averages 
(% increases), but mainly because the baseline visit propensity for some households is very low (leading to a 
very skewed distribution of the % increases across households, with a number of very large figures). 
39 Baseline average probability of visit are 0.24 and 0.07. 
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point to significant differences in reaction between more or less customary shoppers of the 
store. This is important, especially because retailers differ in the composition of their store 
clientele. Moreover, Tables 4.6-4.7 indicate that the event-effects extend beyond the Savings 
Weeks, with dynamics that deviate from those in business-as-usual settings. Below, we 
further explore these refinements. 
4.7.2. Shopper Loyalty Differences  
Table 4.9 indicates the effect of an ongoing event on store visit propensity and weekly 
spending, for (i) shoppers that do not belong to the store’s regular customer base (‘Non-
Customers’, with retailer visit share below 5%), (ii) regular shoppers but for whom the 
retailer is not the primary chain (‘Non-Primary Customers’, with visit share above 5% yet 
below 50%), and (iii) shoppers that allocate the majority of their visits to the store (‘Primary 
Customers’, with visit share 50% or higher). The table confirms that, during the event, these 
customer types get drawn to the store at a different rate. For instance, for the event 
‘Euroweken’ at retailer C1000, relative to the baseline, the average visit propensity increases 
by 37.3% for current ‘Non-customers’; compared to only 24.63 % for Non-Primary 
Customers, and only 6.89% for the store’s primary customers. In absolute terms, this 
retailer’s weekly visit propensity goes up by 5.2% for Non-Customers, compared to 5.5 and 
3.1% for Non-Primary and Primary Customers. Clearly, this propensity to haul in ‘new’ 
shoppers depends on the current composition of the store’s customer base (see also Table 
4.9): the fraction of households that are Non-Customers being much larger for Plus and Super 
de Boer (over 70%) compared to the leading retailers C1000 (about 60%) and especially 
Albert Heijn (35%). In all, this indicates that events do substantially enhance store-visit 
incidence, both for regular and non-regular customers. 
--- Insert Table 4.9 about here --- 
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The relative increase in spending, also, differs by customer type. Non-Customers and 
Non-Primary Customers exhibit stronger percentage increases in spending during event 
weeks. For instance, relative to the baseline, for ‘Hamsterweken at Albert Heijn average 
spending goes up by 13.76% for current ‘Non-customers’; compared to 11.79% for Non-
Primary Customers and 9.15% for the store’s primary customers. However, less regular store-
shoppers also tend to purchase a smaller basket. When it comes to absolute changes in 
spending, customary households still show a substantially larger change in spending during a 
promo event. To illustrate, for Hamsterweken, the absolute spending increase (in Euros) for 
Primary shoppers amounts to 4.3, compared to 4.0 for Non-Primary; and to 3.8 for Non-
customers of the store. This points to an interesting difference among the different shopper 
segments: the event especially increases visit propensity for less-regular store visitors, yet 
more strongly enhances absolute spending among more regular store shoppers.  
4.7.3. Dynamic Effects  
The question remains to what extent these extra sales (from more visits and higher 
spending) during the event period are offset by negative pre-event and post-event effects. To 
this end, we again compare the customer groups’ average visit propensity and spending in the 
baseline scenario (no event occurrence), to those in the week preceding and following the 
event, as predicted by the model (and using the households’ posterior parameters, starting 
from the estimates in Tables 4.6 and 4.7). Like before, for each of the two outcome variables, 
we calculate the indices relative to the baseline (from which the % changes can be obtained 
by subtracting 1 and multiplying by 100). Moreover, we multiply the visit propensity and 
spending indices to get an indicator for the total effect relative to the baseline. First, we do so 
by event, and for each type of week (pre-, during- and post-event). Next, we repeat this 
analysis per customer group (Non-Customers, Non-Primary Customers and Primary 
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Customers, based on their share of visits at the retailer – see also Table 4.9). Figure 4.1 
illustrates the outcomes for all five events.  
--- Insert Figure 4.1 about here --- 
Figure 4.1 shows that the negative lead effects (caused by a significant decrease in 
spending in the pre-event weeks, see Table 4.6) are small in size compared to the sales 
increase (from higher visit propensity and spending) during the event weeks. Moreover, 
though visits and spending become lower again following the event period, spending remains 
up to 3% higher than the baseline for Hamsterweken. For most other events, the spending in 
the post-event week is either lower, or hardly affected. Overall, this suggests that any post-
promotion dips due to stockpiling, are more than offset by the expenditures of newly-
attracted visitors and/or the spending increase among regular visitors during the event period.  
4.8. Discussion and Directions for Future Research 
4.8.1. Discussion 
In recent years, triggered by cut-throat competition from both traditional players and 
hard discounters, grocery retailers have begun to add new weaponry to their promotional 
toolkit: Savings Weeks events. These events differ from the retailers’ weekly ‘business-as-
usual’ promotions in several ways: typically, they last for several weeks, are organized 
around an overarching theme supported with retailer in-store and media advertising, 
emphasize savings opportunities (involving deep price cuts or quantity discounts) across the 
basket bought at the store, and recur on a somewhat regular basis. Through such events, and 
because of their different characteristics, retailers hope to broaden their store clientele, and 
increase spending by their current customers. This study analyses the impact of such events 
on both retailer visits and spending. 
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Unlike business-as-usual retailer promotions (for which previous research found no or 
only weak evidence that they lift the shopper base), we find that Savings Week events can 
substantially increase the fraction of shoppers drawn to the store, by up to 13% during event 
weeks. Moreover, in relative terms, this lift is even higher for households that rarely 
patronize the retailer absent the event – underscoring that Savings Week events can, indeed, 
expand the retailer’s customer base. Conversely, we find very little economical effect of 
similar events at a competing chain. As such, although we do not obtain clear evidence for 
direct store switching: consumers do adjust their store visit patterns (and not just reshuffling 
purchases among already visited stores) around event weeks.  
Moreover, for 3 out of 5 events, given that the store is visited, shoppers also spend 
substantially more (across events, up to 10% more for the average store shopper). Whereas 
non-customary shoppers exhibit a larger relative spending increase, the highest absolute 
spending lift is obtained among more regular store shoppers. So, in all, the retailer benefits 
from increased visits and spending during the weeks of the event.  
Because of their recurring nature, Savings Week events may trigger negative 
anticipation effects. We do find evidence that consumers postpone the chain visits in the 
week prior to the event, and somewhat lower their spending in anticipation of the event – 
although the latter effect is rather minor. Despite the fact that events entice consumers to buy 
in bulk at the retailer and ‘stock up’ at home; our results do not show post-event dips in 
spending at the chain, although visits are slightly lower. This may be because consumers 
increase their usage of the items they hold in store, and/or because they ‘load up’ at the 
expense of competing supermarkets. Based on these findings, it appears that, on the whole, 
gains in traffic and spending at the time of the event are not offset by pre- and post-event 
dips, and ultimately benefit the retailer. This counters the argument raised by some 
practitioners that Savings Week events fail to generate the hoped-for net increase in 
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customers and sales, although we do note that there are substantial differences in 
effectiveness between events. 
4.8.2. Directions for Future Research 
Despite this optimistic picture, several potential caveats remain. First, we find 
important differences between events. Some events are more successful than others, and not 
all events do well. Though we find positive implications for three out of five events, two 
events show a mixed pattern of effects: during these events, retailer visits increase but 
spending is hardly affected. Though, across events, the increases in visit propensity and 
spending induced by the event appear related to the retailers’ market share (higher-share 
retailers setting up more successful events), this does not explain the whole picture: one of 
the retailers has two different Savings Week events that differ highly in effectiveness. This 
leads to the question: what event-characteristics make certain Savings Weeks more effective 
than others? We leave this as an important question for future study.  
Second, while we looked at the weekly store visit and expenditure implications of 
promotional events, retailers may have additional motives to set up these events. For instance, 
they use them to improve the store’s price image (Meijsen 2014) and differentiate them from 
other stores. However, such effects may only materialize in a longer time frame than the one 
considered here. Similarly, retailers may profit in the long run by fostering loyalty among 
newly acquired customers and/or catering to their current clientele – issues that we leave for 
future study. 
 Third, our study pertains to only one country. Although similar promotion events exist 
in other countries (e.g. Kroger’s Cart Buster Savings Event), the effects need not be the same 
due differences in retailer landscape and familiarity with saving weeks. The use of these 
events is a relatively recent phenomenon, raising several questions about shoppers’ 
familiarity with the concepts and how this influences the impact of Savings Week events over 
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time. Recurring Savings Week events may become more popular (as consumers recognize the 
concept) or, alternatively, less popular (as the surprise element disappears, and wear-out sets 
in). Also, lead effects may become more pronounced as consumers learn about the timing of 
the events. Our study provides several insights for retailers in countries where these 
promotional events are not yet a popular tool, but a more reliable assessment of the dynamic 
effects calls for a longer history of observations, and we leave it as a topic for future analysis. 
Similarly, some promotion events observed in practice bear similarity to our “Savings 
weeks”, but differ in the type of product they apply to, and/or in the duration of the event. 
Examples can be found at French retailer Carrefour, which holds a “Crazy Month of 
Perishables”, or in the apparel industry (e.g. “Crazy days” at Inno, a Belgian department 
store, or “Three crazy days” at Bijenkorf, a leading Dutch warehouse). Though we expect our 
findings to largely pertain to such events as well, a more formal analysis would be useful. 
Fourth, while we expect Savings Week events to disproportionately draw non-
customary households to the retailer - tempted by the potential savings they can obtain on a 
subset of their products - these consumers may merely visit the store for this select subset of 
products that is on promotion, which raises concerns about profitability of these newly 
acquired consumers. A similar question arises concerning the subsidization of customary 
consumers; even if the event increases their propensity to visit and/or spending, it remains to 
be seen what part of their basket consists of products that are on promotion, and how this will 
affect the retailer’s bottom line. Further data exploration shows that, indeed, Savings Week 
events do inspire consumers to buy a larger-than-usual portion of the basket under 
promotional conditions (28.6% versus 15.8% in regular weeks), indicating that the extra sales 
are in large part driven by discounted items. This is especially true for non-customary store 
shoppers. Given that event-related discounts are often unusually deep, and often include 
selling prices below cost (Bijlsma 2009), the impact on the retailer’s bottom line deserves 
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more attention. For lack of data on pass-through and margins, we have to leave such profit 
analysis as a topic for future study.  
Lastly, though our focus was on shopper reactions to given promotion events (which 
we treated as exogenous), there are interesting issues on the supply side. For one, more 
(frequent) Savings Week actions by one retailer may also trigger competitive events, and the 
question is: does this simply deepen the promotion trap? The answer is not clear-cut. Some 
retailers, with deeper pockets and more extensive communication, may benefit more, and use 
these events to weaken their competitors. As longer data periods, including more events, 





















Albert Heijn Hi-Lo 34.3 0.333 0.39 43.07 
C1000 Hi-Lo 17.5 0.183 0.25 38.67 
Aldi Hard Discounter 13.6 0.142 0.20 27.36 
Lidl Hard Discounter 11.3 0.104 0.20 26.30 
Jumbo EDLP 9.9 0.087 0.13 42.04 
Plus Hi-Lo 7.4 0.093 0.07 31.22 
SdB Hi-Lo 6.0 0.058 0.06 33.54 
a Fraction of weeks with a household visit, averaged across households 
b Weekly mean spending per household, conditional on store visit. Expressed in Euros and averaged across 
households 
 











C1000 Euroweken 2.57 18 7 1168 (526) 
AH Hamsterweken 3.17 19 6 1543 (653) 
Plus Hollandse Prijsweken 3.00 12 4 652 (335) 
C1000 I Love Gratis weken 3.00 6 2 1203 (526) 
SdB Super Toeter Weken 3.33 20 6 695 (337) 




Table 4.3: Variable Description 








dummy_retailerr Dummy equal to 1 for retailer r   
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
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Sum of weighted price indexes (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤




















Weekly media advertising expenditures for a retailer (in 




Distance in km between household address and the 
nearest outlet of the retailer (updated quarterly), log 
transformed 
  
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑤  Aggregate visit index across households   
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑤  Aggregate spending index across households   
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝑟𝑤
ℎ  
Number of weeks with a visit by a household h, at chain 




Share of household h’s visits to retailer r over the entire 





Spending by household h at retailer r, lagged x periods; 




Average weekly expenditure (in Euros) of household h 













event #1rw Dummy equal to 1 during “Euroweken” at C1000   
event #2rw Dummy equal to 1 during “Hamsterweken” at AH   
event #3rw 




Dummy equal to 1 during “I Love Gratis Weken” at 
C1000 
  
event #5rw Dummy equal to 1 during “Super Toeter Weken” at SdB   
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 
Dummy equal to 1 if there is an event at any of the 





Interaction between household retailer share and 
occurrence of an event at r in week w 
  
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 Lead dummy indicating an event in the following week   
𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  
Dummy activated only in the post-event week (0 
otherwise), and equal to 1 only if household h visited r 




Equal to, in the post-event week, the maximum weekly 
expenditure of household h at r during the preceding 





Table 4.4: Correlation Table Visit Equation Variablesa 













































































































































event #1rw (Euroweken)                 
event #2rw (Hamsterweken) -.015**                
event #3rw (Hollandse Prijsweken) -.015** -.019**               
event #4rw (I Love Gratis weken -.007** -.009** -.009**              
event #5rw (Super Toeter weken) -.016** -.020** -.019** -.009**             
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.010** .115** .077** .003 .054**            
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  .083** .241** -.031** .050** -.065** .698**           
𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.009** -.012** -.012** -.006* -.013** .058** .090**          
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ .026** .104** -.053** .016** -.039** .063** .260** .097**         
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.017** -.022** -.021** -.010** -.022** .080** .070** -.014** .013**        
𝑎𝑑_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤 .036
** .043** .021** .017** -.005* .001 .033** .029** .059** .038**       
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟
ℎ -.018** -.093** .039** -.013** .066** .058** -.158** -.069** -.421** .000 -.089**      
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -.067
** -.087** -.084** -.041** -.088** -.072** -.073** .009** -.013** -.055** .035** .004     
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑤  .040
** .021** -.010** -.003 -.028** .005* .001 .017** .000 .026** .319** .009** .041**    
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 .241
** .517** .054** .147** .106** .077** .155** -.012** .271** -.022** .035** -.127** -.086** .016**   
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝑟𝑤
ℎ  .024** .080** -.046** .012** -.051** .051** .223** .138** .665** .006* .054** -.420** -.007** .012** .169**  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  .003 -.036** -.022** .000 -.017** .280** -.022** -.006** -.019** -.023** .014** -.033** .025** .010** -.013** .052** 
a: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
139 
 


































































































































































































event #1rw (Euroweken)                     
event #2rw (Hamsterweken) -.030
**                    
event #3rw (Hollandse Prijsweken) -.012
* -.019**                   
event #4rw (I Love Gratis weken -.011
* -.017** -.007                  
event #5rw (Super Toeter weken) -.012
* -.019** -.008 -.007                 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.009 .164** .044** .007 .033**                
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  .055** .253** -.047** .031** -.056** .847**               
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ -.003 .063** -.040** .011* -.009 .204** .304**              
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.022** -.034** -.014** -.012* -.014** .080** .094** .033**             
𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟
ℎ .014** -.011* -.006 .014** .000 .087** .049** .015** .009            
𝑎𝑑_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤 .037
** .048** .002 .012* -.021** .047** .102** .048** .035** -.025**           
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟
ℎ .007 -.060
** -.018** -.007 .010 -.168** -.217** -.283** -.022** .009 -.034**          
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−1
ℎ  -.012
* .042** -.027** -.001 -.003 .189** .217** .381** .004 .366** .004 -.102**         
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−2 -.018
** .025** -.026** -.006 -.016** .176** .206** .379** .000 .367** -.015** -.092** .581**        
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−3
ℎ  -.016
** .002 -.025** -.011* -.015** .177** .203** .375** .001 .368** -.018** -.094** .577** .577**       
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−4
ℎ  -.014
** .013* -.024** -.005 -.022** .173** .204** .380** -.004 .366** -.007 -.091** .572** .581** .576**      
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -.084
** -.131** -.054** -.048** -.054** -.079** -.102** -.033** -.047** -.002 .007 .030** -.019** -.016** -.007 -.018**     
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑤  -.042
** .059** -.041** -.038** .059** .000 -.012* .002 -.042** .000 .062** .005 .177** .170** .157** .128** -.047**    
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 .335
** .651** .142** .215** .204** .125** .183** .204** -.039** .017** .044** -.092** .085** .066** .049** .058** -.151** .023**   
𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -.015** -.024** -.010 -.009 -.010 .082** .089** .077** -.018** .053** .028** -.031** .115** .125** .134** .051** .040** .041** -.028**  
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  .026** -.068** -.023** .012* -.006 .155** -.112** -.106** -.021** .132** .001 .109** -.004 -.003 -.002 -.006 .036** .003 -.037** -.016** 
a: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05  
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dummy_C1000 0.109* 0.150* 
dummy_Albert Heijn -0.194* 0.982* 
dummy_Plus -0.495* 1.095* 
dummy_Aldi 0.327* 1.250* 
dummy_Jumbo 0.207* 1.543* 
dummy_Lidl 0.473* 1.032* 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -0.521* 0.150* 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  0.667* 0.091* 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  7.485* 0.115* 
𝑎𝑑_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤 0.056* 0.011* 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟
ℎ -0.745* 0.397* 
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑤  0.525* 0.186* 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠𝑟𝑤
ℎ  0.535* 0.179* 
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟












event #1rw (Euroweken) 0.620* 0.017* 
event #2rw (Hamsterweken) 0.616* 0.044* 
event #3rw (Hollandse Prijsweken) 0.397* 0.213* 
event #4rw (I Love Gratis weken 0.326* 0.040* 
event #5rw (Super Toeter weken) 0.356* 0.176* 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 0.004* 0.004* 
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -0.701* 0.210* 
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -0.145* 0.074* 
𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑟𝑤












constant -7.836* 0.933* 
















a: * = p< 0.05 
b: log-transformed parameter was estimated 




) − 1 
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dummy_C1000 0.640* -0.581* 
dummy_Albert Heijn 0.819* 1.016* 
dummy_Plus 0.184* 0.337* 
dummy_Aldi 0.676* 0.992* 
dummy_Jumbo 1.036* -0.219* 
dummy_Lidl 0.630* 0.392* 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  0.995* 0.119* 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -0.161* 0.035* 
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑟𝑤
ℎ  -1.425 1.214* 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟
ℎ 0.112* 0.334* 
𝑎𝑑_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤 0.005* 0.001* 
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑤  3.910* 1.426* 
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ 2.708* 0.634* 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−1
ℎ  0.084* 0.100* 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−2 0.093* 0.062* 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−3
ℎ  0.093* 0.016* 
𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟,𝑤−4
ℎ  0.038* 0.072* 
𝑎𝑣𝑔_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟












event #1rw (Euroweken) -0.014 0.124* 
event #2rw (Hamsterweken) 0.384* 0.068* 
event #3rw (Hollandse Prijsweken) -0.021 0.166* 
event #4rw (I Love Gratis weken 0.063* -0.097* 
event #5rw (Super Toeter weken) 0.306* 0.395* 
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -0.013* 0.044* 
𝑟𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑟
ℎ ∗ 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 0.080* 0.005 
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑤 -0.107* 0.072* 
𝑙𝑎𝑔_𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑟𝑤
ℎ  0.002* 0.020* 
correction_factor 0.481* 0.112* 
 constant -1.379* -0.222* 
sigmab 2.242* 
a Dependent variable is scaled to allow for stability during estimation (DV=DV/10). *: p<0.05 





Table 4.8: % Increase in Store Visit and Spending by Eventa 
 Store Visits Spending 
event #1 (Euroweken) 13.00 -0.67 
event #2 (Hamsterweken) 8.67 8.77 
event #3 (Hollandse Prijsweken) 13.29 -1.23 
event #4 (I Love Gratis weken 3.36 1.53 
event #5 (Super Toeter weken) 9.76 8.01 
a The percentage increase within the focal retailer is obtained by calculating, for each household (using posterior 
estimates), the counterfactual probability or spending (using augmented data in which we simulate the promo 
event taking place), averaging across households, dividing by the average baseline probability or spending 







Table 4.9: Impact of Events by Household Typea 
Retailer Event 
Non-customers (<=5%) Non-Primary Customers Primary Customers (>=50%) 
% of  
households 




% of  
households 
% increase  
visit probability 
% increase  
spending 
% of  
households 
% increase  
visit probability 
% increase  
spending 
C1000 Euroweken 59.7 37.31 -0.61 27.2 24.63 -0.02 12.4 6.89 0.76 




78.5 31.75 -1.89 14.4 18.80 -0.89 7.1 1.37 0.31 
C1000 
I Love Gratis 
Weken 





72.8 29.83 11.87 21.1 16.76 10.04 5.4 -1.36 7.73 
a Calculations were done in a similar fashion as discussed below Table 4.7. For each customer type, the % change in visit probability and spending was calculated for .1 grid 
values of retailer share, and then averaged across households grouped in that customer-type. 
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Figure 4.1: Dynamic Effects of “Saving Weeks” 
Panel A: Euroweken (C1000)a 
    
 
Panel B: Hamsterweken (AH)a 
    
 














































































Panel C: Hollandse Prijsweken (Plus)a 
    
 
Panel D: I Love Gratis Weken (C1000)a 
    














































































Panel E: Super Toeter Weken (Super De Boer)a 
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